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MISCONCEPTIONS IN RATIONAL NUMBERS, PROBABILITY, ALGEBRA, AND 
GEOMETRY 
 
Christopher R. Rakes 
March 25, 2010 
Abstract 
In this study, the author examined the relationship of probability misconceptions 
to algebra, geometry, and rational number misconceptions and investigated the potential 
of probability instruction as an intervention to address misconceptions in all 4 content 
areas. Through a review of literature, 5 fundamental concepts were identified that, if 
misunderstood, create persistent difficulties across content areas: rational number 
meaning, additive/multiplicative structures, absolute/relative comparison, variable 
meaning, and spatial reasoning misconceptions. Probability instruction naturally provides 
concrete, authentic experiences that engage students with abstract mathematical concepts, 
establish relationships between mathematical topics, and connect inter-related problem 
solving strategies. The intervention consisted of five probability lessons about counting 
principles, randomness, independent and dependent event probability, and probability 
distributions. The unit lasted approximately two weeks. 
This study used mixed methodology to analyze data from a randomly assigned 
sample of students from an untreated control group design with a switching replication. 
Document analysis was used to examine patterns in student responses to items on the 
mathematics knowledge test. Multiple imputation was used to account for missing data. 
vii 
Structural equation modeling was used to examine the causal structure of content area 
misconceptions. Item response theory was used to compute item difficulty, item 
discrimination, and item guessing coefficients. Generalized hierarchical linear modeling 
was used to explore the impact of item, student, and classroom characteristics on 
incorrect responses due to misconceptions. 
These analyses resulted in 7 key findings. (1) Content area is not the most 
effective way to classify mathematics misconceptions; instead, five underlying 
misconceptions affect all four content areas. (2) Mathematics misconception errors often 
appear as procedural errors. (3) A classroom environment that fosters enjoyment of 
mathematics and value of mathematics are associated with reduced misconception errors. 
(4) Higher mathematics self confidence and motivation to learn mathematics is associated 
with reduced misconception errors. (5) Probability misconceptions do not have a causal 
effect on rational numbers, algebra, or geometry misconceptions. (6) Rational number 
misconceptions do not have a causal effect on probability, algebra, or geometry 
misconceptions. (7) Probability instruction may not affect misconceptions directly, but it 
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Purpose Statement and Research Questions 
Probability patterns often run counter to human intuition (Engel, 1970). As a 
result, students tend to develop misconceptions about those patterns and the mathematical 
concepts related to them. Some of these misconceptions fundamentally shape student 
understanding of mathematical patterns beyond probability (e.g., rational numbers, 
variables, linearity). Several researchers have proposed that probability instruction may 
hold the key to reducing these common misconceptions because of the abundance of 
concrete applications found within probability (e.g., Agnoli, 1987; Agnoli & Krantz, 
1989; Bar-Hillel & Falk, 1982; Falk, 1992; Falk & Lann, 2008; Freudenthal, 1970, 1973, 
1983; Shaughnessy, 1992; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Watson & Shaughnessy, 
2004). Clarifying and implementing instructional tasks that are built upon the 
foundational nature of probability to address critical mathematical concepts in core 
mathematics topics offers a radical shift in how we view probability and mathematics 
instruction. Such a shift may create a bridge between abstract concepts and concrete 
applications (Freudenthal, 1983; Stone et al., 2008). The purpose of this study was to 
investigate the role of probability instruction as an intervention for critical 
misconceptions common to rational numbers, probability, algebra, and geometry by 
examining four research questions through a mixed methodology design: 
2 
 
1) Do probability misconceptions have a causal influence on algebra, geometry, 
and rational number misconceptions? 
2) Does probability instruction reduce critical misconceptions in probability, 
rational numbers, algebra, or geometry? 
3) Do student attitudes toward mathematics influence the emergence of errors 
due to misconceptions on mathematical tasks? 
4) Does student metacognition influence the emergence of errors due to 
misconceptions on mathematical tasks? 
Qualitative analysis of student responses formed the initial foundation for this 
study, through the analysis of error responses in order to differentiate between errors due 
to misunderstandings of mathematical concepts versus faulty reasoning processes. The 
results from this analysis were then used to code responses as indicative of 
misconceptions to use in the quantitative analyses. 
Structural equation modeling was used to examine the causal relationship among 
content area misconceptions (i.e., Research Question 1). Hierarchical generalized linear 
modeling was used to examine the efficacy of probability instruction as an intervention 
for reducing misconceptions in rational numbers, algebra, geometry, and probability (i.e., 
Research Question 2). It was also used to analyze the impact of contextual factors on the 
emergence of errors due to misconceptions (i.e., Research Questions 3 and 4). 
Background 
Students enter high school at a time when their physical and cognitive 
development is at a transition point, and mathematics produces particularly strong 
feelings for many of these students. Students often bring preconceived notions about 
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what it means to learn mathematics: They often have a low sense of efficacy, a great deal 
of anxiety, and a deep sense that much of what they learn in mathematics is irrelevant to 
their lives (Schumacker, Young, & Bembry, 1995). By contrast, evidence suggests that a 
strong command of mathematics in high school influences college success and the 
accessibility of many rewarding and lucrative career opportunities (National Sciences 
Foundation, Mathematical Sciences Education Board, 1995). Mathematics teachers in 
command of the nature of learning and teaching mathematics are uniquely situated to 
support student development (Schumacker, Young, & Bembry, 1995).  
Unfortunately, evidence suggests that mathematics teaching practices have 
changed little to meet the needs of students in the last three decades (Hiebert, 2003). 
Consider the following description of traditional teaching practice: 
First, answers were given for the previous day’s assignment. A 
brief explanation, sometimes none at all, was given of the new material, 
and problems were assigned for the next day. The remainder of the class 
was devoted to students working independently on the homework while 
the teacher moved about the room answering questions. The most 
noticeable thing about math classes was the repetition of this routine 
(Welch, 1978, p. 6). 
The most striking feature of this description is its familiarity with current 
mathematics classrooms. Compare Welch’s (1978) description with that of a more recent 
mathematics classroom: 
The typical eighth-grade mathematics lesson in the U. S. is 
organized around two phases: an acquisition phase and an application 
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phase. In the acquisition phase, the teacher demonstrates or leads a 
discussion on how to solve a sample problem. The aim is to clarify the 
steps in the procedure so that students will be able to execute the same 
procedure on their own. In the application phase, students practice using 
the procedure by solving problems similar to the sample problem (Stigler 
& Hiebert, 1997, p. 18). 
These two descriptions were echoed yet again by Manoucheri and Goodman 
(2001). Insufficient support (Tankersley, Landrum, & Cook, 2004) and minimal 
opportunities for professional development (Hiebert, 2003) may explain much of the 
inability of teachers to change their instructional practice: “Unless such opportunities are 
provided, teachers are asked to do the impossible – teach in new ways without having had 
a chance to learn them” (Hiebert, 2003, p. 18). One new way to teach that has 
demonstrated efficacy for helping students learn mathematics concepts is through 
exploratory problem solving (e.g., Mathews, 1997; Wilkins, 1993). Probability concepts 
inherently offer multiple opportunities for students to problem solve and explore 
conceptual relationships in an authentic setting (Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993). Yet the 
potential of probability to meet student needs has not been realized as a result of at least 
two issues. First, both the intended curriculum (i.e., curriculum standards) and the 
enacted curriculum (i.e., what is actually taught) downplay the importance of probability 
relative to algebra and geometry (Mitchell, 1990; Shaughnessy, 2006; Smith, 2003). 
Second, teachers are less comfortable with probability due to their own lack of training 
and experience (Jendraszek, 2008; Shaughnessy, 1992; Swenson, 1998). 
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Significance of the Study 
The present study responds to multiple calls for increased research about student 
understanding of probability concepts (e.g., Shaughnessy, 1992, 2003, 2006; 
Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Sierpinska & Kilpatrick, 1998) and about mathematical 
misconceptions related to probabilistic thinking (e.g., Van Dooren, De Bock, Depaepe, 
Janssens, & Verschaffel, 2003) The results of this study may have direct implications for 
how educators view mathematical instruction. 
Hypotheses 
Error Responses due to Misconceptions 
The mathematics knowledge instrument used in this study (Appendix M), 
composed of 17 released items from the National Education Assessment Program 
(NAEP), consisted of questions measuring algebra, geometry, rational number, and 
probability content. I hypothesized the types of misconceptions that might influence item 
responses and which distracters might indicate those misconceptions (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Misconception Hypotheses for each NAEP Item 
Item Correct Response Underlying Misconception Hypothesis 
Associated 
Responses 
1 A Absolute & Relative Comparison C, E 
2 A Meaning of Rational Numbers: Confusion of Part-Part vs. Part-Whole  B, C, D, E 
3 B Rational Number Meaning A 
4 A Spatial Reasoning – Interpreting arrow vs. Region C,D 
5 D Rational Number Meaning A, B, C 
6 A Additive vs. Multiplicative Structure D, E 
7 E Additive vs. Multiplicative Structure A, B, C, D 
8 D Reversal Error – Meaning of Variables B 
9 A Spatial Reasoning: Student may choose “yes” because figure has 4 sides. B 
10 B Spatial Reasoning: Meaning of Area – Counting Sides instead of regions. D 
11 E Meaning of Variable – Unit Confusion, Partial Conversions A 
12 C Additive vs. Multiplicative Structure/Coefficient Reversal D 
13 B Rational Number Meaning D, E 
14 A Confusion of Absolute & Relative Comparison B 
15 B Rational Number Meaning: Part-Part vs. Part-Whole D 
16 B Meaning of Variable A 




Qualitative analysis of student explanations for each response was used to test these 
hypotheses and adjust the coding of misconception responses accordingly. 
Probability Instruction as the Intervention 
I conjectured that probability instruction may reduce misconceptions in rational 
numbers, algebra, and geometry. This hypothesis was tested using hierarchical 
generalized linear modeling. 
Structure of Mathematical Misconceptions 
Studies have indicated that rational number misconceptions and/or probability 
instruction hold a primary, predictive position relative to algebra and geometry 
misconceptions (e.g., Fuson et al., 2005; Kilpatrick et al., 2001; Lamon, 2007; Moss, 
2005). A synthesis of that research, however, did not suggest which supersedes the other, 
nor did it demonstrate conclusively that either rational number or probability 
misconceptions are causal predictors of algebra and geometry misconceptions. Because 
probability content is inundated with rational number concepts, isolating their 
misconceptions is problematic without special attention to explanations of reasoning that 
accompany incorrect responses. Probability concepts have an advantage over rational 
number concepts: They naturally include concrete investigations (e.g., rolling a die, 
flipping a coin, examining lottery outcomes, random walks) that may help students 
construct meaning for abstract mathematical ideas (e.g., randomness, variation, counting 
principles). Based on these connections, I hypothesized that probability misconceptions 
act as a gatekeeper for addressing misconceptions in the other three content areas. To test 































































Figure 1A models a relationship among content area misconceptions in which 
rational number misconceptions hold a primary position while probability 
misconceptions act as a filter on algebra and geometry misconceptions. Figure 1B 
reverses the relationship between rational number and probability misconceptions from 
Figure 1A. Figure 1C models rational number and probability misconceptions as co-
varying while simultaneously exerting a causal influence on the development of algebra 
and geometry misconceptions. Figure 1D models the possibility that rational number 
misconceptions impact algebra, geometry, and probability misconceptions causally. 
Figure 1E reverses the role of probability and rational numbers in Figure 1D. Figure 1F 
models a non-causal relationship among all four content area misconceptions. I 
conjectured that Figure 1B or 1E would be the best fitting model. 
Assumptions 
Educational research is founded on beliefs about the best ways to help students 
learn to their fullest potential. In fact, approaches to teaching and learning cannot be 
separated from the underlying philosophical assumptions (Stein, Connell, & Gardner, 
2008). These assumptions directly and indirectly influence the quality of learning that can 
take place. The three major categories of philosophical assumptions addressed in this 
study are epistemology, axiology, and ontology as described by Creswell, (2005) and 
Patton (2002). 
Epistemology 
Epistemology describes relationships between teachers and students, teachers and 
content, or students and content. Traditional views of these relationships in mathematics 
education consider the teacher to be an authoritative conveyer of knowledge while the 
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students are blank slates to be filled. With very little personal interaction, traditional 
mathematics teaching follows a rote pattern of providing answers to homework; a brief, if 
any, explanation of new materials; and then students work on the assignment quietly at 
their desks while the teacher roams the room to answer questions (Fey, 1979), harkening 
back to the philosophies of Locke (Adamson, 1922) and Rousseau (1979). This 
traditional view considers the student and content to be completely separate, non-
interacting entities. The results of this view of mathematics teaching has produced 
students who can inconsistently carry out mathematical procedures, have a superficial 
understanding of the concepts at the heart of mathematical procedures, and are unable to 
conduct mathematical problem solving in unfamiliar contexts (Hiebert, 2003).  
In contrast, numerous researchers have suggested that students and content must 
interact if learning is to occur, leading to student-centered instructional approaches (e.g., 
Freudenthal, 1973; Hiebert & Carpenter, 1992; Hiebert & Grouws, 2007; Von 
Glasersfeld, 1987). Studies have found that the student-centered approach has more 
benefits to student learning than the traditional approach (e.g., Ford, 1977; Gregg, 1995; 
Hoffman & Caniglia, 2009; McMahon, 1979). Mastery learning (as in Coppen, 1976; 
Haver, 1978; Tenenbaum, 1986) is one example of student-centered learning: Students 
are tested and tutored on each topic until they achieve successful scores before 
proceeding to the next unit of instruction. Cooperative learning (as in Freeman, 1997; 
Slavin & Karweit, 1982) is another example of student-centered learning: students work 
in groups to facilitate peer tutoring and problem solving.  
Problem solving strategies (as in Mathews, 1997; Wilkins, 1993) also provide 
students the opportunity to struggle with non-routine mathematical situations (as 
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recommended by Hiebert & Grouws, 2007). Watson and Shaughnessy (2004) posited that 
the purposeful use of probability problem solving explorations may benefit students by 
providing fascinating, unique situations. The present study will not investigate the 
differences between teacher-centered and student-centered approaches; rather, both 
treatment and control groups will engage in student-centered, exploratory problem 
solving activities, and teacher effects will be minimized by having teachers in the study 
teach both a treatment and control group. 
Axiology 
For the present study, axiology will refer to the role of values in learning. The 
ability for students to learn a subject in a particular classroom from a particular teacher is 
greatly influenced by the alignment between student and teacher values and preferences, 
and learning styles (Gardner, 1987, 1989; Gardner & Hatch, 1989; Goldman & Gardner, 
1989; Hatch & Gardner, 1986; Silver, Strong, & Perini, 1997). Furthermore, the value-
laden nature of education constrains educators to consider the overt and covert messages 
being conveyed to students. Gardner (2009) identified a framework of five mental states 
for considering the impact on students of the transmission of values: the disciplined mind, 
the synthesizing mind, the creating mind, the respectful mind, and the ethical mind. 
These states of mind are not hierarchical; all are important. And although they may 
interact, these mental states do not necessarily have a causal relationship. The disciplined 
mind refers to multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary modes of understanding, and the 
ability to put that intelligence into action. The synthesizing mind identifies the ability to 
pull from multiple sources and types of sources of information and combine them into a 
new, integrated whole. This mental frame is especially important because of the 
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explosion of information available and the pace at which information is expanding. The 
creating mind looks beyond information and processes and innovates new processes – in 
the U.S., Gardner stated that the primary role of schools in relation to the creative mind is 
one of protection rather than cultivation. The respectful mind learns to value the 
differences in others. Although much of the cultivation of the respectful mind takes place 
at home, Gardner maintained that for many children, schools present the only model for 
respectful thinking. Therefore, he submitted that teachers must take this modeling role 
into account with every behavior. Children develop the ethical mind as they engage with 
questions of the type of person they want to be in the world and their place in relation to 
the rest of the world. These ethical thoughts, Gardner claimed, require abstract thinking 
that does not fully develop until adolescence. Schools play an important role in the 
development of this ethical frame of mind: 
Within schools, students do not literally have an occupation or a 
citizen’s card. But for most young people, schools are the first substantial 
institution in which they are involved. And so it is a permissible extension 
to think of the vocational role of the young person as student and the 
citizenship role of the young person as a member of the school 
community. The habits of mind developed as student worker and student 
citizen may well help determine the ethical (or nonethical) stand of the 
future adult (Gardner, 2009, p. 19). 
In mathematics, student values are often ignored. Students tend to value practical 
applicability and authentic experiences in mathematics, and the widespread absence of 
those qualities has resulted in motivational issues: 
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Research has shown that disengagement or lack of interest is a 
factor in low student achievement (NCTM, 2000). Students may 
disengage from math because of difficulty with the subject, lack of 
support, or simply boredom. Students may disengage while still attending 
class. Many of these students believe that the math that they learn in 
school is not relevant to life after high school (Stone, Alfeld, & Pearson, 
2008, p. 769). 
The value students place on relevance is often overlooked in mathematics 
education in three ways: (1) Mathematics instruction often trades reasoning for rules and 
procedures, having the effect of separating problem solving from meaning making; (2) It 
emphasizes procedural understanding over conceptual understanding; and, as a result of 
the first two, (3) It inhibits meta-cognitive skills from being used in mathematics (Fuson, 
Kalchman, and Bransford, 2005). Fuson et al. (2005) proposed that the reversing of these 
trends will include the development of productive disposition (i.e., considering 
mathematics to be sensible and useful combined with a sense of self efficacy, as in 
Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001). The present study does not test these assertions. 
Instead, it builds on the assumption that practical applicability appeals to student values. 
Ontology 
Ontology describes the nature of reality. Ontological assumptions influence the 
meaningfulness and interpretability of research results (Patton, 2002). The ontological 
assumptions of the present study will be organized by responding to four questions: (1) 
Are mathematical concepts part of a “singular, verifiable reality and truth” or the result of 
multiple socially constructed realities; (2) How do people know mathematics; (3) How 
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should mathematics be studied; and, (4) What mathematics is worth knowing? 
Are mathematical concepts part of a “singular, verifiable reality and truth” or 
the result of multiple socially constructed realities? The present study proceeds from the 
basis that a single, objective reality exists for mathematics, but understanding such a 
reality requires students to filter it through social constructs. As a result, the nature of 
mathematical reality as it is understood from person to person varies. This assumption is 
closely tied in with how people know mathematics.  
How do people know mathematics? Kant (1786/1901) proposed the importance of 
intuition (described as the only way human knowledge can relate to an object) to learning 
mathematics. “All human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to 
conceptions, and ends with ideas” (p. 516). He divided intuition into two categories: 
empirical and pure. He defined empirical intuition as the intuition of the senses, and any 
object of empirical intuition as a phenomenon. He defined sensation, then, as the “effect 
of an object upon the faculty of representation” (p. 63). Empirical intution can only exist 
after experience, or as posterior intuition (p. 63). Pure intuition, by contrast, refers to the 
organization of objects prior to sensation. Pure intuition is therefore independent of 
experience: The stripping away of properties such as “substance, force, divisibility, 
impenetrability, hardness, color, etc.” leaves two characteristics that belong to the form of 
the object: extension and shape (p. 64). Developing these concepts further, he defined the 
two objects of pure intuition, which must exist a priori and external to experience, as 
space and time. Mathematical conceptions proceed from intuitions: “Mathematical 
cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions. The construction of a 
conception is the presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the 
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conception” (p. 522). In the present study, intuition will be used to refer to the way 
mathematical objects are understood. Although these intuitions are independent of 
training and, to a certain degree, experience, the present study assumes that natural 
intuition can be modified through experiences that provide cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957).  
How should mathematics be studied? Hiebert and Grouws (2007) described two 
fundamental characteristics of a mathematics classroom that focuses on conceptual 
knowledge and relational understanding. First, explicit attention to concepts supports the 
development of conceptual understanding. The effect of conceptual focus has been 
demonstrated across research designs, teaching styles, and classroom environments. 
Second, teachers allow students to struggle with important concepts. By use of the term 
struggle,  
We do not mean needless frustration or extreme levels of challenge 
created by nonsensical or overly difficult problems. We do not mean the 
feelings of despair that some students can experience when little of the 
material makes sense. The struggle we have in mind comes from solving 
problems that are within reach and grappling with key mathematical ideas 
that are comprehendible but not yet well formed (p. 387). 
Although skill efficiency and conceptual struggle are not mutually exclusive, each 
mode of teaching relies on a different features within the classroom. However, Hiebert 
and Grouws (2007) noted that studies in their review found high skill levels in a variety 
of class types that focused on conceptual understanding (e.g., teacher-centered versus 
student-centered). Learning skills in a conceptual environment versus a procedural one 
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seems to afford students increased ability to adapt their knowledge to new situations. In 
the present study, the importance of conceptual focus will not be examined. Instead, both 
treatment and control groups will receive conceptually-based instruction. 
What mathematics is worth knowing? A curriculum is generally set in place to 
delineate the important topics to be studied. How the term is understood varies between 
groups. Teachers usually consider curriculum to refer to goals or objectives, textbooks, 
standards documents, printed materials, lesson plans, study sheets, or tests; 
administrators, on the other hand, may be more interested in the material taught by 
teachers or commercial programs (Sinclair & Ghory, 1979). Parents may consider 
curriculum to mean the types of courses offered by a school. Reys and Lappan (2007) 
described all of these notions of expressed curriculum as the intended curriculum (p. 
676). Sinclair and Ghory (1979) identified three other dimensions to the meaning of 
curriculum: expressed, implied, and emergent. 
The expressed curriculum refers to “learning objectives, learning opportunities, 
sequence of content, and evaluation procedures” (p. 5). The expressed curriculum carries 
the teacher’s interpretation of the intended curriculum into the classroom. The infusion of 
ever-increasing content demands and pressure from standardized testing has resulted in 
the “mile wide, inch deep” curriculum (Schmidt, Houang, & Cogan, 2002, p. 3). Reys 
and Lappan (2007) found that content emphases in mathematics vary widely between 
states. They suggested that future revisions of state documents should include 
collaboration between states with a great deal of national direction.  
The implied curriculum is the expression of unspoken messages through 
classroom policies and procedures and school culture. The implied curriculum holds 
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special importance for the present study by its reference to “unintended learning that 
results because of what is included or omitted in the content that is taught” (Sinclair & 
Ghory, 1979, p. 6). In many classrooms, authentic mathematical experiences are omitted 
from the curriculum in order to move students through content more quickly (Hiebert & 
Grouws, 2007). Sometimes, content is deleted or minimized due to teachers’ lack of 
familiarity or comfort level with the content, as is often the case with probability 
(Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993).  
The emergent curriculum represents a response from the teacher based on 
formative assessment, resulting in adjustments to the expressed curriculum as needed to 
fill in gaps between learners and content (Sinclair & Ghory, 1979). The emergent 
curriculum can be considered a tool that is especially important for teachers to reduce 
mathematical misconceptions. 
Little consensus exists in the United States about critical issues such as how to 
rate the importance of specific topics within a curriculum, the role of accountability 
testing, or the appropriate time to introduce important concepts. The present study did not 
attempt to resolve these issues; instead, it proceeds from the assumption that each school 
and teacher addresses curriculum issues differently. As a result, the random assignment 
was stratified to divide the effects of these differences across both treatment conditions. 
Limitations 
Several teachers replaced the researcher-provided conceptually-based 
instructional materials with procedurally-based materials for the probability intervention 
unit. These teachers cited several reasons for doing so (e.g., not believing that their 
students could handle the provided materials and discomfort with the probability 
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material). While teacher effects were controlled across treatment and control groups, the 
observed magnitude of intervention effects may be reduced from a more homogenous 
conceptually-based intervention. Therefore, the analysis was limited to relative 
comparison of effects. 
The testing instrument for mathematics knowledge may have also limited the 
analysis of the study. The literature review identified an underlying set of foundational 
misconceptions that were unable to be measured discretely from the distractor responses. 
As a result, subsequent hypotheses about the structure of these fundamental 
misconceptions could not be tested with these data. 
Organization of the Remaining Chapters 
The following chapters provide a rationale for the investigation of probability 
misconceptions along with the methodology, results, and conclusions of the study. 
Chapter 2 examines the research foundations for the present study. A synthesis of this 
review allowed for the development of a conceptual framework for how students learn 
and misunderstand mathematical ideas. 
Chapter 3 provides a rationale for the research design and methodology decisions 
made throughout the study. These decisions included how to recruit subjects, how to 
assign classes to treatment groups, determination of sample sizes needed to have 
adequate power, appropriate analytic techniques for each research question, and how to 
handle missing data to maximize power while minimizing threats to validity. This chapter 
also includes a description of the treatment, treatment procedures, and assessment 
instruments. 
Chapter 4 begins with descriptive statistics of the sample and the results of each 
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test. The chapter goes on to report the results of the qualitative analysis of student 
responses to each item in the mathematics knowledge test and how that analysis informed 
the coding of error responses. The chapter then provides the statistics from the analysis of 
the structure of misconceptions. The chapter ends by presenting the results of the 
contextual factor analysis. 
Chapter 5 begins by discussing how the structural analysis underscores the 
inadequacy of organizing misconceptions by content areas. It continues by discussing 
how the qualitative and structural analyses taken together suggest the need for the 
development of a new instrument to specifically measure misconceptions. The chapter 
concludes by discussing the contextual factors that influenced the production of errors 










As students develop mathematical thinking and reasoning, several key stumbling 
blocks prevent deep conceptual learning (e.g., the transition from whole numbers to 
rational numbers in elementary and middle school as in Moss, 2005). These problems 
often persist throughout high school, adding to the difficulties of transitioning from 
arithmetic to algebra (Kilpatrick, Swafford, & Findell, 2001). Throughout these transition 
periods, students may attempt to incorporate new information into their current 
knowledge base without having sufficient understanding to successfully bridge the ideas 
(MacGregor and Stacey, 1997). Errors resulting from these misunderstandings may 
indicate a common set of misconceptions that affect the learning of every mathematics 
content area. 
Defining Misconceptions 
The term misconception has been used in research to refer to a wide range of 
issues, and its use has evolved through two phases (Confrey, 1987). The first phase, from 
the early 1970’s to the early 1980’s, laid the foundation for examining misconceptions as 
ideas that emerge from students examining problem solving situations intuitively, making 
decisions that appear rational yet lead to errors (Clement, 1982; Confrey, 1987). These 
errors often surprise educators, are difficult to eradicate, and affect a large portion of 
people.  
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In the second phase of misconceptions research, mathematics educators focused 
on errors rather than misunderstandings. Slip, bugs, and repair theory concentrated on 
procedural errors (e.g., VanLehn, 1980; 1983) while systematic errors focused more on 
conceptual errors.  
Systematic errors include the systematic (and inappropriate) 
application of familiar fragments of arguments, algorithms and definitions 
without any attempt to integrate across representational systems. They are 
common across students, and permit accurate predictions of what answers 
students will give to a set of well-defined problems (Confrey & Lipton, 
1985, p. 40). 
A recent study in Kentucky shed light on the comparative strengths of focusing on 
conceptual errors instead of procedural errors (McGatha, Bush, & Rakes, 2009). The 
study compared student achievement resulting from observed teacher assessment 
behavior, including addressing procedural errors and conceptual errors. Teachers who 
focused on deep reasoning (7th grade: a non-testing year in Kentucky) saw the highest 
gains in student achievement. Teachers who focused on procedural errors (8th grade: a 
testing year in Kentucky) obtained the least amount of growth in student achievement. 
Another study examining instructional strategies in algebra found that teaching methods 
focused on helping students develop connections between ideas produced larger and 
more consistent effect sizes than interventions that targeted procedural fluency (Rakes, 
Valentine, & McGatha, 2010). 
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Misconceptions versus Reasoning Errors in Secondary Mathematics 
The symptomatic features of mathematical misconceptions are often discussed in 
literature simultaneously with reasoning errors (e.g., Falk, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972, 1973a, 1973b; Küchemann, 1978). For the purposes of this study, the following 
discussion does not present an exhaustive list of reasoning error types. Three types of 
reasoning errors appear to be related or confused with misconceptions. Some reasoning 
errors result from misunderstandings about ideas and connections among ideas, in which 
case they may indicate an underlying misconception (e.g., Clements, 1982). Other 
reasoning errors emerge from misunderstandings about mathematical procedures (e.g., 
Walker & Singer, 2007). In such cases, the present study does not consider such 
reasoning errors to represent misconceptions. A third type of reasoning error may arise 
from a combination of conceptual and procedural misunderstandings (e.g., De Bock, 
Verschaffel, & Janssens, 1998, 2002). In such cases, misconceptions are often difficult to 
parse out from these other types of error patterns. The present analysis attempts to do so 
by discussing error patterns as they appear in the literature in enough detail to separate 
heuristic reasoning errors from conceptual reasoning errors. Understanding the source of 
errors carries important consequences for how teachers address misconceptions: 
There is a tendency for teachers when confronted with a statement 
from a student that is apparently incorrect to inform the student of the 
error and perhaps state the correct point of view…The view that these 
statements are, however, not isolated beliefs that the student holds but are 
reflections of a more general conceptual framework leads one to be 
skeptical about the effectiveness of these types of local interventions; they 
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do not get at the heart of the problem. An analogous situation would 
involve correcting the assertion that a ship would fall off the earth if it 
ventured too far from shore by negating the assertion or citing evidence to 
the contrary rather than focusing on the apparent underlying belief in a flat 
rather than spherical planet (Konold, 1988, p. 18). 
If an error within a task occurs because of a fundamental misconception of a 
mathematical idea or the relationship between ideas, then directing the student’s attention 
to a procedure-based correction within the task may be insufficient. Such an attempt to 
fix the error may appear successful for a specific type of task, but when students face a 
new, unfamiliar situation, the misconception will often reassert itself on student 
reasoning (Hiebert & Grouws, 2007). The same situation can occur when the 
misunderstandings are a combination of meaning and procedures (e.g., Fisher, 1988; 
Phillippe, 1992). Instead, interventions that are effective in the long term will address the 
lack of understanding about the meaning of the important mathematical ideas (Hiebert & 
Grouws, 2007). 
If an error in reasoning occurs despite conceptual understanding, then addressing 
the error by focusing on the procedures may be effective. Focusing on the underlying 
meaning and reviewing how procedures relate to that meaning will, however, reinforce 
understanding of the structure and relationships of the mathematical ideas (Kieran, 1989, 
1992, 2007). So regardless of the source of the error, focusing on the underlying meaning 
and connections of mathematical ideas appears to offer the longest lasting benefits for 
students (Skemp, 1976/2006). 
These connections may be especially important for reinforcing student struggle 
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with the specific hurdles of learning rational numbers, algebra, and geometry; conversely, 
the difficulties in one area often influence student ability to handle the difficulties in 
another area. Rational numbers, for example, may play a fundamental role in students’ 
ability to solve algebraic and geometric problems. Misunderstandings about the 
connections between variable symbols and the meaning of variation may influence 
student capacity to understand probability concepts such as randomness. 
Several key concepts from algebra, geometry, and rational numbers also appear to 
influence multiple facets of probability. The relationship between these misconceptions 
may suggest a connection between probability and these other three content areas. Such a 
connection may indicate that probability instruction may offer a unique inroad into 
addressing misconceptions about each of these areas by developing the meaning of 
fundamental concepts important to each topic. 
Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Rational Numbers 
Rational Number Meaning 
Rational number concepts confound student mathematical understanding more 
than whole numbers, in part because of the multiple representations and uses of rational 
numbers and the major conceptual shift that is required of students when learning rational 
numbers (Fuson et al., 2005; Kilpatrick et al., 2001; Lamon, 2007; Moss, 2005).  
When fractions are treated as numbers in the beginning of the 
journey – too early on – learners often assume that the greater the 
denominator the greater the amount – 7181 >  because 8 > 7. Even when 
they begin to understand that the denominator is a divisor, and therefore 
the greater the number of pieces, the smaller the amount, the relationship 
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of the numerator to the denominator escapes them (Fosnot & Dolk, 2002, 
p. 56). 
Two of the most common rational number relationships have been described as 
“part/part” and “part/whole” (e.g., Baturo, 1994; Behr, Harel, Post, & Lesh, 1992). 
Part/part relationships occur when a quantity within one unit is compared to a quantity 
within another unit (Lamon, 1999). For example, a male/female ratio represents a 
part/part relationship: neither quantity represents the total number of people in the class. 
Part/whole relationships, on the other hand, represent the relationship between a part and 
a whole. For example, the male percentage of a class represents a part/whole relationship. 
Negotiating between part/whole and part/part relationships and the quantities represented 
by each may be critical to overcoming the rational number hurdle (Fosnot & Dolk, 2002): 
One third of one strip of paper is not equivalent to one third of 
another, shorter strip of paper. It is this relational thinking that makes 
fractions so difficult for children. The parts must be equivalent, but they 
must also be equivalent in relation to the whole (p. 56). 
Behr et al. (1992) agreed with Fosnot and Dolk’s connection between difficulties 
with fractional meaning and equivalence, elaborating on the multiplicative structure of 
rational number relationships: 
Fundamentally, the question of whether two rational numbers are 
equivalent or which is less is a question of invariance or variation of a 
multiplicative relation…Two rational numbers a/b and c/d, can be 
compared in terms of equivalence or nonequivalence by investigating 
whether there is a transformation of a/b to c/d, defined as changes from a 
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to c and from b to d, under which the multiplicative relationship between a 
and b is or is not invariant (p. 316). 
The part/whole relationship is a necessary step in understanding rational numbers, 
but it may not be sufficient to developing meaning. Wu (2005) described the importance 
of rational numbers to mathematical understanding and the insufficiency of the 
part/whole relationship. 
The subject of fractions (which is the term I will use for 
nonnegative rational numbers) is known to be a main source of 
mathphobia. If this is not reason enough for us to teach fractions better, let 
me cite another one: understanding fractions is the most critical step in the 
understanding of rational numbers because fractions are students’ first 
serious excursion into abstraction. Whereas their intuition of whole 
numbers can be grounded on the counting of fingers, learning fractions 
requires first of all a mental substitute for their fingers. They need to be 
clearly told what a fraction is. A fraction has to be a number, and so the 
definition of a fraction as “parts-of-a-whole” simply doesn’t cut it. 
Students have to be shown that fractions are the natural extension of whole 
numbers so that the arithmetic operations +, ─, x, and ÷ on whole numbers 
can smoothly transition to those on fractions (p. 2). 
The fundamental concept of relative versus absolute size interacts with students’ 
ability to interpret the part-whole relationship correctly. Students in elementary grades 
tend to mix these two comparative techniques up; this confusion persists into the high 
school years (Green, 1983b; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004). Steen (2007) described 
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interpretation as a more fundamental problem for students than the computation of 
rational numbers. For example, students have difficulty approximating rational number 
values, such as the sum of 19/20 and 23/25. Given the choices of 1, 2, 42, or 45, most 
eighth grade students in the U. S. chose either 42 or 45, indicating difficulties in ascribing 
meaning to the relationship between each part of a rational number. He observed that 
computers and calculators can help with many of the computational difficulties, but these 
tools are unable to bridge gaps in meaning. Schield (2006) found that these difficulties 
extend to percentage representations of rational numbers as well. Consider an example 
from the Schield Statistical Literacy Survey (Schield, 2002, p. 2): 
Do you think the following statements accurately describe the data shown 
in [Figure 2]? 
[Question] 9.0 20% of smokers are Catholic 
[Question] 10. Protestants (40%) are twice as likely to be smokers as are 
Catholics (20%). 
 
Figure 2. Part-Whole and Part-Part Comparison using Pie Chart (Schield, 2002, p. 2). 
Question 9 asks students to interpret a relationship between a part (i.e., Catholics) 
and the given whole (i.e., Smokers). Schield (2006) reported that only 19% of the college 
students in his sample analyzed this relationship incorrectly. By contrast, 62% missed 





identities. Since 20% of smokers are Catholic and 40% of smokers are Protestant, 
students (correctly) conclude that the number of Protestant smokers is twice that of 
Catholics for this sample. Question 10 reverses the logic of Question 9. Although 20% of 
smokers are Catholic, the graph does not indicate the converse: 20% of Catholics are not 
necessarily smokers, nor are 40% of Protestants (based on the chart). The difficulties 
students exhibited on Question 10 indicate that they have a limited understanding of the 
nature of part-whole relationships. Schield (2006) also found that tables reporting 
percentages present a similar difficulty for students, as in the following example:  
Do you think the following statements accurately describe the 20% circled [in 
Table 2]? 
Q30. 20% of runners are female smokers. 
Q31. 20% of females are runners who smoke. 
Q32. 20% of female smokers are runners. 
Q33. 20% of smokers are females who run (Schield, 2002, p. 6). 
Table 2 
Two-Way Half Table 
 PERCENTAGE WHO ARE RUNNERS 
 Non-smoker Smoker Total 
Female 50% 20% 40% 
Male 25% 10% 20% 
Total 37% 15% 30% 
Note. From Schield, 2002, p. 6. 
 
In Table 2, each percentage represents a part-whole ratio: the numerator (the part) 
represents the quantity of runners while the denominator (the whole) represents the 
intersection of the row and column quantities. One of the primary clues for reading this 
table is the lack of any 100%’s in any cell of the table: These missing values should be 
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interpreted as meaning that each percentage represents a portion of a different quantity 
from the others. So, runners comprise only 50% of female non-smokers while they make 
up 25% of male non-smokers. The circled 20% thus represents the statement that runners 
include 20% of female smokers. Schield (2006) reported high error rates among college 
students on all four questions above: 55%, 53%, 62%, and 42% respectively. Each 
question examines student understanding of part/whole relationships from a different 
perspective. Question 30 reverses the role of the whole (i.e., female smokers) and the part 
(i.e., runners). Question 31 confuses smokers as part of the whole along with runners 
while Question 33 confuses females as part of the whole. Question 32 correctly identifies 
the role of each quantity.  
In contrast to a two-way half table, 100% row tables and column tables must be 
interpreted differently.  
Table 3 
100% Row Table 
 SEX  
 Male Female Total 
Black 75% 25% 100% 
White 50% 50% 100% 
Other 40% 60% 100% 
Total 50% 50% 100% 
Note. From Schield, 2002, p. 6. 
 
Table 4 
100% Column Table 
College Students 
Major Male Female Total 
Business 60% 20% 40% 
Economics 10% 50% 30% 
Miscellaneous 30% 30% 30% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Note. From Schield, 2005, p. 1 
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In Table 3, the 100%’s in the row marginal cells indicate that each cell percentage 
represents a portion of the row quantity. So, females make up 25% of the Black sample 
while they account for 50% of the White sample. In Table 4, the column quantities now 
represent the whole. So, business majors account for 60% of the male sample while they 
account for only 20% of the female sample. Schield (2005, 2006) considered these errors 
to represent fundamental misunderstanding about the meaning of rational numbers and 
the connection between different representations of rational numbers. The table format of 
the questions may also have contributed to student errors, which would not necessarily 
represent underlying mathematical misconceptions. His analysis, however, suggested that 
sufficient evidence indicated mathematical misconceptions unique from difficulties with 
table formats. 
Probability Connections to Rational Number Meaning 
Rational number difficulties instill a sense of frustration and anxiety about 
mathematics (Gresham, Sloan, & Vinson, 1997); on the other hand, probability 
applications of rational numbers may provide the concrete examples students need to be 
able to derive meaning from these number relationships thereby reducing that anxiety. 
Probability applications regularly expose students to part/whole relationships, 
readily providing concrete substitutes for fingers. These applications go beyond simply 
counting outcomes: They also ask students to examine which quantities to count for each 
part of the probability ratio, how to count them, and how to compare those values. 
Green’s (1982) counter problem provides an example of how rational number 
relationships can be examined in a probability context (p. 20): 
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6 (e) Two other bags have black and white counters. 
Bag J: 3 black and 1 white 
Bag K: 6 black and 2 white 
Which bag gives a better chance of picking a black counter? 
(A)  Same Chance (B) Bag J 
(C) Bag K  (D) Don’t Know 
Why? 
Sixty-two percent chose C, citing the larger number of black counters as the 
reason for their choice. This error highlighted an underlying misconception about rational 
number equivalence: Students failed to recognize that the number of black marbles was 
not being compared, but the relationship of the number of black marbles to the whole in 
each bag.  
In addition to interpreting the meaning of a single rational number relationship, 
students are often asked while studying probability to compare whether two sets of 
rational number relationships are equivalent, i.e., the linear proportion. Linear 
proportions are highly useful for solving a wide array of mathematical problems (Van 
Dooren et al., 2003). Linear patterns are also highly intuitive because of their simplicity 
(Rouche, 2003). However, Freudenthal (1983) recognized a potential misconception 
regarding linearity: “Linearity is such a suggestive property of relations that one readily 




Van Dooren et al. (2003) determined that many misconceptions about numerical 
relationships can be traced from the overgeneralization of linearity or proportionality. 
They described several types of situations in which students tend to apply linear 
proportions although the situation actually contained an additive structure. For example, 
“Sue and Julie were running equally fast around a track. Sue started first. When she had 
run 9 laps, Julie had run 3 laps. When Julie completed 15 laps, how many laps had Sue 
run?” (p. 114). In their study, the subjects were elementary education teachers rather than 
students, yet they reported that 97% of their sample solved the problem using a 
proportion, 9/3 = x/15 (computing x = 45), instead of x + 6, for a correct answer of 21. 
Their study revealed a striking pattern: Subjects tenaciously held to their faulty 
reasoning, some through four interviews focused on correcting the misunderstanding. 
Their study revealed some of the difficulties students have modeling quantities within a 
rational number relationship: Students who opted for a straight linear proportion 
indicated through their interviews that they believed the relationship between Julie and 
Sue is proportional (i.e., multiplicative), rather than additive.  
Lamon (1999) offered an example of similar errors related to interpreting 
mathematical quantities. This example suggested that the errors are not simply overusing 
linearity, as Van Dooren et al. (2003) later suggested. Instead, Lamon noted that students 
do not only overuse proportions; they also use addition when proportions would have 
been appropriate. Lamon suggested that such errors stem from fundamental 
misapplication of meaning — students attempting to connect two mathematical 
relationships without truly understanding the meaning of either. Consider her example of 
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snake growth: 
Jo has two snakes, String Bean and Slim. Right now, String Bean 
is 4 feet long and Slim is 5 feet long. Jo knows that two years from now, 
both snakes will be fully grown...At her full length, String Bean will be 7 
feet long, while Slim’s length when he is fully grown will be 8 feet. Over 
the next two years, will both snakes grow the same amount? (Lamon, 
1999, p. 12). 
Using an additive structure to compare the absolute growth rates, one can 
consider that both snakes will grow the same amount, three feet. On the other hand, 
comparing the relative growth rates requires considering the amount of growth in relation 
to the original size through a multiplicative structure. String Bean’s additional three feet 
will be an additional 3/4 or her original length, while Slim’s additional growth will only 
be an additional 3/5 of his original length. So, the additive comparison reveals the same 
amount of growth, but the multiplicative comparison reveals a different rate of growth. 
Each interpretation is correct within the context of answering a particular question, and 
both result in erroneous solutions if their meanings are confused. Such errors of meaning 
resulting in faulty reasoning get at the heart of mathematical misconceptions. 
Probability Connections to Linear Proportions 
These errors of meaning emerging from confusion about the nature of linear 
proportions also appear in probability. The Birthday Paradox provides a well-known 
example of this connection: 
If in a gathering of 50 people one asks how probable it is that there 
are two people with the same birthday in the room, it is nearly always the 
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case that this probability is grossly underestimated. The mathematician 
who stages this can count on a success such as only magicians can boast 
of, if several pairs, maybe even a triple, can be found with the same 
birthdays (Freudenthal, 1973, p. 587). 
Several interpretations have been offered to explain students’ difficulties with this 
issue. Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggested that the underlying misconceptions result 
from the misuse of the linear proportion arising from reliance on the representativeness 
heuristic: 
Most students are surprised to learn that in a group of as few as 23 
people, the probability that at least two of them have the same birthday 
(i.e., same day and month) exceeds .5. Clearly, with 23 people the 
expected birthdays per day is less than 151 . Thus a day with two birthdays, 
in the presence of 343 “empty” days, is highly non-representative, and the 
event in question, therefore, appears unlikely (p. 37). 
The expected ratio of 151  emerges from the expectation of equivalency: 36523  is 
approximately 151 , or 7%. However, counting only 23 possible matches only accounts for 
the potential matches of one person to the other 22. The other 22 could each have 
matches as well. A simple example may clarify the appropriate counting techniques: 
Suppose we randomly choose four people, and their birthdays are labeled A, B, C, & D. 
The possible matches in this scenario are A = B, A = C, A = D, B = C, B = D, and C = D. 
To count these matches, we see that there are three potential matches for A, two for B, 
and only one distinct match left for C, or 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 potential matches. If we were to 
add a fifth person E, the counts for A, B, and C would increase by 1, and D would now 
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have a unique possible match with E. Thus, the general formula for counting the number 
of possible matches for n randomly chosen people is 1 + 2 + 3 + … + (n – 1), an 
arithmetic series with a constant increase of one unit per term. The formula for the sum Sn 
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In this series, the “nth” term is actually the “(n – 1)th” term, and the first term has 
a value of one, so the formula after substitution becomes Equation 2. 








1 −=−=−+−=−  (2) 
Another way to arrive at Equation 2 begins by using the formula for combinations 
to compute the number of ways to choose any two people from a group of size n, or nC2. 
Using substitution, we arrive at Equation 3, which simplifies to Equation 2 by canceling 
out the (n – 2)! term. 
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Rather than being linear, the pattern of counting potential matches follows a 
quadratic pattern (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Number of Potential Birthday Matches for Groups of 2 – 100 people. 
Returning to the original examples discussed by Freudenthal (1973) and 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), we can readily compute that 50 people have 50*49/2 = 
1225 possible matches, and 23 people have 23*22/2 = 253 possible matches. These 
numbers cannot be used as either the numerator or denominator of the desired 
probability: 1225 is larger than 365, and probabilities larger than one are impossible. 
Using 253/365 is tempting, however, to do so assumes once again that the change in 
probability is linear, which eventually would lead to probabilities larger than one. To 
examine this problem closer, we turn to the Fundamental counting principle. Since only 
one day out of each year can provide a successful match for any randomly chosen person, 
we can conclude that the probability of no matches is 364 days out of 365 and that each 
potential match is independent of the others. The Fundamental counting principle 
stipulates that the probabilities should be multiplied together. Equation 4 demonstrates 
this calculation for four people (six potential matches) while Equation 5 shows the 
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Since the probability of success and failure have a sum of one, the probability of 
finding a birthday match in a group of four randomly chosen people can be computed as 
1 – 0.982 = 0.018, or 1.8%. Extending the same logic to a randomly chosen group of 23 
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or approximately 96.5%. 
From these computations, we see that neither the number of potential matches nor 
the probability distribution follows a linear pattern. Instead, the pattern of potential 
matches is quadratic while the probability distribution is geometric (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Probability Distribution for a Birthday Match for Groups of 2 – 100 people. 
Van Dooren et al. (2003) elaborated on the linearity misconception that leads 
students to believe that the probability of a birthday match in a group of 23 people is 
23/365: 
In that case, you would indeed need 183 people to get a probability 
for a birthday match exceeding 0.50…We would argue that people 
applying this strategy would also believe that – compared to a group of 23 
– the probability of getting a birthday match in a group of 46 people is 
doubled, in a group of 69 it is tripled, etcetera (p. 118). 
In at least three places throughout the Birthday Problem, intuition typically leads 
to the application of a linear relationship, sometimes through the modeling of the 
part/whole relationships that comprise the probability ratio, at others through reverting to 
linear proportions to analyze the probability space.  
These studies seem to indicate that reasoning errors involving rational numbers 
may be heuristic in nature, but they also may indicate deeply embedded, fundamental 
















how to compare these quantities. Probability, on the other hand, appears to include 
contextual situations that present students with the opportunity to engage with both the 
heuristic and meaning difficulties of rational number meaning and the appropriate 
application of the linear proportion (i.e., discernment between additive and multiplicative 
relationships) This intertwining of rational number meaning and relationships among 
rational number quantities with probability contexts can be seen again in the rational 
number concepts of uniformity, equality, and change  
Uniformity, Equality, and Change 
Intuitive beliefs about uniformity are highly associated with rational number 
reasoning. As Fosnot and Dolk (2002) pointed out, wholes must be divided into equal 
parts in order for a rational number relationship to make sense. Proportionality requires 
uniformity as well. When this belief is used as a problem solving technique, it is referred 
to as the uniformity heuristic (Falk, 1992, p. 205). In probability, theoretical probabilities 
are based on the assumption of uniformity, and probability spaces are often assumed to 
be distributed equally across outcomes. Problems involving conditional probability run 
counter to uniformity and equality beliefs. Confusion about the meaning of conditional 
situations and their effect on resultant probabilities (consisting of several rational number 
quantities) leads to misconceptions about the nature of conditional probability and the 
effect of increased information on possible outcomes. In the absence of training, students 
often fall back on the uniformity heuristic, resulting in overgeneralization errors. The 
Three Prisoner Problem, which is mathematically identical to Vos Savant’s (1990) Monty 
Hall Problem, illustrates the issues surrounding the interpretation of conditional 
information based on assumptions of uniformity. The problem as described by Bar-Hillel 
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and Falk (1982) and Falk (1992) is as follows: 
Tom, Dick, and Harry are awaiting execution while imprisoned in 
separate cells in some remote country. The monarch of that country 
arbitrarily decides to pardon one of the three. The decision who is the 
lucky one has been determined by a fair draw. He will be freed; but his 
name is not immediately announced, and the warden is forbidden to 
inform any of the prisoners of his fate. Dick argues that he already knows 
that at least one of Tom and Harry must be executed, thus convincing the 
compassionate warden that by naming one of them he will not be violating 
his instructions. The warden names Harry. Thereupon Dick cheers up, 
reasoning: “Before, my chances of a pardon were 1/3; now only Tom and 
myself are candidates for a pardon, and since we are both equally likely to 
receive it, my chance of being feed has increased to 1/2” (Falk, 1992, p. 
198). 
Students often believe, like Dick, that the probability of his being freed has 
increased from 1/3 to 1/2 because the probabilities must remain equal across the available 
outcomes. However, such a belief requires the assumption that the choice of a name is 
randomly chosen, which does not hold in this situation. Instead, the warden, like Monty 
in the Monty Hall problem, is choosing to disclose one of the outcomes based on 
information to which he is privy (Falk, 1992). Therefore, the probability of any one of the 
prisoners being freed is conditional on the warden’s information and requires considering 
the situation from a conditional probability standpoint.  
Conditional probability focuses primarily on how quantities represented by 
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rational numbers change as a result of new information being added to a context. The 
new information alters the assumptions on which the original quantities are based, 
thereby changing the meaning of the new quantities as well. For such a situation, Bayes’ 
Theorem is especially helpful. Bayes’ Theorem defined probability as “the ratio between 
the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be 
computed, and the value of the thing expected upon its happening” (Bayes, 1763, p. 376). 
These two values became known as the prior distribution (value based on expectation) 
and the posterior distribution (value based on an experiment). Although the probability 
for each of the three prisoners is described as uniform in the problem itself, this 
description referred only to the prior distribution: 
In the case of an event concerning the probability of which we 
absolutely know nothing antecedently to any trials made concerning it, 
seems to appear from the following consideration; viz. that concerning 
such an event I have no reason to think that, in a certain number of trials, it 
should rather happen any one possible number of times than another. For, 
on this account, I may justly reason concerning it as if its probability had 
been at first unfixed, and then determined in such a manner as to give me 
no reason to think that in a certain number of trials, it should happen any 
one possible number of times than another (Bayes, 1763, p. 393). 
Uniformity in the prior distribution means that P(T) = P(D) = P(H) = 1/3, where 
the events T, D, and H represent the event of each person being chosen for freedom. 
Assuming that the guard has no reason to lie and no bias, we can compute the likelihood 
that he would name either Harry or Tom to not be freed, given that he knows which 
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prisoner will be freed and cannot name Dick (Table 5). 
Table 5 
Conditional Probability Equations (from Falk, 1992, p. 201) 
Probability Equation Description 
P (h | T) = 1 Probability that Harry is named if Tom is to be freed. 
P (h | D) = ½ Probability that Harry is named if Dick is to be freed.  
P (h | H) = 0 Probability that Harry is named if Harry is to be freed. 
P (t | T) = 0 Probability that Tom is named if Tom is to be freed. 
P (t | D) = ½ Probability that Tom is named if Dick is to be freed. 
P (t | H) = 1 Probability that Tom is named if Harry is to be freed. 
 
Dick arrived at the probabilities in Table 5 under the assumption that he 
cannot be named. His probabilities also consider the likelihood of each prisoner 
being freed to be equal. So, if Harry is to be freed, and the warden cannot name 
the prisoner to be freed, and he cannot name Dick, then only Tom can be named, 
so P (t | H) = 1. Likewise, if Dick is to be freed, then the warden can name either 
Tom or Harry, so P (h | D) = P (t | D) = ½. In Bayesian terms, these probabilities 
represent the prior distribution (in this case, the distribution prior to the warden 
naming a prisoner). These probabilities, however, do not represent the probability 
distribution after the warden names the prisoner — the posterior distribution. 
Bayes’ Theorem provides a formula for computing posterior distribution 
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The denominator of this formula represents the total probability of an 
outcome while the numerator represents the probability of an outcome (Event B) 
under the condition A. Applying this formula to the prisoner problem, we can 
compute the posterior probability that Dick will be freed given that Harry was 
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The denominator of Equation 8 represents the total probability of any 
prisoner being freed if Harry is named by the warden. The numerator represents 
the probability of Dick being freed if the warden names Harry. Substituting the 
prior distribution probabilities from Table 5 produces Equation 9. 
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So, the disclosure of the warden’s information does not change Dick’s 
probability of being freed from the original 1/3. The examination of this outcome 
brought to light a belief related to the uniformity belief, the no news, no change 
belief (Falk, 1992). While Falk described both of these beliefs as heuristics 
because subjects used them to solve problems, they are not beliefs about 
procedures, but of meaning under the context of change. Subjects who believed 
the no-news-no-change perspective believed that Dick already knew that one of 
the other two would not be freed, so revealing the name added no new substantive 
information. Unlike the uniformity heuristic, the no news, no change heuristic 
correctly computes the solution as 1/3. However, Falk provided two illustrations 
to demonstrate the erroneous nature of this belief.  
First, the no-news-no-change pattern does not hold for Tom. Using 
Equation 10 and the values from Table 5, we can compute the probability for Tom 







Using substitution, we compute Tom’s posterior probability (Equation 11). 
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So, although Dick’s chances did not change by the warden’s information, 
Tom’s chances of being freed have doubled ⎯ the warden’s information was not 
completely irrelevant to the probabilities. So, if Dick could choose, switching 
places with Tom would double his chances of being freed. This outcome is 
isomorphic with the Monty Hall problem: Switching doors also doubles a 
contestant’s chances of winning the prize. The Monty Hall problem attracted a 
great deal of attention in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s as mathematicians and 
mathematics educators vehemently opposed Vos Savant’s (1990) claim that the 
choice of switching doors made a difference in the probability of winning. This 
opposition to the switching claim adds further evidence to Van Dooren et al.’s 
(2003) conclusions about the pervasiveness and persistence of mathematical 
misunderstandings about meaning and relationships: Such errors are evidently not 
limited to novice learners. 
Falk’s second argument against the no-news-no-change belief related the 
belief back to uniformity; specifically, she showed that this belief also relied on 
an assumption of uniformity. Falk (1992) related a variation of the prisoner 
problem in which Tom is favored by the monarch, and so he gets two votes for 
freedom while Dick and Harry each receive only one. The prior probabilities 
become P(T) = 1/2, P(H) = P(D) = 1/4, a non-uniform distribution. The 
assumptions about the decision making process for the warden remain unchanged 
(i.e., no bias or reason to lie). Using Bayes’ Theorem again, the posterior 
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probability for Dick getting his freedom changes, as shown in Equation 12. 
( )( )


















When the assumption of uniformity does not hold true for a situation, assumptions 
about change and the meaning of rational number quantities under conditions of change 
become untenable. The ability to discern the applicability of any particular assumption 
about rational number quantities for a specific problem requires understanding of which 
units to count, how to count them, and how those quantities interact with other 
information from a particular problem (i.e., relational understanding, as in Skemp, 
1976/2006). Freudenthal (1970) summarized the unique role of probability in connecting 
these abstract mathematical concepts to concrete examples: 
Probability applies in everyday situations…There is no part of 
mathematics that is as universally applied except, of course, elementary 
arithmetic…In no mathematical domain is blind faith in techniques more 
often denounced than in probability; in no domain is critical thought more 
often required (p. 167). 
These studies suggest that probability instruction may play a unique role in 
challenging deeply-held assumptions about the meaning and relationships of rational 
number quantities within a contextual situation. 
Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Algebra 
Students beginning the study of algebra face learning barriers from several 
sources. First, algebra is often the first course in which students are asked to engage in 
abstract reasoning and problem solving (Vogel, 2008). Researchers have demonstrated 
that the abstract nature of algebra increases its difficulty over arithmetic (Carraher & 
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Schliemann, 2007; Howe, 2005; Kieran, 1989). The impediment of abstractness to the 
construction of meaning directly affects the ability of students to construct multiple 
representations of algebraic objects (Kieran, 1992; Vogel, 2008).  
Second, the learning of algebra requires students to learn a language of 
mathematical symbols that is completely foreign to their previous experiences (Kilpatrick 
et al., 2001). The multiple ways in which this language is described and used during 
instruction often prevents students from connecting algebraic symbols to their intended 
meaning (Blanco & Garrote, 2007; Socas Robayna, 1997). In some cases, students are 
completely unaware that any meaning was intended for the symbols (Küchemann, 1978). 
In other cases, they may know that meaning exists, but limited understanding prevents 
them from ascribing meaning to the symbols, or they may assign erroneous meaning to 
the symbols (Küchemann, 1978). For example, as students study topics such as functions 
and graphs, they begin to understand and interpret one set of algebraic objects in terms of 
another (e.g., a function equation with its graph, a data set by its equation, a data set by 
its graph, as in Leinhardt, Zaslavski, & Stein, 1990). McDermott, Rosenquist, and Van 
Zee (1987) found that students are generally able to plot points and equations; however, 
in spite of this procedural fluency, students still lack the ability to extract meaning from 
graphical representations. They concluded that the difficulty lay in the connection of a 
graph to the construct it represents. Specifically, students are readily capable of 
demonstrating procedural fluency, but memory and procedural understanding is unable to 
guide students through problems involving interpretation (Skemp, 1976/2006). 
Kieran (1992), Howe (2005), and Carraher and Schliemann (2007) recognized 
that learning the structural characteristics of algebra creates a third obstacle faced by 
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students. 
The difficulty that students experience with understanding the 
structure of algebra, even its most elementary aspects such as are found in 
high school textbooks, was exemplified by their early attempts to convert 
expressions into equations in order to have a representation that includes a 
result, the unsystematic and strategic errors they committed while 
simplifying expressions, their resistance to operating on an equation as an 
object as shown by their not using the solving procedure of “doing the 
same thing to both sides,” their not treating the equal sign as a symbol of 
symmetry…their difficulty in seeing the “hidden” structure of equations, 
[and] their non-use of algebra as a tool for proving numerical relations 
(Kieran, 1992, p. 412). 
The abstract, structural, and language barriers interact within algebra. For 
example, consider the expression a + b: How students interpret the meaning of each 
variable depends on how well they can handle the abstract nature of the symbols. Further, 
students must recognize that the expression a + b represents the total number of items 
from a set of a and b items (Kieran, 1992). 
The teaching methods used to convey content often create a fourth barrier to 
learning algebra. Sfard (1991) highlighted a difficulty of expectation as one problem with 
teaching methods: 
More often than not, both students and teachers fail to 
acknowledge the fact which is one of the most important implications of 
our three-phase schema: Insight cannot always be expected as an 
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immediate reward for a person’s direct attempts to fathom a new idea. The 
reification, which brings relational understanding, is difficult to achieve, it 
requires much effort, and it may come when least expected … [it] may 
occur after a period of intensive work followed by days of rest (p. 33). 
Kieran (1992) concluded from Sfard’s (1991) study that a great deal of time must 
be spent connecting algebra to arithmetic before proceeding to the structural ideas of 
algebra. Furthermore, the lack of materials designed to facilitate the transition from 
arithmetic to algebra forces teachers to either create materials themselves or conduct 
time-intensive searches (Kieran, 1992). Instead, teachers often rely on whatever sequence 
is outlined by a textbook. 
Such a choice is highly problematic: Kieran (1992) proposed that textbook 
explanations are often insufficient for helping students understand the abstract, structural 
concepts necessary in algebra. Consider the following explanation of linear functions 
from an algebra textbook (Figure 5): 
 
Figure 5. Textbook description of linear functions (Larson, Boswell, Kanold, & Stiff, 2010, p. 75) 
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Function Relationships 
Notice that the definition of linear functions as described in this example relies on 
recognizing a prescription: If a function can be written in slope intercept form, it is linear. 
While not incorrect, this explanation is insufficient for situations that call for alternate 
forms of linear functions (such as the standard form or point-slope form). Notice also that 
the definition of function notation is mixed with the definition for linear functions. 
Students often fail to recognize that function notation is a general form intended for all 
functions rather than just linear (Chang, 2002). As a result, students may develop a 
misconception that functions are supposed to be linear (Chang, 2002; Kalchman & 
Koedinger, 2005). Socas Robayna (1997) offered another example: Students may 
continue trying to simplify an expression until they reduce it to a single number. Baroudi 
(2006) noted similar difficulties with the meaning of the equal sign, and found that 
additional time spent with numerical equations may not be sufficient for learning the 
structure of algebraic equations. Instead, he suggested the importance of intermediate 
representations to bridge the gap between arithmetic and algebraic structures. 
Skemp (1976/2006) considered the underlying foundations of mathematical 
misconceptions as emerging from an instrumental understanding of mathematics that 
forces students to rely on memorization. Kieran (2007) agreed with Skemp’s viewpoint 
of the limiting nature of instrumental mathematics. Even the manipulation of symbols, 
once considered primarily an algorithmic process, has become recognized as emergent 
from concepts (Kieran, 2007). Skemp gave the analogy of a person trying to navigate 
through a new city. A person with an instrumental understanding of the city may have a 
number of ways to get from point A to point B. The difficulty with this understanding 
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arises when the person deviates from the original course. In such a case, the person gets 
lost. Instrumental understanding of algebra produces similar results. For instance, 
students may learn a set of prescriptions for solving equations of the form ax + b = c; 
when they encounter equations of the form ax + b = cx + d, their prescriptions are unable 
to accommodate the new form.  
Probability and rational number assumptions influence how students understand 
non-linear functions. Student understanding of rational number and probability concepts 
may also influence their understanding of algebraic structures (Falk, 1992).A famous 
examples of this misuse of the rule of three took place as a result of a bad bet: 
De Méré knew that it was advantageous to bet on the occurrence of 
at least one six in a series of four tosses of a die – maybe this was an old 
experience. He argued it must be as advantageous to bet on the occurrence 
of at least one double-six in a 24 toss series with a pair of dice. As Fortune 
disappointed him, he complained to his friend Pascal about preposterous 
mathematics which had deceived him (Freudenthal, 1970, p. 151). 
De Méré made two erroneous assumptions about the probability and rational 
number structures in this situation. First, he assumed the one die probability to be 4/6, 
computed by adding the probability of 1/6 four times (i.e., an additive, linear 
accumulation of probabilities). Second, he inferred that the probability of rolling at least a 
double six with two dice should be proportional, or 24/36. Both situations are binomial 
rather than linear. For the one-die scenario, P(Success) = 1/6 while P(Failure) = 5/6. The 






















































⎛=≥XP or 0.517 (13) 
So, rather than having a 67% probability, the original probability should have 
been 51.7%. In the two-dice scenario, P(Success) = 1/36 while P(Failure) = 35/36. The 
binomial theorem where n = 36 and k ≥ 1 can be computed similarly to produce the 
probability of rolling at least one double six in 24 rolls to be 0.491 or 49.1%. The 
binomial formula, a non-linear algebraic equation, applies to many situations where 
linear relationships do not hold for the quantities of interest. The De Méré problem 
illustrates how these underlying assumptions about probability and rational number 
structures influence understanding of the functional relationship that is so critical to 
algebraic thinking and reasoning when that relationship is not linear (Freudenthal, 1983; 
Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005; Kaput & Hegedus, 2004; Thorpe, 1989). 
Probability and rational number assumptions influence how students understand 
linear functions. Even algebraic problems that do require a linear function cause students 
tremendous difficulties (Moss, Beatty, Barkin, & Shillolo, 2008). Moss et al. attributed 
these difficulties to student misconceptions about additive versus multiplicative 
structures. For example, the Trapezoid Table Problem presents a series of trapezoidal 
tables joined with seats placed around the table. Students are also provided with a table of 
values as in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Representations provided in the Trapezoid Table problem (Moss et al., 2008, p. 157). 
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For pattern problems such as the Trapezoid Table, Warren (2000) found that 
students struggling with linear patterns tended to revert to a recursive pattern (i.e., 
repeatedly adding three to the previous y value, yn = yn-1 + 3) rather than developing a 
functional relationship between the number of tables and number of chairs (i.e., 
recognizing that the three acts as a slope ratio of change, a multiplicative operand, yn = 3n 
+ 2). Stacey (1989) identified the same tendency with similar problems (e.g., the 
Christmas Tree Problem, Ladders). The problem with such thinking is not that the 
recursive pattern is incorrect, but that it does not describe the relationship between x and 
y as students often believe it should (Warren, 2000).  
Non-linear functions offer a similar challenge for algebra students; specifically, 
students continue to apply this additive feature to numerical relationships, confusing it for 
functionality. If the additive feature is present, as in the Trapezoid Table problem, then 
students recognize the sequence as a function. If, on the other hand, an additive pattern 
cannot be found, the relationship is discarded as non-functional (Chang, 2002; Kalchman 
& Koedinger, 2005). More generally, Clement (2001) noted that students often rely on 
the presence of a formula do determine if a relationship is a function: 
Students may erroneously consider 32 −± x a function, since it is 
an algebraic formula; whereas they might not consider the correspondence 
that Mary owes $6, John owes $3, and Sue owes $2 to be a function, since 
no formula “fits it” (p. 746). 
Variables and Variation 
Variable interpretation. The notion of variability is especially important in 
algebra (Briggs, Demana, & Osborne, 1986; Edwards, 2000; Graham & Thomas, 2000; 
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Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005). MacGregor and Stacey (1997) found that students have 
difficulty assigning meaning to variables, failing to recognize the systemic consistency in 
the multiple uses of variables. Research efforts in algebra have long focused on how well 
students could discriminate between the uses of variables (Kieran, 2008). Küchemann 
(1978) developed a test for variable understanding which matched Piagetian sub-stages 
with item complexity: The results indicated that students interpret variables six ways 
(Table 6). 
Table 6 
Hierarchical Levels of Variable Interpretation 
Level Piagetian Sub-Scale Description 
1 Concrete Operations Evaluating the variable using trial and error. 
2 Ignoring the variable. 
3 Variable represents an object or label. 
4 Formal Operations Variable represents a specific unknown. 
5  Variable represents a generalized number. 
6 Variable represents a functional relationship. 
 
Gray, Loud, and Sokolowski (2005) examined student responses to questions 
examining student interpretation of variables using Küchemann’s hierarchy as a 
framework. For the question, “Small apples cost 8 cents each and small pears cost 6 cents 
each. If a stands for the number apples bought and p stands for the number of pears 
bought, what does 8a + 6p stand for?” 81% of students in basic algebra, 76% in college 
algebra, and 50% in calculus answered incorrectly (Gray et al., 2005, p. 4). Gray et al. 
identified the most common error as substituting the price of the fruit for the letters and 
giving the resultant solution, 100. Students who gave this solution appeared to interpret a 
and p as specific unknowns (Küchemann’s Level 4). The next common error resulted 
from interpreting the letters as labels for the objects (Küchemann’s Level 3) rather than 
the price of the objects, “8 apples and 6 pears” (p. 5). Their findings agreed with those 
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found by Küchemann (1981) for high school students: “Children have relatively little 
difficulty with items…where the letters can be thought of as objects or names of 
objects…they find it much more difficult when the letters necessarily represent numbers, 
especially numbers of objects” (p. 307).  
Similarly, Torigoe and Gladding (2006) compared student ability to solve sets of 
parallel problems, one involving numerical values and the other providing variables. In 
one problem, students were asked to determine the minimum acceleration necessary for 
police to catch a bank robber fleeing the scene of a crime. In one version, the prompt 
provides specific numerical quantities while the second version provided symbols to 
represent the quantities. 
The percentage of correct responses for the symbolic version (57%) was 
significantly lower than for the numerical version (94%) for a sample of 894 college 
students. Their study suggested that, holding all other task characteristics constant, the 
meaning of variables and the quantities they represent causes significant difficulties for 
students in algebra. Thorpe (1989) suggested that one possible reason for such difficulty 
is in the fragmentation of instruction. He encouraged the elimination of the concept of 
expressions from the algebra curriculum entirely: 
Asking students in an algebra course to manipulate expressions is 
analogous to asking students in a writing course to manipulate phrases 
rather than sentences. Expressions are not important in themselves. They 
are important only when they are implicitly or explicitly part of an 
equation. The expression 2x + 1, by itself, is incomplete. To have 
meaning, it must be imbedded in an equation, such as f(x) = 2x + 1, or 2x + 
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1 = 0. The equation provides meaning for the expression, as well as a 
context for x. (Is x a variable or does x represent a member of a solution 
set?) Just as we teach students of writing to speak in sentences, let us teach 
students of algebra to speak in sentences! (p. 18). 
From Thorpe’s point of view, understanding the nature of a variable is intertwined 
with the meaning of equations in a particular context. However, placing variables in the 
context of an equation may not be sufficient to advance student understanding of 
variables.  
Operating at Küchemann’s (1978) Level 4, many students can readily find the 
solution of 3 for a problem such as 5x – 4 = 11. However, in solving for such an 
unknown, students may not recognize the varying nature of x; that is, that as x takes on 
different values, the value on the right hand side of the equation (i.e., the 11) changes as 
well. Furthermore, the same letter may be used in multiple problems. Suppose instead 
that 5x – 4 = 20. In this problem, we find that the same letter x now represents a value of 
3.2. Students rarely recognize or value such subtleties of change, instead relying on rote 
procedures (Fuson et al., 2005; Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005), nor do they recognize the 
connection to a two variable equation, such as y = 5x – 4 (Kieran, 2008). Students will 
often look for an “answer,” not recognizing that multiple solution sets can exist within a 
single problem or that multiple equations can be related. This lack of meaning may also 
be due to fragmented instruction (Thorpe, 1989; Kieran, 1989, 2007) and an instructional 
focus on procedures rather than concepts and connections between ideas (Hiebert & 
Carpenter, 1992; Hiebert & Grouws, 2007).Probability instruction can be used to focus 
the concept of variable directly on the changing values within a quantity, thereby helping 
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students avoid or alleviate this confusion. 
The reversal error presented by Kaput and Clement’s (1979) Student Professor 
Problem (i.e., Write an equation to represent the phrase, ‘There are six times as many 
students as professors at this university’) may demonstrate underlying misconceptions in 
the meaning of variables and equality. Clement (1982) attempted to eliminate the reversal 
error by warning students of the potential reversal while Rosnick and Clement (1980) 
tutored students specifically about the reversal error, hoping that cognitive awareness 
alone could assist students. Fisher (1988) and Phillippe (1992) substituted used letters 
other than S and P, hoping to advance students beyond the use of letters as labels. Each of 
these efforts resulted in a lack of significant change in the error rate. Clement (1982) 
identified three types of strategies used by students in the student professor problem (see 
Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Strategies Used in the Student Professor Problem (Clement, 1982, p. 21). 
In the word order matching strategy, students displayed the label misconception, 
operating at Küchemann’s (1978) Level 1. Similarly, in the static comparison, students 
relied on a mental image of the makeup of a typical university with more students than 
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professors. Clement (1982) found that the static comparison image was so strong that 
even after considering the correct equation, S = 6P, students considered it impossible and 
discarded it in favor of the erroneous equation. 
Probability quantities are also affected by static comparisons. Static comparison 
thinking may contribute to misconceptions in probability as well. Consider the following 
problem: “Of the following two subgroups, which is larger? (a) Unmarried physicians, or 
(b) Unmarried physicians who like to travel abroad” (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989, p. 543).  
Respondents overwhelmingly chose (b), reasoning that unmarried physicians are 
more likely to travel abroad than married ones. This reasoning also represents static 
comparison: Agnoli and Krantz (1989) found that students based their decisions on a 
priori knowledge rather than the meaning of the mathematical statement. Likewise, 
MacGregor and Stacey (1997) suggested that students often make such errors as a result 
of relying on intuition and making analogies to more familiar situations. Errors resulting 
from static comparisons are persistent, resistant to direct interventions, and often result in 
biased mathematical judgments in unfamiliar contexts (Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973a, 1973b, 1982, 1983), Agnoli and Krantz 
(1989), and Shaughnessy and Bergman (1993) divided these biased judgments into two 
categories, representativeness and availability. Representativeness, results from 
transferring properties of large samples to small samples, especially the notion that small 
samples reflect the parent population as well as large samples (or, “neglect of small 
samples” in Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993, p. 182). The second judgmental heuristic 
error, availability, reflects a person’s tendency to estimate probabilities based on 
available personal experiences. These judgment errors themselves do not appear to be 
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misconceptions, but they do appear to emerge from a fundamental misunderstanding 
about the nature of probabilistic quantities. Whether static comparison errors begin with 
probability or algebra or affect both content domains simultaneously is unclear. These 
errors may, however, link fundamental probability misconceptions to algebra 
misconceptions. 
MacGregor and Stacey (1997) suggested that misleading teaching practices and 
materials may exacerbate the need for students to rely on judgmental heuristics in 
mathematics. Thorpe (1989), Kieran (1989, 1992) and Leitzel (1989) suggested that de-
contextualizing the algebra curriculum may be one such misleading practice that guides 
students away from the systemic structure of algebra. On the other hand, Kieran (2008) 
noted that advances in instructional technology may help reverse some of this de-
contextualization. For example, Ainley, Bills, and Wilson (2004) presented evidence that 
spreadsheet applications can help students build bridges from numerical specificity to 
variable generality: 
In the algebra-like notation of the spreadsheet, the cell reference is 
used ambiguously to name both the physical location of a cell in a column 
and row, and the information the cell may contain. The spreadsheet thus 
offers a strong visual image of the cell as a container in two which 
numbers can be placed…The image offered by the spreadsheet is 
ambiguous in another powerful way: when a formula is entered in a cell, it 
can be ‘filled down’ to operate on a range of cells in a column. The cell 
reference can then be seen as both specific (a particular number I may put 
in this cell) and general (all the values I may enter in this column). This 
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image is likely to support the idea of variable as a range of numbers in 
functional relationships (p. 2). 
Chazan and Yerushalmy (2003) examined the complexity of variable concepts 
and concluded that a functions-based approach focusing on variation/change rather than 
unknowns to be solved allows students to develop more advanced understanding of 
variables. Such an approach directs students to interpret variables at Küchemann’s (1978) 
two highest abstract levels, generalized numbers and functional relationships. The 
concept of variation as studied in probability follows Chazan and Yerushalmy’s advice: 
Variables are quantities within which patterns for expected values are based on 
distributions; Variation is examined as a measure of change that describes differences 
between small samples and the population, variation from the mean within a sample; and 
students explore patterns within random variables and the significance of small amounts 
of variation in large samples (Watson & Kelly, 2005; Watson, Kelly, Callingham, & 
Shaughnessy, 2003; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004; Zawojewski & Shaughnessey, 2000). 
Probability instruction, therefore, may offer an alternative approach to leading 
students to the meaning of variable by combining the concept of variable with authentic 
contexts and technological tools (e.g., spreadsheets) with the exploration of variation for 
different sample sizes. Often, students underestimate the amount of variation in small 
samples, inappropriately applying the Law of Large Numbers (Shaughnessy, 1992; 
Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Shaughnessy, Canada, & Ciancetta, 2003). Consider the 




Figure 8. The Candy Problem (Watson and Shaughnessy, 2004, p. 107). 
Student responses on this item indicated that some students have no intuitive 
sense of the amount of variation they should expect in repeated sampling with 
replacement while others included a reasonable amount of variation in their predictions 
(Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004).  
Green’s (1982) thumbtack question demonstrated how issues with variation are 
linked with assumptions of uniformity and equality. In this problem, students were asked, 
“A packet of 100 drawing pins is emptied out onto a table. Some drawing pins land 
pointing up and some land pointing down: How many up and how many down would you 
expect out of the 100?” (p. 30). Green (1983a) reported that most students chose a 50-50 
outcome, assuming that the probability of up and down is equal. Trying a variation of the 
same problem, he included additional information about a prior trial in which 32 tacks 
landed up and 68 down. Some students chose a reversed solution, 64 landed up and 36 
down, explaining that the given information did not match their own experiences (i.e., the 
availability heuristic). The item was modified to its final form, making the prior trial 
seem more realistic and including a non-numeric choice that all outcomes are equally 
likely. In the final sample, students overwhelmingly chose the non-numeric option, 
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confirming their belief in uniformity and equality. 
Another question from Green (1982) linked notions of variation with randomness 
and the belief that randomness means uniformity: 
A teacher asked Clare and Susan each to toss a coin a large number 
of times and to record every time whether the coin landed Heads or Tails. 
For each ‘Heads,’ a 1 is recorded and for each ‘Tails,’ a 0 is recorded. 
Here are the two sets of results: 
 
Now one girl did it properly, by tossing the coin. The other girl 
cheated and just made it up. Which girl cheated? How can you tell? (p. 
27). 
Students at all grade levels overwhelmingly believed that the regularity of Clare’s 
pattern and the long run lengths in Susan’s pattern made Susan the most likely culprit for 
having cheated, when, in fact, the reverse was true. Green conjectured that their 
reasoning errors emerged from a deeper misconception about the nature of variation 
within randomness and suggested a link between variation misunderstandings and beliefs 
about uniformity. 
The gambler’s fallacy is another example of a reasoning error that may be linked 
to misconceptions about variation, representativeness, and randomness (Falk & Konold, 
1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The gambler’s fallacy denotes a belief that, given a 
sequence of independent events repeated a number of times and a particular outcome has 
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occurred more than would normally be expected, a different outcome is more likely on 
subsequent trials. For example, a student tosses a coin six times and gets a single tail the 
first time and then five heads. The gambler’s fallacy represents the belief that the tails 
outcome is more likely on the next flip. 
When subjects are instructed to generate a random sequence of 
hypothetical tosses of a fair coin…they produced sequences where the 
proportion of heads in any short segment stays far closer to .50 than the 
laws of chance would predict…Subjects act as if every segment of the 
random sequence has strayed from the population proportion, a corrective 
bias in the other direction is expected (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, p. 
106).  
Tying Algebra, Probability, and Rational Numbers Together through Error Patterns 
Static comparisons and judgment bias errors appear to affect the learning of both 
algebra and probability. Some of these errors may be due to misunderstanding 
fundamental concepts in algebra such as variable meaning and functions. Errors in 
reasoning within probability may sometimes be due to misconceptions about rational 
number quantities and their relationships within specific contexts. Misapplication of 
additive and multiplicative structures in algebraic contexts may also be connected to 
misunderstanding the rational number quantities within a specific situation. The 
connections between these reasoning errors also appear in geometry contexts. 
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Critical Misconceptions Specific to Learning Geometry 
Spatial Reasoning 
Student orientation toward geometry is quite different from that of algebra: 
Students are often intrinsically motivated to study the properties that govern the shapes 
encountered in daily life (Engel, 1970; Freudenthal, 1973). In spite of this motivational 
factor, students still struggle with errors and misunderstandings in geometry due to 
limited spatial reasoning (Clement & Battista, 1992).  
Spatial reasoning begins with the differentiation between objects and 
representations. Objects are abstractions, ideas considered through reasoning (Battista, 
2007). Representations, on the other hand, are used to signify objects other than 
themselves. For example, a line drawn on a piece of paper only represents a geometric 
line, defined in Euclidean geometry as having infinite length and no thickness. The Van 
Hiele (1959/1984a) framework is especially helpful for describing student spatial 
reasoning processes and how they distinguish between objects and representations. 
This framework classifies geometric reasoning into five levels. Within Level 0, 
the base level (visual in Clement & Battista, 1992), children reason geometrically solely 
on the basis of recognition. At this stage, shapes are examined as a whole. Only the 
physical appearance of a shape is considered without regard to parts or properties, and no 
distinction is made between objects and representations (Crowley, 1987). For example, 
they may recognize that a rectangle is different than a square only because it appears 
different. Within Level 1 (analysis in Crowley, 1987 and descriptive/analytical in 
Clements & Battista, 1992), students analyze geometric concepts using properties and 
characteristics of shapes and figures (Crowley, 1987). For example, students will 
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recognize that a rectangle has four sides, that opposite sides are equal, and that the four 
angles all measure 90°. They may not, however, recognize the hierarchical ordering of 
properties. For example, they may attribute the properties of a rectangle to a square 
without realizing that a square is actually a special rectangle. At Level 2 
(abstract/relational; Clements & Battista, 1992), students do begin the ordering of 
properties (Van Hiele, 1959/1984a) through informal deduction (Crowley, 1987). 
Students using abstract/relational reasoning categorize shapes and figures according to 
their properties and recognize hierarchical classifications, such as considering a square to 
be a rectangle with congruent sides. At Level 3 (deduction in Crowley, 1987 and formal 
deduction in Clements & Battista, 1992), students are able to develop theorems within an 
axiomatic system. Additionally, they distinguish between the roles of theorems, 
postulates, as definitions; their thinking is also concerned with the meaning of the 
converse of a theorem (Crowley, 1987; Van Hiele, 1959/1984a). Most high school 
instruction goes no further than Level 3 (Crowley, 1987); however, Level 4 (rigor in 
Crowley, 1987 and rigor/mathematical in Clements & Battista, 1992), involves the 
formal reasoning about mathematical systems in the absence of reference models. 
Clements & Battista (1992) also proposed a pre-base level which they called pre-
recognition in which children are unable to distinguish between shapes. 
The Van Hiele framework can be used to help explain common misconceptions 
that develop in geometry through missing or inadequate spatial reasoning. Clements and 
Battista (1992, p. 422) compiled 11 of the most common geometric misconceptions: 
1. An angle must have one horizontal ray. 
2. A right angle is an angle that points to the right. 
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3. To be a side of a figure a segment must be vertical. 
4. A segment is not a diagonal if it is vertical or horizontal 
5. A square is not a square if its base is not horizontal. 
6. The only way a figure can be a triangle is if it is equilateral. 
7. The height of a triangle or parallelogram is a side adjacent to the base. 
8. The angle sum of a quadrilateral is the same as its area. 
9. The Pythagorean Theorem can be used to calculate the area of a 
rectangle. 
10. If a shape has four sides, then it is a square. 
11. The area of a quadrilateral can be obtained by transforming it into a 
rectangle with the same perimeter. 
Students who hold Misconceptions 1 – 5 operate at the base level of recognition. 
For example, a student who believes that a square is not a square unless its base is 
horizontal (Misconception 5) does not associate the properties of a square to the label. 
Instead, such a student relies strictly on the visual orientation of a particular drawing. 
Students who hold Misconceptions 6 – 11 have moved to the analysis level: They are 
aware of properties, but the properties have not been organized into a coherent system. 
For example, a student who believes that the sum of a quadrilateral is the same as its area 
(Misconception 8) acknowledges that a quadrilateral has the property of a constant sum 
for its interior angles but confuses the meaning of an angle with the meaning of area. 
Teaching methods and materials coupled with a lack of authentic experiences may 
exacerbate misconceptions resulting from the limited spatial reasoning found at the lower 
Van Hiele levels (Oberdorf & Taylor-Cox, 1999). They described the example of early 
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geometric activities in which students are taught to distinguish between rectangles and 
squares. They maintained that such differentiation is quite difficult to eradicate in later 
grades. Instead, they advocated for the use of exploratory activities that allow students to 
examine quadrilaterals as a whole and provide the substance for rich discussions about 
similarities and differences between different quadrilaterals. 
Monoghan (2000) found that textbooks tend to reinforce an over-reliance on 
typical representations of geometric objects, a condition that may result in limiting 
progression from the recognition stage to the analysis stage. Swindal (2000) and 
Monaghan (2000) recognized a fundamental gap first identified by Van Hiele 
(1959/1984a) and Shaughnessy and Burger (1985): Students and teachers think about the 
same concepts from different levels. Most students in high school geometry reason at 
Levels 0 or 1 (recognition and analysis) while teachers think, reason, and teach using 
vocabulary from Level 2 (abstract/relational thinking). Furthermore, courses that focus 
primarily on the development of proof using language from Level 3 offer most students, 
who are functioning at Levels 0 and 1, limited opportunity to advance their understanding 
of spatial properties and relationships (Hiebert & Grouws, 2007). 
Misunderstandings about spatial properties and relationships appear dissimilar to 
algebra, probability, and rational number reasoning errors on the surface, but the number 
patterns within spatial relationships involve rational numbers and algebraic patterns. 
Geometric models are also often used to represent probability ratios. 
Proportionality and Geometric Learning 
Just as with rational numbers, probability, and algebra, linear proportions abound 
in geometry (e.g., side lengths and perimeter of similar figures follow the Rule of Three, 
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as in Carter et al., 2010; Dietiker et al., 2007; Serra, 2003). Freudenthal (1983) and 
Stacey (1983) noted that the abundance of linear applications in geometry often leads 
students to the belief that linearity is universally applicable. Students often cling to the 
linear model tenaciously in spite of additional information that discredits the linear model 
for a particular scenario (De Bock et al., 1998, 2002; De Bock, Van Dooren, Verschaffel, 
& Janssens, 2002). De Bock et al. (1998, 2002) studied student problem solving with 
problems involving squares, circles, and irregular figures, half of which required a linear 
proportion while the other half required non-linear reasoning. Their example for square 
figures follows (De Bock et al., 1998, p. 68). 
Enlargement of a square figure 
Proportional item: 
Farmer Gus needs approximately 4 days to dig a ditch around a 
square pasture with a side of 100 m. How many days would he need to dig 
a ditch around a square pasture with a side of 300 m? (Answer: 12 days) 
Non-proportional item: 
Farmer Carl needs approximately 8 hours to manure a square piece 
of land with a side of 200 m. How many hours would he need to manure a 
square piece of land with a side of 600 m? (Answer: 72 hours) 
De Bock et al. (1998) found that 98% of their sample of 12 and13 year old 
students solved the proportional problems correctly, whereas only 5% of the same sample 
solved the non-proportional items correctly. They also found that problems for irregular 
figures were missed more than problems for squares or circles. In their follow up study 
(De Bock et al., 2002), they interviewed students who had missed non-proportional 
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problems. The interviews progressed through five stages, each progressively adding more 
information to direct the students toward a non-linear model. Most students required at 
least three stages before realizing that the linear solution was incorrect; some students 
clung to the linear solution even after all five stages. 
The ability to distinguish how and when to use proportionality relationships 
appears to affect the learning of geometry as well as algebra, probability, and rational 
numbers. Misusing these relationships may be due to misunderstanding geometric ideas 
and the connections between them. The inter-connectedness between these potential 
misunderstandings with rational number, probability, and algebra may indicate that a 
novel teaching strategy targeting the underlying misconceptions may help reduce 
reasoning errors in all four content areas. 
Teaching Probability to Correct Foundational Mathematical Misunderstandings 
Stone, Alfeld, and Pearson (2008) echoed the sentiments of Freudenthal (1970): 
In order to guide students to deep mathematical learning, mathematical content must be 
tied to authentic experiences to which students can relate. Probability offers such a 
connection between mathematics and the real world naturally (Liu & Thompson, 2007), 
and its de-emphasis in U.S. high school mathematics curricula may account for many of 
the difficulties students have connecting abstract mathematical ideas to concrete 
examples (Davis, 1992). In spite of the ability of probability to bridge the gulf between 
the abstract and concrete, several reasons explain its exclusion from mathematics 
curricula. First, teachers are typically less familiar with probability content than other 
areas of mathematics (Jendraszek, 2008; Swenson, 1998). Compounding this problem is 
the fact that probability is often viewed as a second-rate topic (Mitchell, 1990; 
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Shaughnessy, 2006). Furthermore, curriculum issues in the United States have 
historically been problematic: Every state develops its own standards, varying widely in 
organization and complexity (Boland & Nicholson, 1996; Reys & Lappan, 2007). Issues 
of cognitive development of a child and student mobility between schools and states 
compound curriculum issues even further (Engec, 2006; Fajemidagba, 1983). The 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) began an effort to coordinate the 
development of a recommended mathematics curriculum, publishing the Curriculum and 
Evaluation Standards as a result (NCTM, 1989). Even after concerted efforts to increase 
the teaching of probability, Shaughnessy (1992) found that the NCTM recommendations 
are minimized in the classroom. Figure 10 shows that, even when the recommendations 
are followed, number, algebra, and geometry receive the greatest emphasis while 
probability is given minimal attention. 
 
Figure 9. NCTM (2000) Mathematics Strands for Grades K – 12 (p. 30). 
Although data analysis and probability are inextricably linked, the two areas may 
need separate degrees of emphasis in high school. Shaughnessy (2007) found that student 
ability to compute means, medians, and modes had improved since his 1992 report, but 
student understanding of randomness, chance, and variation had not improved 
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correspondingly. Likewise, Smith (2003) found that many high school teachers handle 
probability differently than statistics; they may relegate probability to the end of the year 
as time permits or simply delete it from the curriculum completely. 
This de-emphasis of probability has devastating consequences for mathematics 
students. First, excluding probability from the mathematics curriculum may increase the 
disparity between mathematics and the real world. Shaughnessy and Bergman (1993) 
stated, “It appears that stochastic problems may closely resemble the type of problem 
solving that our students will have to do in their own private lives or on their jobs” (p. 
193). Furthermore, people are faced with choices involving probability on a daily basis 
that affect the quality of life for themselves and their family and friends, e.g., career 
decisions (Hume, 1970; Papps, 2008), interpreting weather, economic, and political 
forecasts (Resnick, 1987), business and personal purchasing choices (Ashman, 2001; 
McAvoy, 2001; Swaminathan, 2003), and gaming (Barry, 1988; Brandt & Pietras, 2008; 
Clotfelter & Cook, 1991; Lai-Yin & Rob, 2005).  
Second, Engel (1970) and Shermer (2008) found that humans typically do not 
intuit probability correctly without formal training. In fact, researchers have found that 
humans’ lack of intuition regarding probability poses one of the primary difficulties in 
both the learning and teaching of the subject (Engel, 1970; Kahneman et al., 1982; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973a, 1973b, 1983; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993). This 
stumbling block creates a significant barrier to understanding abstract mathematical 
concepts. For example, when students examine the conjunction of two sets (A ∩ B), they 
often conclude that the conjunction has a greater magnitude than the parent sets (Agnoli, 
1987; Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Shaughnessy, 1992). This intuitive response has been 
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traced to the use of judgment heuristics such as representativeness (Agnoli, 1987; 
Shaughnessy, 1992). Heuristics are often useful for framing mathematical reasoning to 
solve problems (Pólya, 1957; Schoenfeld, 1992). However, reliance on heuristic 
judgments may lead to reasoning errors when they reflect beliefs rather than attributes or 
when those heuristics are used as substitutes for understanding the meaning of concepts 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1983; Shaughnessy, 1992). Consider an example in which 
students are asked to compare two sets, “Men who have had one or more heart attacks” 
and “Men who are over 55 years old” (Agnoli, 1987, p. 3). Basing the comparison on 
representativeness beliefs often leads students to conclude that the conjunction of these 
two sets, “Men who have had one or more heart attacks and are over 55 years old,” is 
actually larger than either of the two parent sets (i.e., they believe that men over 55 are 
more likely to have a heart attack) when, actually, parent sets are always larger than their 
conjunction. 
Third, the misconceptions prevalent in probability may influence the foundations 
of how students think about mathematics generally. For example, Green (1983b) reported 
on a survey of over 3,000 British teens’ (ages 11 – 16) in which he identified a major 
misconception in the area of proportions: Students most commonly chose the incorrect 
answer that corresponded with the largest numerator value rather than the relative size of 
the rational number relationship. Through tasks such as Green’s Marble Problem, an 
exploration of probability problems provides a natural venue for exploring rational 
number concepts. The authentic experiences so necessary for learning probability 
concepts also require scrutiny of the meaning of the rational numbers used for reporting 
probabilities. Additionally, the concrete applications of probability (e.g., flipping coins, 
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rolling a die, simulation and modeling) may be a critical key for students struggling to 
integrate abstract concepts into their prior conceptions of mathematics (Evans & 
Tsatsaroni, 2000; Freudenthal, 1970; Fuson, 1998; Green, 1983b; Watson & 
Shaughnessy, 2004). Connecting abstract concepts such as randomness to probability 
simulations such as The Cliff Hanger applet (Mathematics, Science, and Technology 
Education, 2005) may also improve student orientations toward mathematics (Stone, 
Alfeld, & Pearson, 2008) and student flexibility in unfamiliar problem solving situations 
(Evans & Tsatsaroni, 2000). As a result, students may develop a deeper relational 
understanding of mathematical concepts, allowing them to handle greater mathematical 
complexity and difficulty.  
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A Conceptual Framework to Model Mathematics Learning 
The similarity between reasoning across mathematics content areas suggests a 
pathway of learning that either results in understanding or misconceptions and errors. To 
develop a model that traces these pathways, several factors must be considered. First, the 
introduction of new concepts is typically accompanied with tasks or problems for the 
students to complete. The characteristics of these tasks (e.g., task complexity, difficulty, 
discrimination between ability levels) may influence how students interpret the new 
material. Second, students must filter tasks through their own knowledge framework. 
Third, the pedagogical emphasis on either concepts or procedures direct students to 
develop either relational or instrumental understanding (Skemp, 1976/2006). If students 
learn relationally, then the conceptual understanding they develop may produce stronger, 
more consistent procedural skills, which in turn may reinforce deeper more robust 
conceptual understanding. This understanding may then be integrated into a student’s 
knowledge framework for use with future tasks. 
Alternatively, the development of instrumental understanding leads to the 
development of procedures without meaning, with incomplete or erroneous meaning, or 
even the lack of awareness of meaning (Skemp 1976/2006). Misunderstanding the 
meaning of mathematical objects in some way is the very essence of misconceptions. 
Mathematical misconceptions result in errors that are often difficult for teachers to 
prevent or obstruct. Researchers have repeatedly found that systematic errors due to 
misconceptions rather than faulty reasoning adhere to patterns of over- or under-
generalization of properties or concepts for a particular task (e.g., Chang, 2002; Falk, 
1992; Fuys & Liebov, 1997; Kalchman & Koedinger, 2005; Van Dooren, De Bock, 
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Depaepe, Janssens, and Verschaffel, 2003). For example, in geometry, Fuys and Liebov 
(1997) suggested that students struggling to move from a visualization level of spatial 
reasoning to an analysis level may under-generalize geometric properties by including 
irrelevant characteristics of a shape in their mental framework; or conversely, they may 
over-generalize relationships between figures by discarding any number of a shape’s 
unique properties. If unchecked, these misconceptions may be integrated into students’ 
mathematical understanding, thereby influencing future learning.  
Difficulties Inherent to Addressing Mathematical Misconceptions Directly 
Multiple attempts to develop interventions for reducing misconceptions have met 
with limited success. Some of these efforts have focused on addressing task-specific 
errors (e.g., Rosnick & Clement, 1979). One difficulty with such a strategy is that if the 
error was due to a misconception, the underlying misconception will remain in the 
student’s knowledge framework to adapt and reappear in the same or other task. Other 
endeavors have attempted to address the reasoning that leads to an error using a variety of 
strategies such as worked examples (e.g., Fisher, 1988; Phillippe, 1992; Rosnick & 
Clement, 1980). Directly addressing erroneous reasoning appeared to make no significant 
improvement in student learning (Weinberg, 2007). 
Weinberg (2007) suggested that another reason student errors can be so insidious 
is that students attempt to adapt their knowledge base to the problem scenario, sometimes 
accurately and sometimes not. The adaptive nature of these errors suggests that the 
reasoning processes are built on a deeper foundation of understanding relating to the 
structure and meaning of mathematical ideas (Kieran, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
An even more robust intervention design may be needed to alter students’ 
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mathematical thinking and reasoning. Rather than targeting reasoning processes directly, 
such an intervention might focus instead on transforming the instrumental understanding 
responsible for difficulties in meaning that can lead to misconceptions into relational 
understanding. If a teaching intervention targets the development of meaning and 
connections, then misconceptions that develop may be only a normal, temporary part of 
the learning process (Resnick, 1983). 
Mathematical Task Characteristics 
Teachers typically introduce new concepts by presenting a task or problem as a 
motivation for learning the mathematical concept. Rousseau (1976) identified eight task 
characteristics that potentially influence how students internalize the meaning of the task 
and its connection to the underlying concept: task identity, task autonomy, skill variety, 
task variety, task feedback, task learning, dealing with others, and task significance. Task 
identity refers to the ownership a student assumes for an activity. Task autonomy, closely 
aligned with identity, focuses on the degree of independence students have in decision 
making throughout a task. Skill variety emphasizes the breadth and depth of skills 
required to complete a particular task. Task variety, on the other hand, refers to the 
breadth of subjects and courses provided by a school. Task learning represents the 
breadth and scope of opportunities for obtaining new skills, what Hiebert and Grouws 
(2007) referred to as opportunity to learn. Task feedback speaks to the amount of 
feedback students receive from a task versus the feedback from teachers. Catanzaro 
(1997) maintained that task feedback creates a more stimulating, positive learning 
environment over instructor feedback. Rousseau (1976) defined dealing with others as 
“the opportunity to interact with teachers, teaching assistants and other faculty” (p. 3). 
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Many researchers would also emphasize the importance of interactions with other 
students (e.g., Berg, 1993; Freeman, 1997; Henderson & Landesman, 1995; Nichols & 
Miller, 1994; Parham, 1993; Slavin & Karweit, 1982; Slavin & Lake, 2008; Slavin, Lake, 
& Groff, 2009; Whicker, Bol, & Nunnery, 1997). Task significance represents student 
perceptions of a particular task’s relevance to life beyond academic concerns. Rousseau 
(1976) found that task significance may have the strongest impact of her eight task 
characteristics. 
Student Thought Processes Influencing Mathematical Misconceptions 
Erroneous thinking resulting from misconceptions is often stable and robust, 
interfering with a student’s ability to learn mathematics (Moschkovich, 1998). 
Researchers tend to agree that a possible key to addressing these issues may lie in the 
alignment of student thought processes with mathematical logic (e.g., Behr, 1980; Blanco 
& Garrote, 2007; Collis, 1975; Enfedaque, 1990; Kieran, 1980; Palarea Medina, 1999; 
Socas Robayna, 1997) and the connection of specific misconceptions to the student’s 
larger knowledge framework (e.g., Moschkovich, 1998; Smith, diSessa, & Roschelle, 
1993). This knowledge framework includes (at least) four components that can influence 
whether a student develops relational or instrumental understanding: (1) Discernment; (2) 
Orientation toward mathematics; (3) Individual context; and (4) Environmental Context. 
Discernment. Discernment has been defined as an aspect of knowledge that 
encompasses the active, cognitive components of learning (Ronau & Rakes, 2010; 
Ronau, Rakes, Wagener, & Dougherty, 2009; Ronau, Wagener, & Rakes, 2009). Kant 
(1786/1901) proposed that cognition is engaged through the process of perceptions 
leading to conceptions, which in turn lead to ideas. Davis (1992), comparing Japanese to 
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American tests, considered the influence of such perceptions to be paramount to deep 
mathematical learning:  
Perhaps 75 one-step problems on a test will produce about the 
same ranking of students as will 6 multistep problems that require serious 
thought (and perhaps some originality). But the message that they send to 
students is entirely different. The one-step problems say to students, “You 
do not have to do much hard thinking in mathematics, nor must you be 
very creative; all you have to do is pay attention in class, memorize 
dutifully, practice diligently, and you will get no surprises on the tests.” 
The Japanese tests send a different message ⎯ rather more in the spirit of 
the contest problems that a very few U.S. students encounter ⎯ where it is 
more clear from the outset that, if you have developed nothing more than 
routine skills, you will be hopelessly ineffective. You must strive for 
ingenuity and originality (p. 725). 
Davis (1992) went on to consider the meaning of mathematics from a cognitive 
perspective. He gave three examples of problems whose solution required the addition of 
whole numbers. These problems differed in the degree of decision making required about 
each contextual situation prior to concluding that addition is needed for each.  
Now, here is the main point behind these three examples: Most 
people who have not had an opportunity to think seriously about such 
matters would claim that the mathematics is that part of the problem that 
the calculator did. They might find the decisions…or the choice of 
arithmetical operations…to be thought provoking, but they would 
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probably not consider them an essential part of the mathematics…they 
might not even notice that there was any thinking involved other than the 
computation that the calculator carried out. I would argue that such 
observers are precisely wrong. There is very little mathematics in the 
actual carrying out of the computations…The mathematics lies mainly in 
analyzing the real situation and deciding how to represent it in an 
appropriate abstract symbolic form (Davis, 1992, p. 727). 
Schoenfeld (1992) agreed with Davis’ conceptualization of the nature of 
mathematical learning. He added that mathematical problem solving requires a great deal 
of metacognitive regulation and that such behavior is learned best through “domain-
specific instruction” (p. 357). In an earlier work (Schoenfeld, 1982), he considered three 
types of analysis to be important to mathematical problem solving: analysis of tactical 
knowledge (i.e., domain-specific facts and procedures), analysis of control knowledge 
(i.e., strategic/executive behavior), and analysis of belief systems. The analysis of control 
knowledge speaks directly to metacognition, the regulation of cognitive processes. 
Several other researchers have suggested that cognitive and meta-cognitive skills filter 
student ability to understand mathematical concepts (Andrade & Valtcheva, 2009; 
Dermitzaki, Leondari, & Goudas, 2009; Fuson et al., 2005; Lin, Schwartz, & Hatano, 
2005; Nemirovsky & Ferrara, 2009; Usher, 2009). Swanson (1990) found that the 
development of metacognition may operate independently of aptitude and may impact 
learning more: 
On the surface, it appears that high metacognitive skills can 
compensate for overall ability by providing a certain knowledge about 
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cognition. This knowledge allows low-aptitude/high-metacognitive 
children to perform in ways similar to those of children with high aptitude. 
Thus, one may argue that measures of metacognition and general aptitude 
in the present study are tapping different forms of knowledge, and that 
high performance on the problem-solving tasks is more closely related to 
higher performance on the metacognitive measures than on the aptitude 
measures (Swanson, 1990, p. 312). 
Schraw and Dennison (1994) identified two constructs that measure 
metacognition: knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition. They found that, 
although the two constructs are correlated, each may affect cognitive performance in a 
unique way. Other studies have shown that students use these cognitively-based 
discernment faculties to connect abstract concepts to concrete representations (e.g., 
Secada, 1992; Spillane, 2000; Von Minden, Walls, & Nardi, 1998). 
Orientation toward mathematics. Schoenfeld’s (1982) third type of analysis 
focused on student beliefs. He posited that student beliefs about the nature of a 
mathematical task can greatly influence the degree of cognitive effort expended for the 
task. Schoenfeld (1985) conducted a survey of 230 students in three high schools. He 
found three aspects to student beliefs about mathematics. (1) Students in his sample 
attributed success in mathematics to work rather than luck. (2) Students in his sample 
disagreed that mathematics solutions were either “right” or “wrong.” They also declared 
the importance of teaching multiple ways to solve mathematics problems. This response 
surprised Schoenfeld because “very little of such teacher behavior was observed in the 
classroom studies…their response suggests either a strong acceptance of the mythology 
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about teaching, or some strong degree of wishful thinking” (p. 14). (3) Students view 
mathematics learning as largely dependent on memorization while simultaneously 
viewing it as a means to develop logical thinking.  
McLeod (1992) agreed with Schoenfeld’s description of beliefs and attitudes as 
components of affect; however, he added a third, distinct component category: emotions. 
Emotional reactions to mathematics learning occur when students experience obstacles to 
solutions. Such obstacles elicit negative feelings such as tension, frustration, fear, 
anxiety, embarrassment, and panic. Once obstacles are overcome, positive emotions 
return. He maintained that one goal of mathematics pedagogy should be to reduce the 
occurrence of these negative emotions. From attitudes, beliefs, and attitudes, seven 
subconstructs of affect emerge: confidence, self concept, self efficacy, anxiety, effort and 
ability attributions, learned helplessness, and motivation. 
Schoenfeld and Mcleod agreed that affect and cognition are linked (Schoenfeld, 
1989; McLeod, 1992). Schoenfeld (1989) found that beliefs and attitudes influence the 
way people develop conceptions about mathematics, directly and indirectly impacting 
their mathematical ability. Barkatsas, Kasimatis, and Gialamas (2009) found that high 
levels of mathematics achievement are associated with positive attitudes toward learning 
mathematics; positive attitudes, in turn, are associated with mathematics confidence and 
affective engagement. Ismail (2009) found that self-confidence appeared to supersede the 
impact of socio-economic disadvantage on student achievement. 
In summary, components of affect such as beliefs, attitudes, and emotions mold 
student orientations toward mathematics. Pedagogical strategies within mathematics 
influence the development of conceptions or misconceptions as a result of their attention 
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to orientation. 
Individual context. The contextual factors that students bring to a mathematical 
learning situation interact in multiple ways to influence how students interpret 
mathematical concepts. These individual context factors refer to characteristics such as 
gender, race, culture, socio-economic status, parent education levels, background 
experiences, and learning styles (Ronau et al., 2009; Ronau & Rakes, 2010; Ronau, 
Wagener, & Rakes, 2009). 
Evidence has suggested that boys and girls construct their understanding of 
mathematics differently (Fennema & Sherman, 1977) and hold different attitudes toward 
mathematics (Sherman & Fennema, 1978). Although moderate changes have occurred 
over time, inequity between genders still exists (Carrell, Page, & West, 2009; Fennema, 
2000; Mendick, 2008; Van Langen, Rekers-Mombarg, & Dekkers, 2008; Wei & Hendrix, 
2009; Zohar & Gershikov, 2008). 
Kozol (1992, 2005) examined educational practices across the country and 
asserted that inequalities also continue to exist across racial lines. Snipes and Waters 
(2005) agreed with Kozol’s assessment, conducting a case study in a single state. 
Lubienski (2001) and Lim (2008) found that race and class interact to produce an effect 
on mathematics achievement. Class measures include factors such as parent education 
levels and socio-economic status (SES). Parent education levels, one measure of SES, 
significantly predicted above average achievement during the Third International Math 
and Science Study (TIMSS; Schreiber, 2000). Lehrer, Strom, and Confrey (2002) found 
that prior mathematical experiences influence student orientation toward mathematics. 
Anderson (1990) asserted that cultural influences overshadow gender and racial effects 
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on equity in student achievement. Nelson, Joseph, & Williams (1993) agreed with 
Anderson, claiming that culture also has a direct bearing on affect. Strutchens (1995) 
proposed the use of a five-dimensional framework for increasing equity in mathematics 
education: content integration, knowledge construction, prejudice reduction, equitable 
pedagogy, and empowering school and social culture. 
Alomar (2007) and Esposito Lamy (2003) linked gender, race, culture, and affect 
with family variables such as parenting style and poverty. Lopez, Gallimore, Garnier, and 
Reese (2007) found that for immigrant populations, family factors influence English 
language literacy, which in turn affects student mathematics achievement.  
Personal characteristics such as learning styles, personality, and temperament also 
influence how students learn mathematics. The Silver-Strong studies (Silver, Brunsting, 
& Walsh, 2008; Silver, Strong, & Perini, 1997; Strong, Perini, Silver, & Thomas, 2004; 
Strong, Silver, & Perini, 2001) together with the work of Keirsey (1998) suggest a link 
between learning styles and personality. Keirsey (1998) described personality in terms of 
the Myers-Briggs notation. In this framework, a person may be Introverted (I) or 
extraverted (E); rely more on intuition (N) or the senses (S) to interpret a situation; rely 
more on feelings (F) or thinking (T) to make decisions; and, prefer routine (J for 
judgment) or sponteneity (P for perceiving), resulting in 16 different personality styles 
that he grouped into four categories with internal reliability ratings between 0.82 and 0.83 
(Alpine Media Corporation, 2003). Silver et al. (1997) used the same constructs to 
determine four categories of learning styles: Mastery, Understanding, Interpersonal, and 
Self-Expressive Learners. The dependence on these two frameworks on the Myers-Briggs 
constructs (Myers, 1962) suggests a possible link between learning styles and personality. 
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These frameworks directly map onto one another (Table 7).  
Table 7 
Alignment of Keirsey Personality Framework with Silver-Strong Learning Styles 
Silver-Strong 
Learning Style 




Mastery Value: Clarity and Practicality 
Prefer: procedure, drill and practice, concrete, 
closed questioning. 
Guardian Administrators: 





Value: Logic and Evidence 
Prefer: logic, debate, inquiry, indendent study, 
argumentation, and why questions. 
All Rational Subgroups: 
INTJ; INTP  
ENTJ; ENTP 
Interpersonal Value: The ability to help others 
Prefer: topics that affect lives, 
cooperative/collaborative learning, and teacher 
attention to successes and struggles. 
Guardian Conservators: 
ISFJ; ESFJ  
Artisan Entertainers: 
ISFP; ESFP 
Self Expressive  
 
Value: Originality and aesthetics 
Prefer: use of imagination to explore ideas, 
creative artistic activity, open-ended 
questions, and generating possibilities and 
alternatives. 




Understanding the role of values and preferences of the various types of learners 
directly impacts the equitable teaching of mathematics (Gardner & Hatch, 1989). Second, 
the traditional mathematics education described by Fey (1979) that still continues today 
(Hiebert, 2003; Hiebert & Grouws, 2007; Stigler & Hiebert, 1997) targets mastery 
learners almost exclusively, while they account for only about 35% of the population 
(Silver et al., 1997). In smaller samples, such as a single high school, the mastery learners 
have been found to account for far lower percentages (24% in Tungate, 2008). That 
mathematics teachers tend to be mastery learners themselves seems likely and would 
account for the disproportionate bent toward traditional practices.  
Personality has been framed most prominently as five major constructs known as 
“The Big Five:” Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and 
Openness to Experience (Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994, p. 189) . Personality emerges from 
temperament, but assessment of adult personality may not map directly from 
temperament (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). For example, cognitive self-concept may 
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supersede temperamental tendencies (i.e., beliefs about how a person would like to be, 
should be, and is in reality are difficult to separate).  
Posner and Rothbart (2007), Rothbart and Jones (1998), Rueda, Rothbart, 
Saccomanno, and Posner (2007) and Rudasill (2009) asserted that Attention, one 
temperament factor, may influence the learning of mathematics both directly and 
indirectly. “Everywhere in cognitive neuroscience, specific brain networks seem to 
underlie performance. However, some of those networks have the improtant property of 
being able to modify the activity in other networks” (Posner & Rothbart, 2007, pp. 15-
16).  
In brief, individual factors such as gender, race, class, personality, learning styles, 
and background experiences interact to influence orientation and cognition in 
mathematics. Moreover, evidence suggests that temperament may be a critical individual 
learning factor. Equitable mathematics teaching requires the consideration of the unique 
effects of these individual context factors.  
Environmental Context. Environmental factors interact with individual factors to 
influence the equitability of learning opportunities in mathematics. Controversy over the 
importance of environmental factors on learning lasted for decades, beginning with the 
publication of Equality of Educational Opportunities, more commonly known as The 
Coleman Report (Coleman et al., 1966). This study examined the achievement impact of 
differences between races on: school factors such as class size, access to chemistry, 
physics, and language laboratories, number of books in libraries, number of textbooks; 
teacher and principal characteristics such as type of college attended, years of teaching 
experience, salary, maternal education level, vocabulary ability, and dispositions; and 
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student characteristics such as parental background, presence of parents at home, size of 
family, parental expectations, parental involvement, and socio-economic status. Equality 
fundamentally altered definitions of equality from simply comparing resource “inputs” to 
analyzing the effects of inputs on educational achievements (Coleman, 1967a). Coleman 
(1967b) considered the complexity of implicit assumptions present within an input-based 
notion of equality: 
It is one thing to take as given that approximately 60% of an 
entering high school freshman class will not attend college; but to assign a 
particular child to a curriculum designed for that 60% closes off for that 
child the opportunity to attend college. Yet to assign all children to a 
curriculum designed for the 40% who will attend college creates 
inequality for those who, at the end of high school, fall among the 60% 
who do not attend college… there is a wide variety of different paths that 
adolescents take on the completion of secondary school (Coleman, 1967b, 
p. 9). 
Instead, Equality examined inequality based on five different criteria: degree of 
racial segregation, allocation of resources, teacher orientations, weighted resource inputs 
based on achievement predictability, and output (e.g., achievement, career choice) 
differences (Coleman, 1968). Equality found that student characteristics accounted for the 
majority of variance in achievement and of the impact of teacher characteristics on 
learning. For example, Coleman et al. (1966) reported that teacher variables accounted 
for 2.06% of the variation in mathematics achievement for Black students but only 0.61% 
for White students (p. 294). They concluded that “variations in school quality are not 
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highly related to variations in achievement of pupils” (p. 297). However, technology 
capabilities of the time limited the researchers’ analytic capabilities (Stringfield & 
Teddlie, 2004). Later studies (e.g., Bryk & Raudenbush, 1988; Raudenbush & Bryk, 
1984) took advantage of technological advancements by conducting multilevel analyses 
on the subsets of the Coleman et al. (1966) data set:  
The results were startling ⎯ 83% of the variance in [learning] 
growth rates was between schools. In contrast, only about 14% of the 
variance in initial status was between schools…this analysis identified 
substantial differences among schools that conventional models would not 
have detected (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2004, pp. 9-10). 
Recent studies have continued to emphasize the importance of environmental 
factors on students learning. Hegedus and Kaput (2004) found that the way classroom 
activities are organized affects the potential depth of student understanding. Cobb, 
Gresalfi, and Hodge (2009) found that cultures within a classroom influence the 
development of personal identities in mathematics. LaRocque (2008) found that student 
perceptions of the classroom environment are associated with reading and mathematics 
achievement. She noted that the interaction of perception with gender was not statistically 
significant but that the interaction of perception with grade level was significant. 
McMahon, Wernsman, and Rose (2009) agreed with LaRocque’s findings that 
perceptions of classroom difficulty are strong predictors of mathematics and science self-
efficacy. Bong (2008) found that classroom goal structures influence student perceptions 
of mathematics learning. She also found that relationships influence perceptions of 
learning. In like manner, Carter (2008) described the impact of having a classroom 
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climate that values the struggle of connecting mathematical concepts to current 
conceptions. She concluded that such a climate enhances student self efficacy and 
confidence. Similarly, Murayama and Elliot (2009) concluded that classroom goal 
structures influence the development of intrinsic motivation.  
Amenkhienan and Kogan (2004) concluded that the student-teacher relationship 
influences the amount of learning that occurs. Stemler, Elliott, Grigorenko, & Sternberg 
(2006) proposed a framework for interpersonal relationships with teachers, noting that the 
work of teaching is largely social in nature. Likewise, Hughes and Kwok (2007) 
identified teacher relationships with both parents and students as mediating factors of 
student motivation and achievement. They also noted an interaction between race and the 
amount of teacher support received. Osterman (2000) summarized research findings on 
the interaction of student belongingness and school and classroom conditions with 
motivation and achievement:  
Research also tells us that conditions in the classroom and school 
influence students’ feelings about themselves; these in turn are reflected in 
student engagement and achievement. Not all students experience 
alienation to the same extent, yet, for the most part, students and 
researchers describe schools as alienating institutions…While the “peer 
culture” may establish norms dress and behavior, it is not necessarily one 
that satisfies students’ need for belongingness (p. 360). 
Stipek (2006) added to Osterman’s findings: 
Learning requires effort, and one of the best predictors of students’ 
effort and engagement in school is the relationships they have with their 
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teachers…To promote high academic standards, teachers need to create 
supportive social contexts and develop positive relationships with students 
(p. 46). 
Accordingly, the impact of the learning environment and student perceptions of 
that environment interact with individual context but also act as a distinct component to 
student learning. 
Putting the Model Together 
Figure 10 offers a pictorial interpretation of how the characteristics of a task and 
of a student’s knowledge framework may operate within a mathematics classroom 
learning environment. Procedural knowledge isolated from conceptual knowledge and the 
connections between ideas results in instrumental understanding (Skemp, 1976/2006). 
Instrumental understanding may result in a cycle of misconceptions and faulty reasoning 
reinforcing each other and weakening a student’s knowledge framework for 
understanding future tasks. When conceptual knowledge and procedural knowledge 
develop together, they reinforce each other and strengthen a student’s knowledge 
framework for future tasks. When students complete a task, teachers have limited 
opportunities to assess the knowledge framework and thought processes that lead to a 
response; instead, assessment usually focuses on whether or not a response was correct. 
Unfortunately, correct responses do not necessarily indicate that a student understands the 
mathematical concepts completely. Figure 10 therefore includes the possibility that 
correct responses can be produced even with erroneous reasoning, and if unchecked, that 
reasoning will reinforce misconceptions and erroneous reasoning, thereby weakening a 
student’s knowledge framework for understanding future tasks.  
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Resnick (1983) suggested that errors often occur when students look for meaning 
in situations where the given information is incomplete. In such cases, students often 
attempt to use their prior knowledge to fill in the gaps and yielding misconceptions. Thus 
Resnick (1983) found that working through these difficulties may be a normal part of the 
learning process and that combating misconceptions and faulty reasoning must become 
an expected part of the struggle that is so critical to deep conceptual learning as Hiebert 
and Grouws (2007) later pointed out. Moschkovich (1998) agreed with Resnick when she 
noted refinement of understanding as a primary goal of teaching: “We need to understand 
the process of conceptual change that enables learners to transform and refine their 
conceptions to more closely fit with the desired understanding” (p. 209). 
Tracing the root causes of errors and recognizing erroneous reasoning requires an 
examination of student explanations about their reasoning processes. Previous 
interventions targeting specific errors or the underlying reasoning have met with limited 
success (e.g., Clement, 1982; Fisher, 1988; Phillippe, 1992; Rosnick & Clement, 1979), 
possibly because these interventions may have targeted the error instead of the latent 
reasoning and misconception that led to the error. Furthermore, students with 
misconceptions and faulty reasoning may produce correct answers; as a result, 




































































































































































The rationale for using probability instruction as an intervention targets these 
concerns: (1) Focusing on connections between probability concepts and algebra, 
geometry, and rational number concepts may help students develop relational 
understanding; (2) Probability instruction focuses on developing meaning rather than 
eliminating errors; therefore, if students produce correct answers for incorrect reasons, 
the development of meaning may help alter the misunderstandings that led to the 
errorneous reasoning; and, (3) Probability simulations and experiments offer concrete 
explorations for students investigating complex, abstract mathematical phenomena that 
often lead to misunderstanding, misconception, and faulty reasoning. 
Summary and Research Questions 
Research into misconceptions is necessarily problematic due to the latent nature 
of those misconceptions. Researchers must rely on observable errors and discern whether 
those errors are due to faulty reasoning despite having solid relational understanding of 
concepts or if they are due to misunderstanding about the meaning and connections of 
mathematical ideas.  
Students encounter special difficulties when transitioning from whole numbers to 
rational numbers and from arithmetic to algebra. They often struggle to determine when 
linear proportions are or are not appropriate. They also have difficulty distinguishing 
between additive and multiplicative relationships. These difficulties appear in the study 
of rational numbers, algebra, geometry, and probability and often create obstacles to 
constructing meaning and connecting the meaning of ideas within structured 
relationships. While these difficulties are equally poignant in the learning of probability, 
the concepts within probability offer significantly more opportunities for simulations and 
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experiments that help bridge the gap between abstract ideas and concrete examples. 
Probability, however, is often deleted or minimized from the curriculum due to 
time constraints and/or teacher insecurity with the material. The interconnectedness of 
common mathematical misconceptions across probability, algebra, and geometry coupled 
with the limited training students receive in probability and the significant potential of 
probability experiments to bridge abstract mathematical concepts with concrete examples 
suggests the possibility that probability instruction holds the key to alleviating 
fundamental mathematics misconceptions. To explore this potential, the present study 
will examine the following four research questions: 
1) Do probability misconceptions have a causal influence on algebra, geometry, 
and rational number misconceptions? 
2) Does probability instruction reduce critical misconceptions in probability, 
rational numbers, algebra, or geometry? 
3) Do student attitudes toward mathematics influence the emergence of errors 
due to misconceptions on mathematical tasks? 
4) Does student metacognition influence the emergence of errors due to 






CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY 
The present study examines the structure of mathematical misconceptions in high 
school and the impact of attitudes toward mathematics and metacognitive knowledge and 
skills on the development of misconceptions. Additionally, the possible role of 
probability instruction as an intervention for mathematical misconceptions will be 
assessed. 
The measurement of mathematical misconceptions is inherently problematic due 
to the latent nature of those misconceptions. For example, Zawojewski and Shaughnessy 
(2000) pointed out the inadequacy of simple multiple choice tests to identify the thought 
patterns that result in a particular answer. Instead, they recommended including a 
qualitative component to each question to provide clues to underlying student thinking. In 
order to include that strategy in the instruments used in this study, an initial assessment of 
student responses was necessary to determine the source of student reasoning errors. For 
example, were reasoning errors occurring on a particular due to a lack of relational 
understanding, despite having relational understanding, or due to a more fundamental 
misunderstanding of foundational mathematical ideas? The results of that analysis, 
presented in Chapter 4, were used to code errors for the subsequent quantitative analyses. 
As such, the design of this study falls within the mixed methodology design as described 
by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998).  
This chapter contains a description of the probability unit that will serve as the 
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intervention along with the design of the study and its rationale, threats to validity, the 
assessment instruments and their reliability coefficients, and data analysis techniques.  
Research Design 
Subjects 
The present study was conducted with 19 mathematics teachers recruited from 
four schools in three Kentucky school districts with 1,142 students enrolled in their 53 
algebra and geometry classes. All elements of the protocol were approved by the 
University of Louisville’s Internal Review Board for the protection of human subjects in 
research, as required by federal regulations (Protection of Human Subjects, 2009). 
Design Description 
The present study used a randomly assigned untreated control group with a pretest 
and switching replication (Equation 14; Shadish et al., 2002).  
NAEPATMI/MAINAEPATMI/MAINAEPATMI/MAI
NAEPATMI/MAINAEPATMI/MAINAEPATMI/MAI




The outcome of interest for the analysis of the intervention is the rate of growth 
during the treatment period; the collection of pretest data removes pre-existing 
differences as a source of group difference. Use of a control group allowed a comparison 
of growth rates in the intervention group and the normal rate of growth without the 
intervention thereby minimizing history and maturation threats to validity. Classes for 
each teacher were randomly assigned to treatment conditions using Microsoft Excel 2007 
and Minitab 15 statistical software to minimize any selection threats to validity. The 
switching replication fulfilled two purposes: (1) The ethical obligations of research 
demand that all students receive the intervention instruction; (2) The post-post test 
provided data on the retention of intervention effects for follow-up studies.  
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Probability Instruction Intervention 
The intervention for this study was a probability unit designed to provide students 
multiple opportunities to explore the meaning of fundamental mathematical concepts 
rather than targeting specific error patterns. Because the relationship between probability 
and algebra differs from that of probability and geometry, the probability concepts 
studied in each class varied.  
In algebra, the intervention consisted of five lessons. The length of instruction 
varied across schools and teachers to accommodate the dynamics of particular classes. 
From a teaching perspective, such adjustments should be encouraged since students learn 
at varying paces. On the other hand, a research design perspective recognizes that such 
adjustments pose a history threat to internal validity. For example, events occurring 
concurrently with the treatment could cause the observed effect rather than the 
intervention itself (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Since the alternative of rigorously 
abiding by a timeline would also have increased the risk of multiple threats to validity, I 
chose to stay in close communication with each teacher about adjustments made to the 
timeline. For most teachers, the intervention lasted approximately ten 90-minute class 
periods. The overall topics for these lessons were: 
1. Statistical structure (Appendix A and B) 
2. Randomness (Appendix C and D) 
3. Counting principles (Appendix E and F) 
4. Event probability (Appendix G, H, and I) 
5. Probability distributions (Appendix J and K) 
In geometry, the intervention consisted of three lessons, normally lasting 
approximately six 90-minute class periods. The overall topics for these lessons were: 
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1. Counting principles (Appendix E and F) 
2. Geometry probability (Appendix G and I) 
3. Probability distributions (Appendix J and L) 
Teachers were also provided lesson plans for classes in the control condition; 
most, however, chose to continue with their normal instructional sequence. Boston & 
Smith (2009) suggested that teacher-made materials may not offer students the same 
degree of cognitive load. Furthermore, teacher-made materials increase the potential 
unreliability of treatment implementation threat to statistical conclusion validity (Shadish 
et al., 2002). To manage this threat, classes were randomly assigned within teachers so 
that teacher effects were distributed across both to treatment conditions. Classroom 
observations and teacher interviews were conducted to measure the degree of 
heterogeneity between groups. 
Instrumentation 
Three instruments were used to measure student mathematics knowledge, student 
attitudes toward mathematics, and student metacognitive knowledge and skills. The 
mathematics knowledge instrument was used to account for pre-existing mathematics 
knowledge and ability. It was also used to analyze error response patterns to determine 
which errors emerged from mathematical misconceptions or from non-conceptual 
reasoning errors. 
Mathematics Knowledge Instrument 
Items for the mathematics knowledge instrument (Appendix N) were gathered 
from National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) released items 
(U.S.Department of Education, 1996, 2005, 2007). Although all 17 items remained as 
given by NAEP, a prompt was included for each question asking students to explain how 
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or why they chose their response.  
NAEP items are rigorously developed, using review boards, pilot testing, classical 
test theory, and Item Response Theory to analyze item performance (U.S.Department of 
Education, 2008a). These items were deemed to have high content validity for the NAEP-
associated content areas. 
These items included rational number, probability, algebra, and geometry content. 
Table 8 provides a description of each NAEP item used in the assessment instrument 
along with the reported reliability coefficients for each item block (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e). These items were chosen based on two criteria: 
(1) The item content matched the foundational concepts that research has suggested 
connect rational number, probability, algebra, and geometry misconceptions closely 
enough to be able to detect intervention effects; and, (2) The item content and wording 
did not so closely match the activities and problems in the probability unit that the 
treatment group would receive an unfair advantage over the control group. Table 8 
presents the classical test theory difficulty coefficient (i.e., percent correct), the NAEP 
classification of difficulty and complexity level of each item with respect to the intended 
grade level of the item, and the internal consistency of the associated block of items as 








Reported NAEP Item Performance  












1 2007 Probability Relative versus absolute comparison 45% Grade 4  Medium Low M7 0.80 
2 2005 Probability Determine Conditional Probability 49.5% Grade 12 Medium Low M12 0.73 
3 2007 Probability Repeated Sampling Probability 60% Grade 8 Medium Low M11 0.76 
4 2005 Probability Dependent probability 18% Grade 8 Hard Moderate M12 0.75 
5 2007 Algebra Convert temperature units 35% Grade 8 Hard Low M9 0.80 
6 2005 Algebra Effect of variable change 34% Grade 8 Hard Moderate M3 0.76 
7 1996 Algebra Additive versus Multiplicative Structure 58% Grade 8 Medium - M3 0.53 
8 2007 Algebra Solve algebraic word problem 47% Grade 8 Medium Moderate M11 0.76 
9 2007 Geometry Determine if a shape is a parallelogram 26% Grade 8 Hard Moderate M11 0.76 
10 2005 Geometry Area of shaded figure 77% Grade 8 Easy Low M4 0.77 
11 2005 Geometry Find dimensions from scale drawing 85% Grade 12 Easy Moderate M12 0.75 
12 2005 Rational Number Rational Number Quantity Meaning 66% Grade 12 Easy Low M3 0.73 
13 2005 Rational Number Given the scale, determine length of side 56% Grade 12 Medium Low M4 0.79 
14 2007 Rational Number Arrange fractions in ascending order 49% Grade 8 Medium Low M9 0.80 
15 2007 Rational Number Determine fraction of figure shaded 89% Grade 8 Easy Low M11 0.76 
16 2007 Algebra Determine equation to represent table. 54% Grade 8 Medium Moderate M7 0.78 
17 2005 Probability Determine amount from probability 40% Grade 8 Medium Low M4 0.77 
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Since the items were chosen from different blocks, the NAEP-reported 
coefficients do not necessarily represent the internal consistency of the new instrument 
compiled for the present study. Therefore, the pooled internal consistency of the new 
instrument was re-assessed using the pretest data (α = 0.791, 95% CI [0.773, 0.808]) and 
the posttest data (α = 0.772, 95% CI [0.751, 0.773]) and found to have adequate internal 
consistency. The correlation of each item (Table 9) between the pre- and post-tests were 
computed to measure test-retest reliability (i.e., stability). The correlations were moderate 
and significant (p < 0.001) for all items except Item 17, which was only significant at the 
93% confidence level (p = 0.068). Overall, the stability of the items appeared to be 
acceptable (Table 9). 
Table 9 
Stability Correlations Between the Pre- and Post-Test Data for each Item 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Correlation 0.491 0.173 0.273 0.310 0.277 0.217 0.422 0.308 0.279 0.354 0.385 
Item 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Correlation 0.354 0.385 0.268 0.154 0.460 0.300 0.325 0.083 
 
Content validity of content area alignment to national, state, and local standards 
was evaluated by the NAEP Validity Studies Panel. Daro, Stancavage, Ortega, 
DeStefano, & Linn (2007) examined the content coverage, skill coverage, alignment to 
NAEP framework, lack of philosophical bias, lack of ability bias, and representativeness 
of information provided about students. They found that 96% of NAEP 2005 and 2007 
items demonstrated adequate or marginal quality.  
Item Response Theory (IRT) was applied to measure the characteristics of 
difficulty, discrimination (i.e., the ability to distinguish between groups, in this case, 
ability levels), and guessing for each item. IRT, unlike Classical Test Theory (CTT), 
focuses on the correctness or incorrectness of each item individually rather than a raw 
cumulative score (Baker & Kim, 2004). In CTT, difficulty is defined as the percentage of 
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correct responses for an item (as in Table 12, means for pretest items and Table 13, 
means for posttest items). CTT discrimination is typically measured as the point-biserial 
correlation for each item. One problem with CTT is the circular dependence of observed 
scores and samples (Fan, 1998). 
IRT is based on the item characteristic curve, which is computed using a logistic 
function. The curve can be computed as a Rausch model (1 parameter, item difficulty), 
2PL (2 parameters, item difficulty and discrimination), or 3PL (3 parameters, item 
difficulty, discrimination, and guessing). The logistic function for the 3-PL curve is  
( ) ( ) ( )baeccP −−+−+= θ1
11θ  (15)
where: 
a represents the discrimination coefficient 
b represents the difficulty coefficient 
c represents the guessing coefficient 
θ represents the ability level of the respondent 
ParScale 4.1 (Muraki & Bock, 2002) uses an iterative process to compute the item 
characteristic curve. In the first iteration, ability levels (θ) for each subject were 
computed. These values become the starting point for the second iteration, which is used 
to compute the values for a, b, and c. The guessing coefficient, c. was estimated as c = 0 
for all 17 items. Therefore, the model reduced to a 2PL curve, and the values for a and b 
were computed for each item (Table 10). 
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Table 10 
IRT Coefficients for NAEP Items 


















Note: SE for all 17 items for both a and b was < 0.001 
The item characteristic curves (Figure 11) can be used to compare the behavior of 
each item. For each curve, the horizontal axis represents difficulty, b, and the vertical axis 
represents the ability, θ. 
 
Figure 11. Item Characteristic Curves for NAEP Mathematics Knowledge Instrument 
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None of the curves in Figure 11 leveled off at the top or bottom, indicating no 
ceiling or floor effects. The difficulty of an item is defined as the point on the item 
characteristic curve for which the ability level is average, θ = 0.5. The discrimination of 
the item, a, is defined as the slope of the curve. Being a highly difficult item does not 
necessarily mean that an item is also highly discriminating across ability levels. Consider 
a comparison of Items 6 and 7 (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of Item Curves for Items 6 and 7 
The difficulty of Item 6 was 0.93 while the difficulty of Item 7 was -0.27, so Item 
6 was the more difficult of the two items. The slope, however, of Item 7 (1.192) was 
steeper than the slope of Item 6 (0.570); this characteristic means that although Item 6 
was more difficult than Item 7, Item 7 discriminated between ability levels more than 
Item 6. 
The discrimination of items on the mathematics knowledge test ranged from 
0.428 (less differences between high and low ability students) to 1.192 (more differences 
between high and low ability students). The difficulty ranged from -1.308 (Easy) to 0.930 
(Hard). Because the discrimination levels did not approach 0 (no differences between 
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high and low ability students), and the difficulty levels did not indicate that any items 
were extremely easy (approaching -3 and +3), the item characteristics were considered 
appropriate for the planned analyses. 
Mathematics Attitudes Inventory 
Student orientation was measured using the Attitude Toward Mathematics 
Inventory (ATMI; Appendix O; Tapia & Marsh, 2004). This instrument was selected 
because its subscales have been extensively analyzed to establish high reliability and 
content validity (Tapia & Marsh, 2004). The subscales for this inventory were developed 
from multiple literature sources to maximize concurrent construct validity. According to 
the Tapia and Marsh report, the ATMI measures four orientation constructs. Factor 1, self 
confidence, consists of 15 items with a reported Cronbach alpha of 0.95. Factors 2 and 3, 
perceptions of the value of mathematics and enjoyment of mathematics, each contain 10 
items with a Cronbach alpha of 0.89. Factor 4, motivation to learn mathematics, contains 
five items with a Cronbach alpha of 0.88.  
The internal consistency for the full instrument and each subscale was measured 
using the present study data to determine their reliabilities (Table 11). 
Table 11 
Internal Consistency Reliability for ATMI 
Scale Observed Cronbach Alpha 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Full Instrument 0.943 [0.938, 0.949] 
Factor 1: Self Confidence 0.909 [0.901, 0.918] 
Factor 2: Value 0.876 [0.864, 0.888] 
Factor 3: Enjoyment 0.798 [0.778, 0.817] 
Factor 4: Motivation 0.824 [0.806, 0.842] 
 
The observed reliability coefficients for the present study data appeared to be 
comparable to those reported by Tapia and Marsh (2004) and had values higher than the 




Student metacognition knowledge and skills were measured using the 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI; Appendix P; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). 
This instrument was selected because of its unique subscales of metacognition, 
knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition and because it has been rigorously 
tested through two experiments to establish concurrent construct validity for each block 
of items. Three types of knowledge are measured as components of knowledge of 
cognition: (1) Declarative knowledge, defined as knowledge of learning and of one’s own 
cognitive skills and abilities; (2) Procedural knowledge, knowledge of how to use various 
cognitive strategies; and, (3) Conditional knowledge, knowledge of when to use 
particular cognitive strategies and why those strategies should be used. Under the 
regulation of cognition, five components are measured: (1) Planning, including goal 
setting and allocation of resources; (2) Organizing and managing information; (3) 
Monitoring, reflection on cognitive processes during a learning task; (4) Debugging, 
strategies for correcting performance errors or assumptions; and, (5) Evaluation, 
reflection on cognitive processes after a learning task is completed (G. Schraw, personal 
communication, May 31, 2009). Schraw and Dennison (1994) also reported high internal 
consistency for the whole instrument (α = 0.93) and both metacognition factors (α = 
0.88). The internal consistency for the full instrument and each subscale was measured 
using the present study data to determine their reliabilities (Table 12). 
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Table 12 
Internal Consistency Reliability for MAI 
Scale Observed Cronbach Alpha 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Full Instrument 0.946 [0.941, 0.951] 
Factor 1: Knowledge of Cognition 0.870 [0.857, 0.882] 
Declarative Knowledge 0.744 [0.718, 0.768] 
Procedural Knowledge 0.615 [0.573, 0.654] 
Conditional Knowledge 0.668 [0.633, 0.700] 
Factor 2: Regulation of Cognition 0.924 [0.917, 0.932] 
Planning 0.727 [0.699, 0.752] 
Organizing 0.788 [0.767, 0.808] 
Monitoring 0.735 [0.708, 0.760] 
Debugging 0.694 [0.662, 0.725] 
Evaluation 0.673 [0.639, 0.705] 
 
The observed reliability coefficients for the full instrument and two main factors 
demonstrated high internal consistency. Several of the sub-factors showed marginal 
reliabilities (α < 0.7), so only the two main factors were used in the subsequent analysis 
of contextual factors. 
Missing Data 
Rubin (1987) classified missing data due to non-response as either unit non-
response, meaning that the subject refused to answer any of the items, and item non-
response, meaning that the subject skipped questions.  
Unit and Item Non-Response  
The ATMI and MAI surveys of the present study included both types of non-
response. Forty six students did not respond to any items on either survey; 63 additional 
students did not respond to a majority of items, ending at various points throughout the 
survey (Table 13). The format of the questionnaire may shed light on the most typical 
pattern of unit non-response: The front of the survey form included the ATMI and the 
first three questions of the MAI. Questions 4 – 52 of the MAI (i.e., the back of the 
survey) were the most commonly skipped questions. Based on this pattern, which may 
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well be the result of bias in the non-response patterns, I concluded that most non-
response on the MAI was due to the presentation format of the instrument.  
The NAEP achievement data, both pre- and post-test, consisted of very low 
proportions of missing data. On the pretest, missing data accounted for 5.6% of the 
entries across all items and subjects, and only 11 students (< 1%) did not respond to any 
items (Table 13). On the posttest, missing data accounted for 6.5% of the entries across 
all items and subjects, and only 12 students (1.1%) did not respond to any items.  
Table 13 
Sources of Missing Data 
Instrument N Unit Non-Response  
(No items answered) 
Item Non-Response  
ATMI 964 46 (4.6%) • 0 of 40 items with full data 
• 256 (26.6%) cases missing at least one value 
• 2,457 of 16,388 (6.4%) values missing  
MAI 964 109 (11.3%) • 0 of 52 items with full data 
• 316 (32.8%) cases missing at least one value 
• 6,060 of 16,388 (12.1%) values missing 
Pretest 1142 11 (0.96%) • 0 of 17 items with full data 
• 242 (21.4%) cases missing at least one value  
• 1093 of 19,278 (5.6%) values missing 
Posttest 1021 12 (1.1%) • 0 of 17 items with full data 
• 248 (24.3%) cases missing at least one value  
• 1121 of 17,357 (6.5%) values missing 
 
Imputation of Missing Data  
Multiple imputation is an expansion of multiple regression imputation that uses 
Bayesian inference from observed data using probability models to impute values for the 
missing data. The process of multiple imputation begins by estimating a probability 
model for the observed data (the prior distribution). The process continues by computing 
a conditional probability distribution based on the observed data (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, 
& Rubin, 2004). First, the model regresses each missing data point on every other 
variable. Second, the true value for the missing data point is considered the mean of a 
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distribution. Sampling error will therefore result in a potentially different value each time 
a multiple regression imputation is run. To account for this variance, multiple imputation 
creates any number of complete data sets. Rubin (1987) suggested that three to ten 
imputation sets are needed to account for variance in missing data. Brick, Jones, Kalton, 
and Valliant (2005) and Garson (2009) suggested that five sets are typically used. Each 
data set is used in subsequent analyses, and the results of each analysis are averaged. To 
complete the overall analysis, standard errors for each resulting point estimate are 
computed. Table 14 presents the sample sizes, means, and standard deviations for each 
imputed data set for the pretest and surveys, which were administered at the same time. 
Imputation 0 represents the unimputed data set after listwise deletion.  
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Table 14 
Means and Standard Error for Pretest and Survey Data Set 
Imputation 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Pretest Misconception Responses 
Sample Size (N) 1133 1133 1133 1133 1133 900 
Mean Ratio 0.361 0.361 0.363 0.362 0.362 0.352 
Standard Error 0.006 0.006 0.0063 0.006 0.006 0.007 
T ratio from Imputation 0 1.381 1.381 1.652 1.534 1.534 - 
Pretest Correct Responses 
Sample Size (N) 1133 1133 1133 1133 1133 900 
Mean 0.480 0.481 0.481 0.481 0.480 0.495 
Standard Error 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
T ratio from Imputation 0 -2.143* -2.000* -2.000* -2.000* -2.143* - 
ATMI Enjoyment 
Sample Size (N) 921 921 921 921 921 918 
Mean 2.960 2.959 2.950 2.959 2.962 2.959 
Standard Error 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
T ratio from Imputation 0 0.038 0.000 -0.346 0.000 0.115 - 
ATMI Motivation 
Sample Size (N) 921 921 921 921 921 911 
Mean 2.953 2.952 2.947 2.952 2.956 2.957 
Standard Error 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031
T ratio from Imputation 0 -0.131 -0.164 -0.328 -0.164 -0.033 - 
ATMI Value 
Sample Size (N) 921 921 921 921 921 919 
Mean 3.528 3.527 3.527 3.529 3.530 3.532 
Standard Error 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
T ratio from Imputation 0 -0.160 -0.200 -0.200 -0.120 -0.080 - 
ATMI Self Confidence 
Sample Size (N) 921 921 921 921 921 916 
Mean 3.217 3.220 3.215 3.218 3.219 3.219 
Standard Error 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
T ratio from Imputation 0 -0.077 0.038 -0.154 -0.038 0.000 - 
MAI Knowledge of Cognition 
Sample Size (N) 921 921 921 921 921 893 
Mean 3.423 3.427 3.422 3.435 3.424 3.443 
Standard Error 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022
T ratio from Imputation 0 -0.930 -0.744 -0.976 -0.372 -0.883 - 
MAI Regulation of Cognition 
Sample Size (N) 921 921 921 921 921 894 
Mean 3.214 3.223 3.216 3.220 3.213 3.221 
Standard Error 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020
T ratio from Imputation 0 -0.359 0.103 -0.250 -0.051 -0.410 - 
*t > 1.96, p < 0.05 
In addition to the means and standard deviations displayed in Tables 12, Figures 13 – 20 
display the frequency distribution for each data set for each variable. 
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Figure 13. Pretest Percent Correct Data Distributions. 
 




























































































Figure 15. ATMI Enjoyment of Mathematics Data Distributions. 
 















































Figure 17. ATMI Mathematics Self Confidence Data Distributions. 
 















































Figure 19. MAI Knowledge of Cognition Data Distributions. 
 















































Missing data on the posttest were also imputed using multiple imputation. Table 
15 displays the means and standard errors for these data sets, and Figures 21 and 22 
present the frequency distribution for each posttest variable. 
Table 15 
Means and Standard Error for Posttest Data Set 
Imputation 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Misconceptions Responses 
Sample Size (N) 915 915 915 915 915 690 
Mean Ratio 0.377 0.375 0.376 0.375 0.377 0.368 
Standard Error 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
T ratio from Imputation 0 2.546* 1.980* 2.263* 1.980* 2.546* - 
Correct Responses 
Sample Size (N) 915 915 915 915 915 690 
Mean 0.486 0.485 0.484 0.485 0.486 0.498 
Standard Error 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 
T ratio from Imputation 0 -1.488 -1.612 -1.736 -1.612 -1.488 - 
*t > 1.96, p < 0.05 
 






































































Figure 22. Posttest Percent Misconception Data Distributions. 
T tests were used to compare each imputation to the raw data file for the pretest, 
surveys, and posttest. These tests indicated that the imputed data sets for the pretest and 
posttest variables contained significant differences from the unimputed data set (i.e., |t| > 
1.96), implying that the data deleted because of unit and item non-response through 
listwise deletion contained important information that was lost. The ATMI and MAI 
factors did not appear to have significant differences between the unimputed and imputed 
data sets. Based on these results, the imputed data sets were used for all quantitative 
analyses, and the results were compiled into a mean and standard deviation for each 
statistic. 
Attrition 
In addition to unit and item non-response, the posttest consisted of additional 



































































not enough data were available to make inferences about the posterior distributions of 
responses. Attrition occurred in three schools for different reasons, resulting in 113 
students who took the pretest but not the posttest and approximately 100 students who 
took neither test. 
In school A, one teacher refused to participate in the study without informing me, 
the department chair, or the principal. When I observed his classes, the instruction in both 
treatment and control classes matched the expected condition. Prior to instruction, the 
teacher informed me that he “needed to organize” the pretests. On subsequent visits, he 
was absent. As other teachers began to complete the posttest, I sent a message to the 
teacher asking when we could meet to hand off his data. I received the following message 
in response: 
I don’t have any data for you. I never did your study because I 
didn’t have a need to. I had already covered my stats that was required for 
Algebra 1 earlier in the year, and to repeat it would have put me way 
behind schedule for the semester. As for my Geometry classes, I work 
probability into each unit, and to talk about it as a separate unit did not 
seem reasonable for me. I had originally thought I would make up data for 
you, but then I realized two things, one that that isn’t fair to you, and two, 
it was going to be too much work to make it up 
Because these concerns were not voiced until the study was almost completed, addressing 
them in time to avoid the loss of his classes was impossible. 
In school B, two teachers chose to leave the study because of pressure from the 
administration to increase their pace of instruction because of concerns about state 
testing. The three teachers from the first school and the two teachers from this school had 
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already administered the pretest, so their data were retained for the qualitative analysis of 
student responses and the structural model analyses. 
In School C, the superintendent of the district volunteered the entire mathematics 
department to participate in the study. Implementation of the protocol began with the 
administration of the pretest. Three teachers gave the pretest before the others. The day 
after these teachers had completed the pretest, the principal of the school required the 
department chair to withdraw the school from the study. No complaints about the study 
or the protocol from the mathematics teachers were responsible for this decision; rather, 
the difficulties appeared to be the result of internal disagreements at the district level. The 
following message was sent from the school’s mathematics department chair: 
I have some bad news. Our principal called a math dept. meeting 
this morning to inform us that we would not be participating in the 
research study. I am not really sure what happened and I didn’t even know 
we were having the meeting until she came in and had it announced that 
we were meeting. She said after speaking to some people in the dept., she 
doesn’t want us to spend 6 days giving the test and survey’s because it 
would take away from instruction. One teacher had already given the pre-
test and survey and it took 3 days which will bump us up to 9 days for all 
three. It is because we have such short periods. We had a big setback in 
math test scores last year and the complaints were that we did not have 
enough time to cover the content. She and the assistant superintendent 
made the decision to pull us from the study because we are already behind 
in our curriculum again this year. I am very sorry. 
In response to this message, I discussed the situation at length over the phone with the 
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department chair, and as a result, I went to the school to meet with the principal and 
discuss her concerns. Although the principal was expecting me and had agreed to meet, 
when I arrived the principal refused to meet with me. Based on this response and 
subsequent conversations with the department chair and superintendent, I decided to halt 
further efforts to persuade the principal to remain in the study. 
Statistical Power  
In a meta-analysis examining instructional interventions in algebra (Rakes, 
Valentine, & McGatha, 2010), significant effect sizes in algebra across multiple 
intervention strategies averaged around 0.33. Based on that review of literature, this 
effect size was deemed to be a reasonable target when computing statistical power (i.e., 
the ability to detect significant effects). Tables from Cohen (1988) were consulted to find 
the minimum sample sizes needed to obtain a power of 0.80 (as recommended by Cohen, 
1988, p. 390) for finding an effect size of 0.33. The tables in Cohen (1988, p. 384) 
recommended a sample size of 45 for an effect size of 0.30 and 33 for an effect size of 
0.35. Using linear interpolation, the computed sample size needed to meet the power 
requirements was 38.  
Statistical power in a cluster randomized experiment is influenced more by the 
number of clusters than by the number of subjects per cluster (Spybrook, 2008). The 
target sample of 38 was therefore directed toward the number of classes in the study 
rather than the number of students. Computations using Optimal Design Software 
(Raudenbush, 2009) confirmed this estimate (Figure 23). 
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Figure 23. Power Curve for Cluster Randomized Trials 
The curve in Figure 23 estimates the power based on an assumption of having an 
average of 20 students per cluster with an intra-class correlation of 0.05. These 
assumptions seemed reasonable: The average number of students in each class was 17 
(SD = 4.3).  
Data Analysis 
The data analysis for the present study progressed through three stages: (1) 
qualitative analysis of student error responses and explanations, (2) structural analysis of 
content area misconceptions, and (3) hierarchical analysis of student and contextual 
factors on misconceptions. The qualitative analysis of student responses was used to 
adjust the coding of misconceptions for the subsequent quantitative analysis. 
Qualitative Analysis  
The qualitative analysis served two critical functions in the present study. First, 
classroom observations and teacher interviews (structured around topics relating to 
implementation of the intervention lessons) before, during, and after the treatment 
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periods provided data on fidelity of treatment. While observing classrooms, the 
researcher attempted to minimize distractions inherent to having a visitor in a classroom. 
In some classrooms, this goal was best met by slipping in quietly and sitting in the back 
of the class. In other classrooms, teachers preferred to introduce the researcher and 
involve him in the lesson. 
Fidelity to the probability intervention lessons varied widely between teachers. 
Shaughnessy and Bergman (1993) pointed out that many teachers are uncomfortable with 
probability content; varying responses to such discomfort were expected. Some teachers 
preferred to revert to normal, procedural methods of teaching. In this case, the ability of a 
probability unit to counter misconceptions may have been reduced. Other teachers 
followed the lessons provided by the researcher with varying degrees of success. One role 
of the researcher during the treatment period was to provide assistance to the teachers 
throughout the intervention lessons.  
The second major function of the qualitative analysis was to provide an analysis 
of student responses to the open response items on the mathematics knowledge 
assessment. This analysis was used to assess hypotheses of previously identified 
misconception patterns and advance the understanding of the relationship between 
mathematical misconceptions and reasoning errors. This analysis was conducted from the 
constructivist point of view using a narrative analysis (Creswell, 2007; Patton, 2002) of 
symbolic interactions (i.e., the symbols used to provide meaning to students), semiotics 
(i.e., how signs and symbols are used to convey meaning), and hermeneutics (i.e., how 
students interpret signs and symbols).  
These qualitative analyses were fundamental for establishing the context for all 
subsequent quantitative analysis. The first analysis provided evidence of treatment 
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fidelity and intervention effectiveness. The second analysis provided a foundation for the 
interpretation of all quantitative findings.  
Quantitative Analysis  
The quantitative analysis was carried out in two stages. First, using the pretest 
data on the NAEP multiple choice items, possible causal relationships between content 
area misconceptions were examined using structural equation modeling. Second, the 
impact of item, student, and class characteristics on misconception errors was 
investigated using hierarchical modeling. 
Structural analysis of content area misconceptions. Six structural equation models 
were used to compare the competing hypothesized models of misconception relationships 
among content areas (Figure 24). The pretest data were randomly split into two groups 
irrespective of treatment group assignment. The first group of pretest data was used to 
calibrate the six hypothesized models. The second group of pretest data was used to 














































































Figure 24. Hypothesized Structural Equation Models. 
Model identification. Model identification is an extremely important initial 
consideration for any structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis and is determined by 

















































































parameters from the number of independent data moments available (Byrne, 2009). If a 
model has less data moments than parameters (i.e., df < 0), it is considered under-
identified (Byrne, 2009, p. 34). Because an infinite number of solutions are possible for 
an under-identified model, an analysis cannot proceed with such a relationship. If a 
model has an equal number of data moments and parameters (i.e., df = 0), it is considered 
just-identified (Byrne, 2009, p. 34). A just-identified model computes a unique solution to 
the model, but because there are no degrees of freedom, the model can never be rejected. 
The only acceptable model is one that is over-identified (Byrne, 2009, p. 34), having 
more data moments than parameters (i.e., df > 0). In an over-identified model, a unique 
solution can be computed, and that solution has a possibility of being rejected. In a multi-
level structural equation model (i.e., all models except 12F), each level of the model must 
be over-identified as well as the full model. All six models in Figure 24 are over-
identified along with each level within the model (Table 16). 
Table 16 
Degrees of Freedom for Models in Figure 24 
Model Full Model Level 2 Level 3 
A 116 14 4 
B 116 9 9 
C 114 53 ⎯
D 116 14 ⎯
E 116 20 ⎯
F 113 ⎯ ⎯
 
Each multiple choice item was coded dichotomously as demonstrating a 
misconception or not based on the qualitative document analysis. Therefore, the 
polychoric and asymptotic covariance matrices were computed to adjust for the 
discontinuous nature of the observed variables (Byrne, 1998).  
Goodness of fit indices were computed to provide supporting evidence for 
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determining which model of misconception structure best matches the data. Since each fit 
index “operate[s] somewhat differently given the sample size, estimation procedure, 
model complexity, and/or violation of the underlying assumptions of multivariate 
normality and variable independence” (Byrne, 2001, p. 87), multiple fit indices were 
computed and compared to determine which model carries the least amount of 
misspecification for the data. The chi square statistic (χ2) is the foundational statistic used 
to compare models (Hu & Bentler, 1995). χ2 tests the null hypothesis that the covariance 
matrix reproduced according to the hypothesized model is the same as the population 
covariance matrix (Bandalos, 1993). However, as sample size increases, smaller 
differences will be magnified to the extent that unimportant differences will be 
statistically significant (Bandalos, 1993). This sensitivity to sample size led to the 
development of other goodness of fit statistics. Unfortunately the resulting statistics are 
also often prone to sample size correlation, sensitivity to non-normality, factor loading 
magnitudes, and model complexity. These statistics have been categorized as 
incremental, absolute, and residual-based absolute.  
Incremental indices compare the target model test statistic to the independence 
model test statistic. Type 1 indices do so with no underlying distribution assumed, with 
the caveat that the same distribution is used for both the hypothesized and independence 
model. Type 2 indices rely on the central χ2 distribution, a distribution with a mean of 0 
and standard deviation of 1. Type 3 indices rely on the non-central χ2 distribution. The 
present study will report the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), a Type 3 incremental index 
recommended by Byrne (2009), Hu and Bentler (1995), and Goffin (1993). Byrne (2009) 
recommended considering a CFI greater than 0.95 to reflect a well-fitting model.  
Absolute fit indices approach the analysis of model fit from a different 
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perspective than the incremental indices: rather than examining the hypothesized model 
against the independence model, these indices examine how the hypothesized model 
compares to the null model (i.e., not having a model). Marsh et al. (1988) found that the 
Goodness of Fit index (GFI; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1984) provided the most accurate 
results from the absolute index category. For example, although the GFI is correlated 
with sample size, it does not inflate Type I error for sample sizes greater than 100 
(Shevlin & Miles, 1998). Furthermore, its measurements are robust against latent 
dependence for sample sizes greater than 250 (Shevlin & Miles, 1998). The GFI is not, 
however, robust against non-normality at sample sizes below 500, and the present study 
will rely on dichotomous data, which are not normal. Since each half of the pretest 
sample will be greater than 500, this weakness in the GFI is not considered a major threat 
to validity. A GFI value greater than 0.90 represents a well-fitting model. 
Additionally, Browne and Cudeck’s (1989, 1993) Expected Cross Validation 
Index (ECVI) is an adjusted absolute fit index that measures a model’s ability to hold in 
the population beyond a single sample by adjusting Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC; 
Akaike, 1973, 1983). Byrne (2009) recommended comparing ECVI values across 
models: The model with the smallest ECVI “exhibits the greatest potential for 
replication” (p. 82). 
Residual-based absolute fit indices also compare the hypothesized model to the 
null model, but these statistics examine the residuals (i.e., unexplained variance) rather 
than the explained variance. The two primary residual fit indices are the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1998; Steiger & Lind, 1980; Steiger, 
Shapiro, & Browne, 1985) and the Root Mean Residual (RMR; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
1984). RMSEA has been found to be uncorrelated with sample size but moderately 
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influenced by the magnitude of factor loadings and model complexity (Bandalos, 2009; 
Hu & Bentler, 1995). Byrne (2009) considered an RMSEA value less than 0.05 to 
represent a good-fitting model. RMR has been found to be highly sensitive to non-
normality, but is less correlated with factor loading magnitudes and model complexity. 
RMR is unstandardized with a lower bound of zero and no upper bound. Interpretation is, 
therefore, problematic: RMR values must be compared to sample variance/covariance 
magnitudes. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996) presented a modified version of RMR based on 
standardized values (i.e., correlations instead of covariances). The resultant statistic, the 
standardized RMR (SRMR) is bounded between zero and one. Kline (2005) found that 
SRMR values less than 0.10 represented good-fitting models. 
A subcategory of indices, the parsimony-adjusted indices, does not measure 
goodness of fit; instead, these statistics penalize fit statistics for increasing model 
complexity. Including these parsimony-adjusted indices allows the researcher to 
simultaneously examine two interdependent pieces of information about a model: the 
goodness (or badness) of fit and “how parsimonious the model was in its use of the data 
in achieving that goodness of fit” (Mulaik et al., 1989, p. 439). In the present study, the 
parsimony version of the GFI and CFI (PGFI and PCFI) were provided to assess model 
complexity from the perspective of both incremental and absolute fit indices. Mulaik et 
al. (1989) and Byrne (2009) suggested that values of 0.5 or greater for both indices are 
not uncommon in acceptable models.  
This mosaic of fit indices provides multiple perspectives of how well each model 
fits. The particular set of indices described above spans the various types of fit indices 
and a wide array of strengths and weaknesses. By incorporating all of them into the 
proposed analysis, confidence in the best fitting model will have a stronger foundation. 
 126 
Analysis of contextual factors. In addition to the analysis of misconception 
structures, the present study also examined the impact of the probability intervention, 
attitudes toward mathematics, and metacognition on mathematical misconceptions using 
hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLM). The Bernoulli HGLM model best fits the 
dichotomous nature of the outcome data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In a Bernoulli 
model, the outcome variable is transformed to a logit, η, of the odds ratio, φ, for the 
outcome variable as seen in Equation 16. The computed logit becomes the linear outcome 
variable as seen in Equation 17. In this analysis, NAEP items (Level 1) are nested within 
students (Level 2, Equation 18), and students are nested within classes (Level 3, Equation 
19). Variable abbreviations are defined in Table 17. 
Hypothesized Item Level 1 Model ( )
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Hypothesized Class Level 3 Initial Model 
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Declaration of Variables in Equations 15 – 19 
Variable Description 
Conf ATMI Self Confidence subscale. 
Enjoy ATMI Enjoyment of Mathematics subscale. 
Difficulty Item Response Theory Parameter b. 
Discrimination Item Response Theory Parameter a. 
Guessing/Chance Item Response Theory Parameter c. 
KCog MAI Knowledge of Cognition subscale. 
Mean_Conf Classroom average of AMTI Self Confidence subscale. 
Mean_Enjoy Classroom average of ATMI Enjoyment of Mathematics subscale. 
Mean_KCog Classroom average of MAI Knowledge of Cognition subscale. 
Mean_Mot Classroom average of ATMI Motivation subscale. 
Mean_NAEP_Pre Classroom average NAEP mathematics knowledge pretest score. 
Mean_RCog Classroom average of MAI Regulation of Cognition subscale. 
Mean_Value Classroom average of ATMI Valuing Mathematics subscale. 
Mot ATMI Motivation subscale. 
NAEP_Pre NAEP mathematics knowledge pretest score  
RCog MAI Regulation of Cognition subscale. 
Treatment Indicator Variable for Treatment Group Assignment. 
Value ATMI Valuing Mathematics subscale. 
 
Scale variables were centered to facilitate interpretation of the intercepts and 
slopes. In the student Level 2 equation (Equation 18), centering occurred at the group 
level (noted by the subscripts jk and •k), causing the intercepts and slopes to be 
interpretable as student deviation from the classroom average (i.e., intercept represents 
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the average student in the same class on all predictor variables; slope for any variable 
represents the impact of being an above or below average student in the class). In the 
classroom Level 3 equation (Equation 19), scale variables were grand mean centered, 
meaning that the overall mean is subtracted from each classroom mean (noted by the 
subscripts k and •). Grand mean centering changes the interpretation of the classroom 
Level 3 intercepts and slopes just as group centering did on the student Level 2 intercepts 
and slopes. At the classroom level, intercepts now represented the value for the average 
classroom on all predictor variables, and slopes represented the impact of being in an 
above or below average classroom. The regression coefficient for each classroom 
variable therefore represented the effect of a variable on the impact of each 
corresponding student variable. The variables eijk in Equation 17, rqjk in Equation 18, and 
uqpk in Equation 19 represented the random error measurement at the respective levels. 
These variables can be considered the random effect not captured by the model at each 
level, the unique effect of an individual item, student, or classroom on the effect, or 
variance not explained by the model at each level. The generic forms presented here 
include these random effects as potentially applicable to each equation. In reality, these 
random coefficients may or may not be desirable for a particular model. If present, the 
slope for any particular item, student, or school may vary uniquely within the respective 
group. If absent, the slope for all items, students, or schools on a particular equation are 
held constant. Therefore, an equation that excludes the random effect is used to answer 
questions about an effect controlling for a particular variable (i.e., excluding the effect of 
a particular variable); an equation that includes the random effect is used to answer 
questions about the effects of those variables (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Equations that 
exclude random effects are especially useful for questions that involve an analysis of 
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covariance (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). For example, a pre-posttest design usually 
involves questions about student growth during a treatment period. The effect of the 
pretest on the posttest is not interesting in and of itself; rather, removing that effect from 
the observed gain is critical to understanding the effect of the treatment. An equation 
designed to answer this type of question would therefore exclude the random coefficient. 
Summary of Methodology 
Five fundamental mathematics misconceptions were discovered through an 
examination of previous studies (e.g., Clement, 1982; Clements & Battista, 1992; Falk, 
1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973a, 1973b, 1982, 1983; Küchemann, 1978; Shaughnessy 
& Bergman, 1993; Warren, 2000). Seventeen NAEP mathematics items were compiled 
into an instrument to test for these misconceptions within algebra, geometry, rational 
numbers, and probability. The difficulty, discrimination, and guessing coefficients for 
each NAEP item were measured using Item Response Theory. A unit of probability 
instruction was developed as a treatment for misconceptions based on the rationale that 
the abstract connections within probability’s abundant concrete explorations and 
simulations would help students understanding the meaning of abstract concepts and the 
connections between ideas. A randomized pretest-posttest design with a switching 
replication was used to test this hypothesis. In addition to NAEP content area scores 
(percent correct and percent of misconception errors), two surveys were administered to 
measure the impact of contextual factors related to mathematics misconceptions. The 
Attitudes Toward Mathematics Inventory (ATMI) measured four factors of mathematics 
orientation (enjoyment, value, self confidence, and motivation; Tapia & Marsh, 2004); 
the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (MAI) measured two factors of metacognition 
(knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition; Schraw & Dennison, 1994).  
 130 
Treatment fidelity was assessed from classroom observations and teacher 
interviews. Student explanations on the NAEP instrument were examined qualitatively to 
code content area misconception responses. The structural relationship of content area 
misconceptions was examined using structural equation modeling. The impact of item, 
student, and class characteristics on the emergence of misconception errors for a 
particular task was examined using three level hierarchical generalized linear modeling 









This chapter describes the results of three analyses. First, student responses were 
examined to differentiate between reasoning or procedural errors and errors indicating an 
underlying misconception. Second, hypothesized relationships among content area 
misconceptions were examined using structural equation modeling. Third, the impact of 
item, student, and class characteristics was measured using three-level hierarchical 
generalized linear modeling and two level hierarchical linear modeling. Observations and 
teacher interviews were conducted to establish fidelity of treatment implementation for 
the third analysis. 
Identifying Misconception Patterns 
A sub-sample was chosen for a qualitative analysis of patterns of misconception 
responses on the NAEP-based mathematics knowledge test. On all items, students were 
asked to provide an explanation for their response choice. Approximately 74% of the 
sample left these explanations blank. To improve representativeness of the overall 
sample, the qualitative sub-sample was chosen using purposive stratification across 
classes; specifically, tests were chosen to be part of the sub-sample if they filled in the 
explanation section of the test for most items. Such a sampling technique produced a 
selection bias — students who completed their explanations were more likely to choose 
the correct answer, resulting in a reduced sample for each distractor to each item. To help 
manage this bias, the sampling procedure continued until all distractors for each item 
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were represented (N = 72). Division of items by content area (i.e., algebra, geometry, 
probability, and rational number) transferred directly from the NAEP classification of 
each item.  
The following descriptions focus primarily on student explanations of errors; 
however, the analysis began with a recognition that correct responses do not necessarily 
indicate conceptual understanding. For all items in which the correct response 
explanations are not discussed explicitly, the explanations by students indicated that they 
did, in fact, understand the concept not understood by students who chose incorrect 
responses. The thick description provided in this analysis was used to establish 
trustworthiness for the coding of misconception responses. 
Misconceptions on Algebra Content Knowledge Items 
Algebra items (i.e., Items 5, 6, 7, 8, and 16; Appendix N) included distractors that 
reflected misconceptions about additive/multiplicative structures, the meaning and 
interpretation of variables, and the meaning of rational numbers.  
Item 5 response patterns. Item 5 described the formula to convert temperature 
from Fahrenheit to Celsius in words and then asked students to convert 393°F to Celsius. 
I hypothesized that choices A, B, and C would represent misconceptions about the 
meaning of rational numbers. Student responses confirmed this hypothesis. For example, 
one student chose A, “Because 393 – 32 = 361; 5/9 = .55, so you divide 361 by 5/9, 
answer is 656.3, to the nearest degree is 650.” This explanation represents the 
explanations of others who chose A, indicating that students who chose A did so because 
they divided by the rational number rather than multiplying, not realizing that the 
resultant rational number, 5/9 of 361, should be smaller than 361.  
I hypothesized that Choice B for Item 5 would result from the ignoring of the 
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denominator, and again, student explanations confirmed this hypothesis. The most 
explicit case of this type chose B, “Because 393 x 5 = 1805.” This student also failed to 
note that he/she had subtracted the 32 from the 393 properly; 361 x 5 is 1805 while 393 x 
5 is actually 1965. I decided that this particular error was simply one of reporting rather 
than a misconception, so it was excluded for the purposes of this analysis. Another 
student who chose B stated, “361 • 5/9 = 200 5/9 = 200 x 9 = 1800 + 5 = 1805.” This 
student failed to realize that the rational number was accounted for by the 200 and 
continued to try to incorporate the fraction, ultimately doing so by misusing both 
numbers. From this question, I considered how the student had correctly computed the 
200 if he/she did not understand how to use the 5/9 later. My best guess was that the 
student used a calculator for the first computation, but thought that 200 x 9 would be an 
easy calculation, so he/she did the last steps by hand and did not check them on the 
calculator. Although this conclusion is wholly speculative, if true, it may suggest that the 
use of calculators to explore the meaning of rational numbers may open an avenue for 
addressing student conceptions and perceptions of rational numbers. 
I also hypothesized that Choice C would represent a misconception about rational 
numbers, specifically, that students would choose C by ignoring the rational number 
altogether. Student responses also verified this hypothesis. Students who chose C 
justified their response with statements such as, “Divide 393 and 32.”  
Originally, I hypothesized that E would not represent a similar misconception as 
those for A, B, and C on Item 5. Student responses, however, contradicted this 
hypothesis. Students who chose E also ignored the denominator and misused the 
numerator as did students who chose B. For example, students justified choice E with 
statements such as, “Divide the numbers,” specifically 361 by 5. Therefore, Choice E was 
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added to the misconception choices for Item 5. 
These interpretations of rational numbers appeared to typify student responses to 
rational numbers. I generalized these patterns of rational number interpretation into five 
types: 
1. Rational number is understood to be a single quantity, but confusion 
about the meaning of that quantity results in the application of the 
wrong operation or the correct operation(s) to the wrong quantities 
(e.g., Divide instead of multiply, multiply by the wrong number). This 
error connects to rational number meaning misconceptions identified 
by Fosnot and Dolk (2002). 
2. Reverse the role of the numerator and/or denominator. This error is 
similar to those described by Baturo (1994), Behr et al. (1992), and 
Lamon (1999). 
3. Ignore either the numerator or denominator (as in Green, 1983b; 
Watson & Shaugnessy, 2004). 
4. Ignore the numerator/denominator AND reverse the role of the 
remaining part of the rational number (e.g., Divide by the numerator) 
5. Ignore the rational number altogether. This error appeared to connect 
to variable number misconception described by Küchemann (1978) in 
which students ignored the presence of variables. 
While this categorization of rational number meaning errors may not account for 
every rational number meaning error for every problem, it may serve as a foundation for 
exploring rational number meaning errors in other problems/contexts. Additionally, this 
list appears to be hierarchical; that is, a Type 2 rational number misinterpretation may 
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represent a greater degree of confusion about the meaning of rational numbers than Type 
1, as would Types 3, 4, and 5 over a Type 2.  
Item 6 response patterns. Item 6 offered students a linear function (y = 4x) and 
asked about the change in y based on an increase of two units to x. Prior to the present 
analysis, only Choices D and E were hypothesized as misconception responses — I 
expected students with additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions to choose D by 
squaring the independent variable coefficient and E by doubling that same coefficient (as 
described by Warren, 2000). Explanations from students who chose these two responses 
supported this expectation. For example, students who chose E typically showed their 
calculation as “4 x 2 = 8.” Alternatively, students who chose A, the correct answer, also 
performed this same calculation but knew to add it to the overall y value rather than 
making it a new coefficient. Therefore, D and E remained misconception responses in the 
coding procedures. Additionally, explanations for choices B and C also indicated 
misconceptions in student reasoning about additive and multiplicative structures. For 
example, students who chose B stated, “4 + 2 = 6” or “It also increases by 2,” similar to 
patterns found by Warren (2000) and Moss et al. (2008). Likewise, students who chose C 
offered one of three justifications, all of which represented a misconception about how to 
handle an additive structure in an algebraic equation. The first type of explanation 
demonstrated a reliance on the balance-beam principle of algebraic equations, stating 
something such as, “You basically add 2 more to the other side,” “Because both sides 
need to be the same, or “Because if one increases, so does the other.” The second type of 
explanation showed that some students chose C because they thought that the change of 
two should be added to the coefficient, stating rationales such as, “Because 4 + 2 = 6 that 
is 2 more than the original amount” or “Because 4x + 2 = 6x.” The third type of response 
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to support Choice C indicated that students knew that the change in y should be additive, 
but they failed to understand the role of the coefficient in that change. These students 
justified their choice of C by asserting, “It would be y = 4x + 2.” As a result of this 
analysis, the coding of misconception responses was expanded to include choices B and 
C. These errors appeared to occur because students were relying on procedures isolated 
from meaning and connections between ideas. The framework in Figure 10 may shed 
light on how these errors emerged. For example, students who relied on the balance beam 
principle for solving algebra equations did not seem to understand why such an approach 
works and what it means to a particular context. These students appeared to demonstrate 
procedural knowledge with instrumental understanding (Skemp, 1976/2006). As a result, 
these students developed algebraic misconceptions about how, when, and why the 
algebra balance beam works. These misconceptions about the balance beam led to faulty 
reasoning that may have reinforced the balance beam misconceptions. 
Item 7 response patterns. Item 7 asked students to choose an expression to 
represent the situation, “A plumber charges $48 for each hour and an additional $9 for 
travel.” The correct response, choice E, uses the $48 per-hour charge as the coefficient to 
the number of hours and adds the $9 travel fee as a one-time charge. Every distractor 
response was hypothesized to represent a misconception about additive/multiplicative 
structures. Student explanations verified this prediction. For example, students who chose 
A interpreted each charge as an “additional” charge. Likewise, students who chose B 
thought the calculation resulting from such an expression should be “added on to the 
original.” They also believed that both charges should be multiplied by the number of 
hours. Students who chose C knew that a charge should be added and another multiplied, 
but they reversed the quantities. Finally, students who chose D understood that the 
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expression should represent “48 times the hours plus 9,” but they did not understand how 
to translate those words into an expression. I concluded that choice D could possibly 
represent variable misconceptions as well as additive/multiplicative structure 
misconceptions, but since the analyses of the present study will not differentiate between 
types of misconceptions, D was left as a misconception response.  
Item 8 response patterns. Item 8 presented students with the following scenario: 
“Carmen sold 3 times as many hot dogs as Shawn. The two of them sold 152 hot dogs 
altogether. How many hot dogs did Carmen sell?” Originally, I hypothesized that choice 
B would represent the reversal error, reflecting the wrong person’s amount, similar to the 
reversal error identified by Clement (1982). The present analysis revealed that such was 
not the case in this sample. In fact, students who chose B provided correct equations such 
as “I did 3s + s = 152 and add the s to the 3s to get 4s and divided 152 and 4 by 4 and got 
s = 38.” Not one student who chose B in the sub-sample indicated that they thought the 
38 represented Carmen’s amount. As a result, I concluded that choosing B did not 
represent a variable meaning misconception so much as a careless error; specifically, not 
catching that the question asked for Carmen’s amount instead of Shawn’s. Almost twice 
as many students in the sub-sample chose C instead of B, and these students did indicate 
one of Küchemann’s (1978) variable interpretation errors — they unanimously ignored 
the variables altogether and simply divided 152 by 3. Students who chose E also ignored 
the variables entirely, showing a similar calculation to that of C. For example, students 
who chose C justified their answers with statements such as, “Because 152 ÷ 3 gives you 
50.8, round and you get 51.” Likewise, students who chose E wrote statements such as, 
“Because 50 + 50 + 50 = 150 – 2.” In both cases, students failed to recognize the role of 
the variable in partitioning the total amount. Other students who chose C and E 
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demonstrated Küchemann’s Level 1 interpretation, evaluating the variable using trial and 
error. Therefore, I concluded that choices C and E should represent the variable 
misconception rather than the original choice B.  
Item 16 response patterns. Item 16 presented students with a table of values and 
asked them to determine the function that best modeled the data. I hypothesized that 
choice A would represent a misconception about the nature of the functional relationship; 
student responses verified this expectation. Students who chose A made statements that 
indicated an understanding of a relationship, but they looked at the relationship 
backwards, i.e., they thought of n as the dependent variable rather than the independent 
variable, similar to the reversal error in Clement (1982). Although such an inversion 
might also be due to a rational number meaning misconception (i.e., doubling rather than 
halving, as in Item 5, error 2, Baturo, 1994; Behr et al., 1992; Lamon, 1999), the purpose 
of the present analysis is not to distinguish between misconception types but rather to 
reflect the presence of misconceptions in a content area. Therefore, choice A remained a 
misconception response in the analysis. This overlap indicates the possibility of an 
underlying multicollinearity across content area misconceptions resulting from the 
influence of the underlying misconceptions. 
Student explanations for choosing C or D on Item 16 also indicated the presence 
of variable misconceptions. Students who chose C explained that they had only used the 
first column of values to determine the equation, concluding that, “You subtract by the n 
and that equals p.” For choice D, students explained that they thought the number of days 
was one of the variable quantities of importance, “Because the days matter too.” These 
students then used the first column of values to conclude that subtraction held the key to 
solving this problem. As a result of this analysis, choices C and D were included as 
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misconception responses for Item 16. 
Misconceptions on Geometry Content Knowledge Items 
The geometry items on the NAEP instrument (i.e., Items 9, 10, and 11; Appendix 
N) examined student misconceptions about spatial reasoning and the meaning of rational 
numbers.  
Item 9 response patterns. Item 9 presented students with a rectangle and asked 
them whether the figure should be classified as a parallelogram. Students who chose the 
correct response, A, did so because, “It has parallel sides” or “It has equal sides.” This 
explanation indicated that these students were operating at least at Van Hiele Level 1, in 
which students recognize that figures have characteristics and properties. Students who 
chose B, on the other hand, indicated operating at Van Hiele Level 0, in which students 
rely on visual recognition of shapes. For example, students made statements such as, 
“Parallelograms are crooked ” and “The figure she drew has right angles.” Other 
students indicated that they thought that being a rectangle and square excludes a shape 
from being a parallelogram through statements such as, “It is a square” and “No. It is a 
rectangle.” These types of errors indicate a fundamental spatial reasoning misconception 
resulting from low Van Hiele levels of understanding (Clements & Battista, 1992; 
Crowley, 1987). Based on this evidence, I retained choice B as a misconception response. 
Item 10 response patterns. Item 10 presented students with a shaded figure within 
a grid of centimeter squares. I hypothesized that Choice D would represent a spatial 
reasoning misconception, in which students would rely on the lengths to compute the area 
rather than on the meaning of area, similar to Clements and Battista’s (1992) 9th and 11th 
most common spatial reasoning misconceptions. Explanations by students who chose D 
verified this hypothesis with statements such as, “Because you multiply the length and 
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width of squares.” Additionally, to arrive at Choice D, students also needed to be 
confused about the length of the diagonals; in this case, they evidently chose to add them 
as a little more than 1, then rounded the length to an even 7 cm. They also failed to 
recognize that the width on one end was 2 cm while on the other end it was 3 cm. 
Therefore, this choice was retained as a misconception choice. 
Additionally, an analysis of Choice C explanations revealed the presence of 
additive/multiplicative structure and spatial reasoning misconceptions, or Van Dooren et 
al.’s (2003) illusion of linearity applied to geometric shapes. Students who chose C 
explained that they simply “counted them all up,” approximating the diagonal lengths as 
1.5 cm and computing a perimeter rather than an area. Therefore, I added Choice C as a 
misconception choice for Item 10. 
Students who chose A for their response to Item 10 also revealed an error in 
spatial reasoning. These students recognized that they needed to count shaded areas, but 
they counted only the wholly shaded squares and ignored the half shaded squares, as 
indicated by statements such as, “There are 9 squares that are fully shaded” and “The 
image is mainly 3 by 3 so 9 sq centimeters, a = 3 • 3 = 9.” These explanations led me to 
believe that Choice A resulted from faulty reasoning, but not necessarily a misconception 
— they knew to add areas, and they appeared to recognize that area is the space inside a 
closed figure. Therefore, Choice A was not added to the misconception choices for Item 
10. 
Item 11 response patterns. For Item 11, students were asked to convert the 
dimensions of an object from one unit of measure to another. I hypothesized that the 
difficulty in Item 11 for students lay in the recognition that the dimensions represented 
two quantities rather than one, so the misconception of interest was the way students 
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ignored these variable quantities. Some students ignored one of the variables; others 
thought that the variables were simply labels and therefore traded labels in a one-to-one 
relationship. Prior to this investigation, I hypothesized only that choice A would represent 
a misconception response, indicating the use of the variable as a label. Explanations by 
students who chose A confirmed this hypothesis, indicating that the values “don’t 
change.” 
Additionally, students who chose B and C also indicated that only one variable 
needed to be accounted for in the computation. Students justified their choices with 
explanations such as, “I did 5 x 3 = 15, then left 3 the same.” Therefore, choices B and C 
were added to the list of misconception responses for Item 11. 
From this investigation, misconception responses for geometry items were 
expanded to include additional choices. Because misconceptions such as 
additive/multiplicative structure were also evident in algebra items, items from both 
content domains may co-vary in the SEM analysis. 
Misconceptions on Probability Content Knowledge Items 
Probability items (i.e., Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 17; Appendix N) on the NAEP 
instrument examined student errors in probability rooted in absolute/relative comparison, 
additive/multiplicative structure, spatial reasoning, and rational number meaning 
misconceptions.  
Item 1 response patterns. For Item 1, students were asked to determine which 
picture represented the greatest probability. I hypothesized that misconception responses 
would follow the patterns identified by Shaughnessy & Bergman (1993) and Watson & 
Shaughnessy (2004): Students with probability misconceptions would focus on the 
number of black marbles rather than the ratio of black to white marbles, or, confusing 
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absolute and relative comparisons. Students demonstrated this misconception precisely as 
expected. For example, students who chose answer C stated that its dish “contains more 
blacks” or “has the most black marbles.” Likewise, students who chose E also indicated 
that the number of black marbles was the only number of importance. Students who 
chose “B” made two absolute comparisons, looking for a combination of the “most white 
and black.” 
Item 2 response patterns. Item 2 presented students with a two-way table (gender 
by color of puppies) and asked students to compute the conditional probability of a puppy 
being male given that it is brown. I hypothesized that Choices B, C, D, and E would 
indicate a misconception about the meaning of rational numbers, as described by Bar-
Hillel and Falk (1982) and Falk (1992). Student explanations for these responses verified 
this hypothesis. 
Students who chose B on Item 2 ignored the condition of being brown altogether 
and instead gave the probability of being male, providing explanations such as “Because 
it’s seven puppies and two of them are male” or “2 total males and 7 total puppies; 
chance a male will be picked 2/7.” These students appeared to be unsure of how to 
incorporate the brown condition into the probability quantity.  
Students who chose C and E on Item 2 gave explanations that indicated confusion 
between part-part relationships (i.e., odds) and part-whole relationships (i.e., probability). 
These students justified their choices with statements such as, “There’s 1 male and 3 girls 
so the probability is 1/3” or “Because there’s 2 female and 3 male.” One student who 
chose C, however, did so because, “There are 3 black puppies and 1 is a male.” This 
student, rather than being confused about the meaning of rational numbers, simply 
computed the wrong conditional probability (black instead of brown), and he/she did so 
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correctly. This way of choosing C appeared to be an abberation rather than the pattern, so 
although C could be reached through a reasoning process not emerging from a 
misconception, the explanations of students in this sample indicated that the choice was 
overwhelmingly due to the misconception. No such abberations appeared in explanations 
for Choice E. Therefore, both C and E were retained as a misconception response.  
Students who chose D for Item 2 provided explanations that indicated two 
reasoning processes, both of which represented thinking based on misconceptions about 
rational numbers. The first explanation, used by the majority of students who chose D, 
relied on a comparison of brown dogs to dogs; these students made statements such as, 
“There are 2 male puppies and only 1 is brown” or “Because all together there is 1 male 
black and 1 brown, add them up which = 2 (so, 1/2).” These responses indicated 
confusion about which quantities should have been represented by the part whole 
relationship. The second type of explanation relied instead on the uniformity heuristic as 
described by Falk (1992). These students chose D, “Because there are only 2 types of 
genders that you can pick.” Whether from confusion about part-whole relationship 
quantities or the uniformity heuristic, the evidence from student explanations indicated 
that choice D did represent a misconception. 
Item 3 response patterns. Item 3 also asked students about a conditional 
probability. In this scenario, Bill had a bag of 30 candies, 10 each of red, blue, and green. 
Using a random draw, Bill ate two pieces of blue candy. Students are then asked if the 
probability of getting a blue candy on the next draw is still 10/30 or 1/3. I hypothesized 
that students who chose A (yes) would ignore the conditional aspect of the probability 
altogether and that students who chose B (no) would recognize that the quantity making 
up the part-whole relationship had changed. Student explanations to both choices verified 
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this hypothesis. Students who chose A sometimes relied on the uniformity heursistic, 
making statements such as, “Because there are 3 colors, and 1 could be picked blue.” 
Others who chose A simply ignored the conditional, justifying their response with 
statements such as, “You have 10 of each color candy to add up to 10/30” or “Because 
there are ten and all together are 30.”  
In contrast to explanations of choice A, students who chose B did not appear to do 
so by guessing or elimination. Indeed, these students recognized that the consumption of 
the two pieces of blue candy changed the quantities represented by the probability: “He 
ate 2/10, so it’s now 8 blues instead of 10,” “Because he has already eaten 2, which 
lessens his chances,” “He already ate 2 of them, so its 28 left,” “Because his chances go 
down,” or “Because he took out 2 candies; it’s now 8/28.” Based on these explanations, I 
concluded that students in this sample who chose correctly did indeed demonstrate a 
stronger conceptual understanding of the meaning of the rational number quantities 
present in the probability, so Choice A was retained as a misconception indicator for Item 
3. 
Item 4 response patterns. Item 4 presented students with a spinner divided in two 
halves, with one of the halves divided in half again. The arrow on the spinner pointed to 
one of the quarter regions. Students were then asked how many times they should expect 
the arrow to land in that region after 300 spins. I hypothesized that a spatial reasoning 
misconception would result in students deciding that the probability of the region was 1/3 
instead of 1/4. Based on this hypothesis, I expected Choice C to result from students 
taking 1/3 of 300. I also expected students to choose D by taking 1/3 of 360, the number 
of degrees of the circle. Explanations for choosing C verified that part of my hypothesis. 
These students made statements such as, “Because there’s 3 spaces and 300 ÷ 3 is 100” 
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or “I divided 300 ÷ 3 & got 100.” Therefore, I retained Choice C as a misconception 
choice. Students who chose D, on the other hand, did not verify my hypothesis. Instead, 
these students indicated that they had recognized the probability of the region as being 
1/4 but made a computation error. Noone who chose D gave explanations that indicated a 
misconception, so it was eliminated as a misconception choice. Explanations for 
choosing B did, however, indicate a misconception, possibly one of spatial reasoning or 
rational number meaning. These students recognized that the region was 1/4 of the circle, 
so they fell back on the number of degrees in a circle. These students made statements 
such as, “The circle is in an angle of 90º,” “Circle = 360, divide it by 4, you get 90,” or 
“Because the circle is split up into 3 parts; a circle’s measure is 360, if cut in half, each 
part will be 180, if one half of the split circle is cut in half again, that side is now 2 sets of 
90º.” This error could be due to misunderstanding about the meaning of the quantities in 
a probability ratio, or it could be due to misunderstanding the quantity being predicted, 
focusing on a single circle instead of the same circle 300 times. Regardless of which 
misconception led to this choice, it seemed clear that choosing B for Item 4 represented at 
least one type of misconception, so it was added as a misconception choice for this Item. 
As with Item 16, the convergence of fundamental misconceptions on multiple content 
areas increased the likelihood of a high degree of collinearity between content area 
misconceptions. 
Item 17 response patterns. Item 17 asked students to visualize a cube whose faces 
are labeled R or S. The probability of landing on R was given as 1/3. Students were then 
asked to determine how many faces of the cube should be labeled R. I hypothesized that 
Choices C and E would represent misconceptions about absolute/relative comparisons or 
the meaning of rational numbers. Students who chose these responses and explained their 
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answers corroborated this expectation with statements such as “because 1/3 Æ 1,” “one 
because there is a one out of three chance,” or “the number on the bottom is how many.” 
Some students who chose C ignored the stated probability altogether, similar to students 
who ignored rational number quantities in Item 5 (as students did with variables in 
Küchemann, 1978). These students relied instead on the uniformity heuristic (Falk, 
1992), stating that “each face R and S gets three sides” and “half of 6 is 3.” From these 
explanations, I concluded that C and E should be retained as representative of 
misconception-based reasoning. 
Misconceptions on Rational Number Content Knowledge Items  
Rational number items (i.e., Items 12, 13, 14, and 15; Appendix N) on the NAEP 
instrument examined student errors on rational numbers based on absolute/relative 
comparison, additive/multiplicative structure, and rational number meaning 
misconceptions.  
Item 12 response patterns. Item 12 presented students with a situation in which 
the postage cost for a letter is based on a different rate for the first ounce. I hypothesized 
that Choice D would indicate an additive/multiplicative structure misconception (as in 
Moss et al., 2008; Warren, 2000). Explanations by students who chose D confirmed this 
hypothesis, making statements such as, “I multiplied .33¢ times 2.7” and “Because 33 + 
33 = 66; 0.7 Æ 1 Î 66 + 22 = 88.” Student explanations of other choices revealed 
additional misconception responses for Item 12. Students who chose E followed the same 
reasoning as students who chose D, but they remembered to round the 2.7 to 3. So, these 
students wrote explanations such as “33 x 3 ounces = 99 cents.” Students who chose B 
used two types of reasoning to arrive at their answer. First, students added “33 + 22 + 
11,” “33 + 22 + 0.7,” or “You have 2 whole ounces, 33¢ + 22¢ = 55¢, next you have to 
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figure out the .7. Take 22 • 70%, which is 18. So you add 12 to 55, total would be 66¢.” 
This final statement, apart from the readily apparent calculation errors, shows the same 
basic reasoning as the first two. This particular justification included several erasures 
over numbers, a characteristic that appeared to indicate that the student had changed 
numbers to arrive at the closest answer available. So, not only does the response 
demonstrate the same additive/multiplicative structure misconception, it may also 
indicate the persistence of the misconception even in the face of numbers not adding up 
correctly. The second type of justification for choice B relied on a multiplicative-only 
strategy, for example, “I multiplied 33 times 2.” Students who chose A used similar 
reasoning to that used by students who chose B. These students also dropped the 0.7 or, 
in one case, the second ounce. Most of these justifications were some variation of, “33 + 
22 = 55.” The student who ignored the second ounce stated, “First ounce is 33 cents, next 
0.7 of ounce is 22, rounded.” As a result of this analysis, I included choices A, B, and E 
as misconception responses in addition to the original hypothesized choice D. The 
presence of additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions in rational numbers as well 
as algebra emphasizes the likelihood of collinearity between content area misconceptions. 
Item 13 response patterns. Item 13 presented students with a diagram and a scale 
of 3/4 in = 10 ft. They were then asked to convert 48 feet to the scale drawing length. I 
hypothesized that Choices D and E would represent reasoning indicative of rational 
number meaning misconceptions. Students chose D because, “3/4 x 10 = 7.5 in” or “3 ÷ 4 
= 0.75, 7.5 in.” These students demonstrated the first rational number misinterpretation 
identified by the analysis of Item 5 responses – performing the correct rational number 
operation to the wrong quantity (as in Fosnot & Dolk, 2002). Therefore, Choice D was 
retained as a misconception response.  
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Students who chose E, however, did not justify their choices with responses that 
implied that they had ignored the numerator as I had hypothesized. Instead, they made 
statements such as, “Because you add 3/4 to 48 ft” or “Add them all up and divide by 
10.” These responses clearly indicated an error in thinking, but I chose to discard E as a 
misconception choice because I could not find a clear connection between 
misconceptions identified by previous research and the reasoning process that led to this 
choice. 
Students who chose C for Item 13 indicated a misconception that I did not 
anticipate in my hypotheses. These students indicated that they had ignored the rational 
number altogether, the fifth rational number mis-interpretation identified by the analysis 
of Item 5. Some students justified their choice with statements such as, “48 ÷ 10 = 4.8 or 
5.” Therefore, choice C was included as a misconception response for Item 13. 
Item 14 response patterns. In Item 14, students were asked to arrange a set of 
three fractions in ascending order, distinguishing between absolute and relative 
comparisons. Students who responsed with choice E recognized the relative relationship 
between fractions, but they misunderstood the nature of that relationship. For example, 
students understood that fractional numbers compare differently than other rational 
number forms, but they failed to recognize that the denominator quantity is the one that 
has this inverse relationship (as in Baturo, 1994; Behr et al., 1992; Lamon, 1999). 
Students who chose E simply stated that “smaller fractions are larger.” Although this 
faulty reasoning clearly demonstrates a misunderstanding, these students did not 
demonstrate the absolute/relative comparison misconception, so E was not included as a 
misconception response. In constrast, students who chose B cited a comparison of the 
numerators only, ignoring the impact of the denominator on the overall quantity (i.e., 
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absolute versus relative comparison misconception). Therefore, B was the only response 
recognized as a misconception response for Item 14. 
Item 15 response patterns. Item 15 presented students with a rectangle divided 
into two columns of 10 cells for a total of 20 cells, six of which were shaded. Students 
were then asked to determine which rational number best represented the probability of 
the shaded region. I hypothesized that students who chose D would do so because they 
used a part-part relationship rather than a part-whole relationship. Explanations by 
students who chose D verified this hypothesis, making statements such as, “3 are black 
and 7 are white.” Therefore, Choice D was retained as a misconception choice for Item 
15.  
Implications of Item Response Patterns 
This analysis of student responses to the NAEP mathematics knowledge test 
fundamentally altered the way misconception responses were coded. For several items, 
student responses validated the hypothesized misconception choices and rationales for 
each choice. For several other items, student responses suggested that the hypothesized 
misconception responses were either not due to misconceptions at all, not due to the 
hypothesized misconception, or not due to the hypothesized misconception for the correct 
reasons. As a result, the coding of these items was changed to match student response 
patterns to maximize content validity prior to the structural analysis of content area 
misconceptions and the analysis of contextual factors on the emergence of 
misconceptions on a particular item. Table 18 summarizes the changes from hypothesized 
to observed misconception responses. 
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Table 18 
Summary of Observed Misconception Responses 
Item Hypothesized Misconception Responses 
Observed Misconception 
Responses 
1 C, E C, E 
2 B, C, D, E B, C, D, E 
3 A A 
4* C,D B, C 
5* A, B, C A, B, C, E 
6* D, E B, C, D, E 
7 A, B, C, D A, B, C, D 
8* B C, E 
9 B  B  
10* D C, D 
11* A A, B, C 
12* D A, B, D, E 
13* D, E C, D, E 
14 B B 
15 D D 
16* A A, C, D 
17 C, E C, E 
*Indicates an item where coding was changed because of response analysis. 
Structure of Content Area Misconceptions 
To examine the structure of misconceptions between content areas in secondary 
mathematics, six potential theoretical models were hypothesized (Figure 24). These 
models were compared by their goodness of fit indices. Additionally, the six data sets 
were randomly split into two data files each, one for calibration of the structural models 
and the other for validation of the resultant models (as recommended by Byrne, 1998) to 
maximize convergent validity.  
Calibration of Hypothesized Structural Models 
Patterns in the modification indices (MIs) across imputations were examined to 
ensure that the maximum amount of error within the model had been explained. I focused 
on the maximum modification index from each data set; however, I also looked for high 
MIs that matched the maximum MI from other data sets for the same model. Instead of 
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finding high matches, I found that the maximum modification index in one data set was 
invariably small in the others (i.e., less than 4, p > 0.05). Therefore, I focused instead on 
the theoretical relevance of each maximum modification index. I considered an MI to be 
theoretically sound based on the content knowledge examined and the underlying 
misconception addressed.  
Analysis of Model A 
Model A specified misconceptions in rational number content area as an 
independent variable that predicts misconceptions in probability content area, which in 
turn predicted misconceptions in algebra and geometry (Figure 24A). Therefore, in this 
model, probability acted as a filter for rational number. The goodness of fit indices 
suggested that this model fit the data very well (Table 19). 
Table 19 
Model A Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 606.76 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.009, 0.035] 0.075 0.66 0.728 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 716.34 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.076 0.66 0.714 1.37 
2 (N = 553) 680.20 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.68 0.726 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 778.03 0.98 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.076 0.66 0.721 1.44 
4 (N = 566) 646.52 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.034] 0.074 0.67 0.716 1.25 
5 (N = 575) 716.60 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.013, 0.034] 0.072 0.67 0.723 1.25 
Wtd. Avg. 707.53 0.99 0.88 0.026 [0.017, 0.035] 0.073 0.68 0.748 1.29 
SEAvg 24.494 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.057 
Note: df = 116 
Calibration. Model A MIs most commonly called for covariances between Item 6 
and 12 and Items 5 and 15 error terms (Table 20). Items 6 and 12 both measured 
additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions, so a relationship between these two 
variables seemed plausible even though they measured different content knowledge. 
Likewise, Items 5 and 15 both measured rational number meaning misconceptions. 
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Table 20 
Model A Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 33.17 TH (4, 6); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
1 339.07 TH (1, 8); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors 
2 43.79 TH (1, 7); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors 
3 894.40 TH (1, 7); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors 
4 68.22 TD (3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 361.69 TH (4, 6); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
 
Since the unimputed data file called for the error covariance of Items 5 and 15, 
this parameter was added to the model and the goodness of fit statistics were computed 
(Table 21). 
Table 21  
Model A2 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 578.83 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.033] 0.075 0.66 0.743 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 750.91 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.040] 0.075 0.66 0.736 1.37 
2 (N = 553) 679.00 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 769.37 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.075 0.65 0.732 1.40 
4 (N = 566) 627.74 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.009, 0.032] 0.073 0.67 0.745 1.19 
5 (N = 575) 680.75 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.0073, 0.031] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.19 
Wtd. Avg. 701.59 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.015, 0.035] 0.072 0.664 0.741 1.26 
SEAvg 28.967 0.004 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.058 
Note: df = 115 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant reduction of model 
misfit for both the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) and the imputed data files (Δχ2 
Unimputed [1] = 27.93, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 5.935, p = 0.015). I therefore, retained 
Model A2 and examined its modification indices (Table 22). 
Table 22 
Model A2 Maximum Modification Indices 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 311.76 BE (2, 3); Regression path from Geometry to Algebra 
1 178.20 TH (1, 8); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors 
2 60.24 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 12 and 15 errors 
3 64.18 TE (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
4 66.25 TD (3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 39.05 TE (12, 11); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors 
 
The addition of the regression path from geometry to algebra created an unstable 
model that would not converge across the data sets. The covariance between Items 7 and 
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12 indicated by Imputation 1 made theoretical sense to me since both items measured 
additive/multiplicative structure misconceptions. So, the parameter was added to the 
model, and the goodness of fit statistics were computed (Table 23). 
Table 23 
Model A3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 7 and 12 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 578.82 0.99 0.88 0.022 [0.000, 0.033] 0.075 0.65 0.657 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 743.84 0.98 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.040] 0.075 0.65 0.657 1.36 
2 (N = 553) 675.08 0.99 0.90 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.663 1.13 
3 (N = 558) 769.14 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.075 0.65 0.635 1.40 
4 (N = 566) 627.27 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.0097, 0.033] 0.073 0.66 0.660 1.19 
5 (N = 575) 677.92 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.0077, 0.032] 0.070 0.66 0.667 1.19 
Wtd. Avg. 698.67 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.016, 0.035] 0.072 0.66 0.656 1.25 
SEAvg 28.604 0.003 0.007 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.006 0.059 
Note: df = 114 
The difference of χ2 test did not reveal a statistically significant reduction of 
model misfit for either the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) or the imputed data files 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 0.01, p > 0.5; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 2.923, p = 0.087). I therefore, discarded 
this model and returned to Model A2. 
The other MIs from Model A2 failed to reveal any theoretically sound alterations 
to the model. For example, Items 12 and 15, Items 1 and 4, measured different content 
areas and different underlying misconceptions. And although Items 13 and 14 both 
examined rational number content, they measured different underlying misconceptions. 
Therefore, I concluded that Model A2 was the best calibration of Model A possible with 
these data (Figure 25). 
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Figure 25. Final Structural Model A2 
Validation of Model A2. To examine the convergent validity of Model A2, the 
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 24).  
Table 24 
Model A2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 449) 621.32 0.98 0.86 0.025 [0.0098, 0.036] 0.081 0.65 0.741 1.50 
1 (N = 556) 617.42 0.99 0.89 0.020 [0.000, 0.031] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.14 
2 (N = 580) 717.36 0.98 0.88 0.028 [0.018, 0.037] 0.076 0.66 0.735 1.27 
3 (N = 575) 764.96 0.98 0.88 0.030 [0.020, 0.038] 0.078 0.66 0.735 1.30 
4 (N = 567) 651.59 0.99 0.90 0.022 [0.0073, 0.032] 0.069 0.67 0.737 1.13 
5 (N = 558) 701.17 0.98 0.88 0.028 [0.017, 0.037] 0.0742 0.66 0.735 1.26 
Wtd. Avg. 689.92 0.98 0.89 0.026 [0.018, 0.033] 0.073 0.66 0.737 1.22 
SEAvg 28.762 0.003 0.004 0.002  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.040 
Note: df = 115 
The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those based on the calibration 
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates. Even though the 
population distribution of these fit indices are not always normally distributed, because of 
the central limit theorem, the sampling distribution around the point estimate will always 
be normally distributed, so a two-way, two-sample t-test is appropriate for comparisons 
of the imputed data sets (Table 25).  
Table 25 
Model A2 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
Imputed Data Set t value 0.40 0.00 -0.88 -0.39 -0.50 0.00 1.57 0.82 
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No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the 
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model 
A2 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the 
model had good convergent validity across samples. 
Analysis of Model B  
Calibration. Model B reversed the relationship specified in Model A for 
probability and rational number. In this model, misconceptions in rational number 
content filtered the influence of probability on the development of misconceptions in 
algebra and geometry. The goodness of fit indices suggested that this model fit the data 
well (Table 26).  
Table 26 
Model B Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation χ2a CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 607.05 0.99 0.87 0.023 [0.008, 0.034] 0.075 0.66 0.75 1.41 
1 (N = 577) 756.98 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.040] 0.075 0.66 0.74 1.39 
2 (N = 553) 682.40 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.68 0.76 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 744.63 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.074 0.66 0.74 1.41 
4 (N = 566) 649.92 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.015, 0.035] 0.074 0.67 0.75 1.27 
5 (N = 575) 710.91 0.99 0.88 0.024 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.67 0.75 1.25 
Wtd. Avg. 709.18 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.017, 0.036] 0.072 0.67 0.748 1.29 
SEAvg 22.042 0.004 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.055 
Note: df = 116 
The unimputed data set called for the addition to Model B of the regression path 
from geometry to algebra (Table 27). This potential structural alteration seemed to offer 
the most substantive change to the hypothesized model. Therefore, this parameter was 
added to the model. 
Table 27 
Model B Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 165.58 BE (2, 3); Regression path from Geometry to Algebra 
1 62.53 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 44.08 TE (12, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 267.85 LY(5, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 5 
4 46.16 TE(9, 4); Covariance between Item 15 and 16 errors 
5 71.34 TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
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Although the addition of this parameter to Model A resulted in an unstable model, 
it did not have such an effect on Model B.Even though the parameter represented the 
same regression path, its meaning within the model was quite different from that of 
Model A. In Model A, it represented dependence of algebra misconceptions on geometry 
misconceptions above and beyond its dependence on probability misconceptions with 
rational number misconceptions acting as the independent, exogenous variable. In Model 
B, this regression pathway represented the dependence of algebra misconceptions on 
geometry misconceptions above and beyond its dependence on rational number 
misconceptions while probability misconceptions acted as the independent, exogenous 
variable. Table 28 displays the resultant model fit indices. 
Table 28 
Model B2a Goodness of Fit Indices, Regress Algebra Misconceptions on Geometry Misconceptions 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 606.20 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.0088, 0.035] 0.075 0.65 0.740 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 756.28 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.075 0.65 0.725 1.39 
2 (N = 553) 676.54 0.99 0.90 0.017 [0.000, 0.028] 0.067 0.67 0.737 1.13 
3 (N = 558) 738.19 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.073 0.65 0.732 1.42 
4 (N = 566) 644.92 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.015, 0.035] 0.073 0.66 0.735 1.27 
5 (N = 575) 703.87 0.99 0.88 0.024 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.66 0.743 1.25 
Wtd. Avg. 704.19 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.016, 0.036] 0.072 0.66 0.734 1.29 
SEAvg 22.565 0.004 0.006 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.058 
Note: df = 115 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a schism between the imputed data set averages 
and the unimputed data file. In the unimputed data file, the difference was not statistically 
significant (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 0.85, p = 0.357). Using the weighted average of the five 
imputed data sets, the reduction of model misfit was significant (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 4.988, 
p = 0.026). To decide whether to retain the model, I considered that the MI that began 
this calibration came from the unimputed data set. So, I expected that any schism should 
have favored the unimputed data set rather than the imputed data sets. This reversal of 
effects suggested to me that the parameter did not affect the model the way the MI 
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suggested it would and that the parameter may add instability to the model even though 
all the data sets converged. I therefore decided to reject this model change and returned to 
the original hypothesized Model B. 
Other maximum MIs from the original Model B called for the addition of a 
crossloading from Rational Number misconceptions to Item 5 and error covariances 
between Items 1 and 4, 7 and 11, 5 and 15, and 15 and 16. I found no theoretical 
foundation for co-varying Items 1 and 4, Items 7 and 11, or Items 15 and 16. Items 5 and 
15, on the other hand, both measured rational number meaning misconceptions; so, their 
covariance seemed plausible as well as the cross-loading between rational number 
misconceptions and Item 5. Since the cross-loading indicated the largest drop in model 
misfit, I chose to try it first. Table 29 displays the resultant fit indices. 
Table 29 
Model B2b Goodness of Fit Indices, Regress Item 5 on Rational Number Misconceptions 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 579.13 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.032] 0.075 0.66 0.743 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 755.81 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.075 0.66 0.736 1.38 
2 (N = 553) 680.76 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 737.37 0.98 0.87 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.074 0.66 0.743 1.38 
4 (N = 566) 630.43 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.010, 0.033] 0.073 0.67 0.745 1.21 
5 (N = 575) 675.78 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.0066, 0.031] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.19 
Wtd. Avg. 696.15 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.015, 0.035] 0.072 0.67 0.743 1.26 
SEAvg 25.285 0.004 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.056 
Note: df = 115 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant reduction of model 
misfit for both the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) and the imputed data files (Δχ2 
Unimputed [1] = 27.92, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.029, p = 0.0003). I therefore, 
retained Model B2b and examined its modification indices (Table 30). 
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Table 30 
Model B2b Maximum Modification Indices 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 37.03 TD (3, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors 
1 62.45 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 44.22 TE (12, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 125.79 TE (12, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors 
4 56.68 TE (12, 10); Covariance between Item 11 and 9 errors 
5 40.62 TE (11, 10); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors 
 
Items 1 and 4, Items 6 and 11, and Items 7 and 11 measured different content 
areas and different underlying misconceptions, so these three pairs of error covariances 
were excluded from consideration. Items 1 and 3 measured probability content 
knowledge but did not measure the same underlying misconception — Item 1 examined 
absolute/relative comparison misconceptions while Item 3 examined meaning of rational 
number misconceptions. Likewise, Items 9 and 11 both measured geometry knowledge, 
but Item 9 measured spatial reasoning misconceptions while Item 11 measured meaning 
of variable misconceptions. Therefore, these error covariances were considered 
theoretically marginal for inclusion in the model. Items 9 and 10, however, both 
measured geometry content knowledge and spatial reasoning misconceptions, so their 
error covariance was explored for possible inclusion in the model (Table 31). 
Table 31 
Model B3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 575.78 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.033] 0.074 0.65 0.731 1.35 
1 (N = 577) 724.69 0.98 0.88 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.074 0.65 0.724 1.32 
2 (N = 553) 676.54 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 712.22 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.072 0.65 0.724 1.35 
4 (N = 566) 622.22 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.0095, 0.033] 0.072 0.66 0.734 1.19 
5 (N = 575) 650.53 0.99 0.89 0.020 [0.000, 0.030] 0.068 0.67 0.745 1.16 
Wtd. Avg. 677.24 0.99 0.89 0.024 [0.008, 0.016] 0.070 0.66 0.734 1.23 
SEAvg 21.237 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.002 0.005 0.005 0.048 
Note: df = 114 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 18.907, p < 0.0001). The reduction in 
model misfit, however, was significant only within a 93% confidence interval 
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(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.35, p = 0.067). Since the modification reduced a significant amount 
of misfit across the imputed data sets and nearly significant in the unimputed data sets, I 
concluded that the modification should be retained. Therefore, the modification indices 
for Model B3 were examined for further calibration (Table 32). 
Table 32 
Model B3 Maximum Modification Indices 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 38.01 TD (3, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors 
1 62.40 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 44.31 TE (12, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 78.97 TE (11, 7); Covariance between Item 7 and 10 errors 
4 38.25 TE (3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 39.06 TH (5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors 
 
Items 1 and 3, Items 1 and 4, and Items 13 and 14 measured similar content 
knowledge but different underlying misconceptions, so these error covariances were 
considered theoretically marginal for inclusion in the model. Items 7 and 10, Items 7 and 
11, and Items 8 and 17 measured different content knowledge and different underlying 
misconceptions, so these error covariances were considered theoretically poor for 
inclusion in the model. Therefore, I concluded that Model B3 (Figure 26) represented the 
best calibration of the hypothesized model with these data. 
 
Figure 26. Final Structural Model B3. 
Validation of Model B3. To examine the convergent validity of Model B3, the 
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 33). 
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Table 33 
Model B3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 449) 628.51 0.98 0.86 0.026 [0.011, 0.037] 0.081 0.64 0.729 1.51 
1 (N = 556) 592.18 0.99 0.90 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.068 0.67 0.737 1.12 
2 (N = 580) 704.41 0.98 0.88 0.028 [0.017, 0.037] 0.074 0.66 0.735 1.25 
3 (N = 575) 755.89 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.077 0.66 0.735 1.28 
4 (N = 567) 612.77 0.99 0.90 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.067 0.67 0.737 1.09 
5 (N = 558) 665.66 0.98 0.89 0.026 [0.015, 0.035] 0.072 0.66 0.727 1.22 
Wtd. Avg. 665.46 0.98 0.89 0.024 [0.015, 0.032] 0.072 0.66 0.734 1.19 
SEAvg 33.392 0.003 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.041 
Note: df = 114 
The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those based on the calibration 
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 34).  
Table 34 
Model B3 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
Imputed t value 0.42 0.67 -0.97 0.00 -1.00 -0.97 0.00 0.92 
 
No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the 
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model 
B3 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the 
model had good convergent validity across samples. 
Analysis of Model C 
Model C specified misconceptions in rational number and probability content 
areas as covarying independent variables, each directly influencing the development of 
misconceptions in algebra and geometry content areas. 
Finding a structurally stable Model C. Imputations 1, 2, and 4 for Model C would 
not converge with the hypothesized model. Using intermediate reported values as new 
starting points, the models were run several times, trying to reach convergence. Instead of 
converging, the models continued to diverge (Table 35).  
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Table 35 
Model C Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation χ2a CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 603.47 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.009, 0.035] 0.075 0.65 0.74 1.42 
1 (N = 577) Hypothesized Model Would not Converge 
2 (N = 553) Hypothesized Model Would not Converge 
3 (N = 558) 722.31 0.98 0.87 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.073 0.65 0.73 1.37 
4 (N = 566) Hypothesized Model Would not Converge 
5 (N = 575) 710.29 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.66 0.74 1.26 
Wtd. Avg. 716.21 0.99 0.88 0.027 [0.021, 0.033] 0.072 0.66 0.74 1.31 
SEAvg 8.500 0.007 0.007 0.004  0.001 0.007 0.007 0.078 
Note: df = 114 
An examination of the intermediate values revealed that the parameter estimates 
for the regression weights from probability to geometry, from rational number to algebra, 
and from probability to algebra differed greatly from all other estimates. Therefore, 
modifications were made to the model, starting with removing the regression pathway 
from probability to geometry. With this change, all imputations except Imputation 4 
converged (Table 36). 
Table 36 
Model C2a Calibration Samples Goodness of Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 603.71 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.0084, 0.035] 0.075 0.66 0.751 1.41 
1 (N = 577) 754.77 0.97 0.87 0.033 [0.024, 0.041] 0.075 0.65 0.725 1.40 
2 (N = 553) 679.23 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 723.33 0.98 0.87 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.073 0.66 0.743 1.36 
4 (N = 566) Model C2a did not Converge 
5 (N = 575) 710.32 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.66 0.743 1.26 
Wtd. Avg. 717.26 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.021, 0.031] 0.071 0.66 0.739 1.29 
SEAvg 9.220 0.008 0.008 0.003  0.002 0.000 0.006 0.074 
Note: df = 115 
Since Imputation 4 did not converge, the original hypothesized Model C was 
adjusted again by removing the regression pathway from rational number to algebra 
(Table 37).  
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Table 37 
Model C2b Calibration Samples Goodness of Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 606.39 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.0098, 0.035] 0.075 0.65 0.74 1.42 
1 (N = 577) Model C2b did not Converge 
2 (N = 553) 678.18 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.75 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 762.34 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.075 0.65 0.73 1.41 
4 (N = 566) 645.32 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.035] 0.074 0.66 0.74 1.25 
5 (N = 575) Model C2b did not Converge 
Wtd. Avg. 695.09 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] 0.072 0.66 0.737 1.27 
SEAvg 30.178 0.003 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.005 0.003 0.066 
Note: df = 115 
Since Imputations 1 and 5 did not converge, the original hypothesized Model C 
(Model C3a) was adjusted again by removing both regression pathways, rational number 
to algebra and probability to geometry (Table 38). 
Table 38 
Model C3a Fit Indices, Remove Rational Number to Algebra and Probability to Geometry Regression Paths 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 607.07 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.0086, 0.035] 0.075 0.66 0.751 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 759.38 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.075 0.66 0.736 1.40 
2 (N = 553) 679.80 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.68 0.756 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 762.49 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.075 0.66 0.743 1.40 
4 (N = 566) 648.89 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.035] 0.074 0.67 0.746 1.26 
5 (N = 575) 727.47 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.035] 0.072 0.67 0.754 1.27 
Wtd. Avg. 715.85 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.017, 0.036] 0.072 0.67 0.747 1.30 
SEAvg 24.986 0.004 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.053 
Note: df = 116 
The difference of χ2 test did not reveal statistically significant reduction of model 
misfit for either the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) or the imputed data files (Δχ2 
Unimputed [2] = 1.61, p = 0.477; Δχ2Imputed Avg[2] = 0.89, p > 0.5). Alternatively, the other set 
of regression pathways was removed, rational number to geometry and probability to 
algebra (Model C3b; Table 39). 
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Table 39 
Model C3b Fit Indices, Remove Rational Number to Geometry and Probability to Algebra Regression Paths 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 608.68 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.0085, 0.035] 0.075 0.66 0.75 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 754.60 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.040] 0.076 0.66 0.74 1.39 
2 (N = 553) 679.95 0.99 0.89 0.017 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.68 0.76 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 771.63 0.98 0.87 0.032 [0.022, 0.040] 0.075 0.66 0.74 1.43 
4 (N = 566) 652.76 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.015, 0.035] 0.074 0.67 0.75 1.28 
5 (N = 575) 723.82 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.034] 0.072 0.67 0.75 1.27 
Wtd. Avg. 716.74 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.016, 0.037] 0.073 0.67 0.747 1.30 
SEAvg 24.929 0.004 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.057 
Note: df = 116 
The difference of χ2 test did not reveal statistically significant reduction of model 
misfit for either the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) or the imputed data files (Δχ2 
Unimputed [2] = 3.6, p = 0.165; Δχ2Imputed Avg[2] = 5.21, p = 0.074). However, both models 
added stability across imputations, so they were deemed superior to the original 
hypothesized model. Furthermore, neither model provided a statistically better fit, so both 
were retained for the synthesizing of the structural model calibration results.  
Calibration of Model C3. Model C specified Rational Number and Probability 
Misconceptions as covarying independent variables. Model C3A specified the regression 
of Algebra on Probability Misconceptions and of Geometry on Rational Number 
Misconceptions. Model C3B specified the regression of Geometry on Probability 
Misconceptions and of Algebra on Rational Number Misconceptions. Since both models 
emerged from the original hypothesized model and neither model contained a 
significantly lower amount of model misfit, both models were calibrated using their 
respective modification indices (Table 40).  
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Table 40 
Model C3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Model, 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
Model C3-A, 0 89.94 LY(3, 2); Crossloading, Geometry to Item 7 
1 53.42 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 45.28 TE(8, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 106.69 TE(8, 2); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors 
4 52.39 TE(8, 6); Covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors 
5 64.77 TH(9, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
Model C3-B, 0 31.54 TH(1, 7); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
1 58.32 TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 343.10 TH(6, 8); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors 
3 61.68 TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
4 45.46 TH(9, 5); Covariance between Item 15 and 16 errors 
5 91.97 TH(9, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
 
Calibration of Model C3A. No theoretical foundation supported the crossloading 
from Geometry to Item 7, the covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors, Item 7 and 11 
errors, or Item 6 and 11 errors. The covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors was 
considered theoretically marginal since those items measured the same type of content 
knowledge but different underlying misconceptions. Likewise, Items 5 and 15 measured 
the same underlying misconception (rational number meaning) but different content 
knowledge. I chose to try the covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors because the 
alignment of underlying misconceptions seemed more consistent with the present study 
purpose. Table 41 displays the goodness of fit statistics for the resultant model. 
Table 41 
Model C3Aii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 579.28 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.033] 0.075 0.66 0.743 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 757.67 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.024, 0.041] 0.075 0.65 0.725 1.39 
2 (N = 553) 678.58 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 755.37 0.98 0.87 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.075 0.66 0.743 1.37 
4 (N = 566) 629.57 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.0095, 0.032] 0.073 0.67 0.745 1.20 
5 (N = 575) 687.99 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.0087, 0.032] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.20 
Wtd. Avg. 701.97 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.016, 0.034] 0.072 0.66 0.741 1.26 
SEAvg 27.316 0.004 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.055 
Note: df = 115 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant reduction of model 
misfit for both the unimputed data file (listwise deletion) and the imputed data files (Δχ2 
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Unimputed [1] = 27.79, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.881, p = 0.0002). I therefore, 
retained Model C3Aii and examined its modification indices (Table 42). 
Table 42 
Model C3Aii Maximum Modification Indices 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 76.22 LY (3, 2); Crossloading between Geometry and Item 7 
1 53.02 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 45.29 TE (8, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 105.95 TE (8, 2); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors 
4 375.57 TH (6, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors 
5 40.75 TE (7, 6); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors 
 
The potential modifications of crossloading Geometry to Item 7, covarying Items 
1 and 4, Items 7 and 11, and Items 6 and 11 were considered theoretically weak because 
there was no shared content area or underlying modifications. Items 7 and 12 measured 
the same underlying misconception in different content areas, so I considered the addition 
of their covariance to be theoretically marginal. Items 9 and 10, on the other hand, 
measured the same content area and underlying misconception, so I chose to add their 
covariance to the model (Table 43). 
Table 43 
Model C3Aiii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 575.55 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.033] 0.074 0.65 0.731 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 726.56 0.98 0.88 0.030 [0.021, 0.039] 0.074 0.65 0.724 1.32 
2 (N = 553) 673.93 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 729.14 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.073 0.65 0.724 1.34 
4 (N = 566) 621.79 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.009, 0.032] 0.072 0.66 0.734 1.19 
5 (N = 575) 662.61 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.005, 0.031] 0.069 0.66 0.734 1.17 
Wtd. Avg. 682.82 0.99 0.89 0.024 [0.016, 0.032] 0.071 0.66 0.732 1.23 
SEAvg 22.736 0.003 0.003 0.002  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.045 
Note: df = 114 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 19.143, p < 0.0001). The reduction in 
model misfit, however, was significant only within a 94% confidence interval for the 
unimputed data set (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.73, p = 0.053). Since the modification reduced a 
significant amount of misfit across the imputed data sets and nearly significant in the 
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unimputed data sets, I concluded that the modification should be retained. Therefore, the 
modification indices for Model C3Aiii were examined for further calibration (Table 44). 
Table 44 
Model C3Aiii Maximum Modification Indices 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 32.26 TD (8, 6); Covariance between Item 12 and 14 errors 
1 53.13 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 45.28 TE (8, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 65.74 TE (7, 3); Covariance between Item 7 and 10 errors 
4 39.93 TD (8, 7); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 39.26 TH (5, 4); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors 
 
Of the potential modifications for Model C3Aiii, none were theoretically relevant 
except the covariance of Item 12 and 14 errors and of Item 13 and 14 errors. Both of 
these item pairs measured the same content area but different underlying misconceptions. 
Therefore, I considered these modifications to be theoretically marginal. Furthermore, the 
magnitudes of MIs appeared small relative to previous models, so I concluded that Model 
C3Aiii represented the best calibration of Model C3A for these data (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27. Final Structural Model C3Aiii. 
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Validation of Model C3Aiii. To examine the convergent validity of Model C3Aiii, 
the goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 45).  
Table 45 
Model C3Aiii Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 449) 626.37 0.98 0.86 0.026 [0.012, 0.037] 0.081 0.64 0.729 1.52 
1 (N = 556) 615.57 0.99 0.89 0.020 [0.000, 0.030] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.14 
2 (N = 580) 727.21 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.037] 0.076 0.66 0.735 1.27 
3 (N = 575) 753.28 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.077 0.66 0.735 1.28 
4 (N = 567) 639.74 0.99 0.90 0.021 [0.0064, 0.031] 0.068 0.67 0.737 1.12 
5 (N = 558) 687.05 0.98 0.88 0.027 [0.017, 0.037] 0.073 0.66 0.735 1.25 
Wtd. Avg. 683.92 0.98 0.89 0.025 [0.018, 0.032] 0.073 0.664 0.737 1.21 
SEAvg 28.851 0.003 0.004 0.002  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.038 
Note: df = 114 
The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those based on the calibration 
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 46).  
Table 46 
Model C3Aiii Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
Imputed Data Set t value -0.04 0.67 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.70 -1.58 0.55 
 
No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the 
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model 
C3Aiii fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that 
the model had good convergent validity across samples. 
Calibration of Model C3B. The potential modifications of covarying Item 11 and 
12 errors, Item 1 and 4 errors, and Items 15 and 16 errors were considered theoretically 
weak because they did not measure the same content knowledge or underlying 
misconception. Because Items 5 and 15 measured the same underlying misconception, 
the covariance of their errors was added to the model (Table 47). 
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Table 47 
Model C3Bii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 580.28 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.033] 0.075 0.66 0.743 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 752.43 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.075 0.66 0.736 1.31 
2 (N = 553) 678.98 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 764.96 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.075 0.65 0.732 1.40 
4 (N = 566) 630.49 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.0099, 0.033] 0.073 0.67 0.745 1.20 
5 (N = 575) 687.72 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.0083, 0.032] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.20 
Wtd. Avg. 703.00 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.015, 0.035] 0.072 0.66 0.741 1.25 
SEAvg 27.783 0.004 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.052 
Note: df = 115 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 28.4, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.741, p = 0.0002). Therefore, 
Model C3Bii was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 48). 
Table 48 
Model C3Bii Maximum Modification Indices 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 32.22 TH (1, 7); Covariance between Item 1 and 10 errors 
1 58.08 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 127.66 TH (6, 8); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors 
3 61.75 TD (4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
4 37.65 TD (8, 7); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 52.48 TH (8, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 14 errors 
 
Items 1 and 10, Items 1 and 4, Items 5 and 14, and Items 11 and 12 measured 
different content knowledge and underlying misconceptions, so they were discarded as 
potential modifications. Items 13 and 14, on the other hand, both measured rational 
number content while examining different underlying misconceptions. In this case, the 
underlying misconceptions were rational number meaning and absolute/relative 
comparisons, and both examined rational number content. The relationship between these 
two misconceptions, therefore, warranted the addition of this covariance parameter to the 
model (Table 49). 
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Table 49 
Model C3Biii Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 579.49 0.99 0.88 0.022 [0.000, 0.033] 0.075 0.65 0.73 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 751.81 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.024, 0.041] 0.075 0.65 0.72 1.38 
2 (N = 553) 678.80 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.75 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 764.66 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.075 0.65 0.73 1.40 
4 (N = 566) 592.02 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.071 0.67 0.75 1.14 
5 (N = 575) 686.72 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.0093, 0.032] 0.070 0.66 0.73 1.21 
Wtd. Avg. 694.87 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.035] 0.071 0.66 0.736 1.25 
SEAvg 34.474 0.004 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.005 0.007 0.064 
Note: df = 114 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 8.121, p = 0.004). The reduction in 
model misfit, however, was non-significant for the unimputed data (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 
0.79, p = 0.374). Furthermore, the ECVI values increased, suggesting that whatever 
model misfit was eliminated by the new parameter was the result of overfitting the model 
to a sample. Therefore, I removed this parameter and retained Model C3Bii as the best 
calibration of this model for these data (Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28. Final Structural Model C3Bii. 
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Validation of Model C3Bii. To examine the convergent validity of Model C3Aiii, 
the goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 50).  
Table 50 
Model C3Bii Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 449) 627.99 0.98 0.86 0.025 [0.0093, 0.036] 0.081 0.65 0.741 1.50 
1 (N = 556) 611.02 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.13 
2 (N = 580) 754.73 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.020, 0.038] 0.077 0.66 0.735 1.30 
3 (N = 575) 764.78 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.020, 0.038] 0.078 0.66 0.735 1.30 
4 (N = 567) 641.47 0.99 0.90 0.020 [0.0037, 0.031] 0.068 0.67 0.737 1.11 
5 (N = 558) 698.49 0.98 0.88 0.027 [0.017, 0.037] 0.074 0.66 0.735 1.26 
Wtd. Avg. 693.31 0.98 0.89 0.025 [0.017, 0.033] 0.073 0.66 0.737 1.22 
SEAvg 33.881 0.003 0.004 0.002  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.047 
Note: df = 115 
The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration 
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 51).  
Table 51 
Model C3Bii Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
Imputed Data Set t value 0.31 0.00 -0.88 0.00 -0.50 0.00 1.57 0.63 
 
No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the 
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model 
C3Bii fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that 
the model had good convergent validity across samples. 
Analysis of Model D 
Calibration. The original hypothesized Model D specified Rational Number 
Misconceptions as the sole independent variable with Probability, Algebra, and Geometry 
Misconceptions acting as dependent variables. The goodness of fit indices indicated an 
excellent fit (Table 52).  
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Table 52 
Model D Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation χ2a CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 607.05 0.99 0.87 0.023 [0.008, 0.034] 0.075 0.66 0.751 1.41 
1 (N = 577) 756.98 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.040] 0.075 0.66 0.736 1.39 
2 (N = 553) 682.40 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.68 0.756 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 744.63 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.074 0.66 0.743 1.41 
4 (N = 566) 649.92 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.015, 0.035] 0.074 0.67 0.746 1.27 
5 (N = 575) 710.91 0.99 0.88 0.024 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.67 0.754 1.25 
Wtd. Avg. 709.18 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.017, 0.036] 0.072 0.67 0.747 1.29 
SEAvg 22.042 0.004 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.055 
Note: df = 116 
The maximum MIs for Model D called for the addition of several error covariance 
terms (Table 53). 
Table 53 
Model D Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 37.24 TE(3,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors 
1 62.53 TE(4,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 44.08 TE(13,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 113.58 TE(13,7); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors 
4 46.16 TH(4, 10); Covariance between Item 15 and 16 errors 
5 71.34 TH(4, 6); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
 
The covariances of the error terms for Items 7 and 11, Items 6 and 11, and Items 
15 and 16 were considered theoretically weak because they shared neither common 
content knowledge nor underlying misconception. The covariances of the error terms for 
Items 1 and 3 and Items 1 and 4 were considered theoretically marginal because they 
measured the same content knowledge but not the same underlying misconception. The 
covariance of the error terms for Items 5 and 15 was also considered theoretically 
marginal because the items measured the same underlying misconception but not the 
same content knowledge. To decide whether to add a parameter, and if so, which one, I 
also considered that Item 3 measured Rational Number Meaning misconceptions while 
Item 1 measured Absolute/Relative Comparison misconceptions, two misconceptions that 
are closely related. Finally, I considered that the covariance of Items 5 and 15 had been 
used in previous models to reduce a statistically significant amount of model misfit, that 
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the MI for Items 5 and 15 was the second highest across the data sets, and that the MI for 
Items 1 and 3 was the lowest across the data sets. Therefore, I chose to add the 
covariance between Item 5 and 15 error terms to Model D (Table 54). 
Table 54 
Model D2 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 5and 15 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 579.13 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.032] 0.075 0.66 0.743 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 755.81 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.075 0.66 0.736 1.38 
2 (N = 553) 680.76 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 737.37 0.98 0.87 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.074 0.66 0.743 1.38 
4 (N = 566) 630.43 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.010, 0.033] 0.073 0.67 0.745 1.21 
5 (N = 575) 675.78 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.0066, 0.031] 0.070 0.67 0.745 1.19 
Wtd. Avg. 696.15 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.015, 0.035] 0.072 0.67 0.743 1.26 
SEAvg 25.285 0.004 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.056 
Note: df = 115 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 27.92, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.031, p = 0.0003). Therefore, 
Model D2 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 55). 
Table 55 
Model D2 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 37.03 TE(3,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 3 errors 
1 62.45 TE(4,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 44.22 TE(13,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 125.79 TE(13,7); Covariance between Item 6 and 11 errors 
4 56.68 TE(13, 11); Covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors 
5 40.62 TE(12, 11); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors 
 
The covariance of Item 9 and 10 error terms offered the theoretically strongest 
adjustment to Model D2. Table 56 displays the goodness of fit statistics for the new 
model resulting from this parameter (Model D3). 
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Table 56 
Model D3 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 575.78 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.033] 0.074 0.65 0.731 1.35 
1 (N = 577) 724.69 0.98 0.88 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.074 0.65 0.724 1.32 
2 (N = 553) 676.54 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.67 0.745 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 712.22 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.072 0.65 0.724 1.35 
4 (N = 566) 622.22 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.0095, 0.033] 0.072 0.66 0.734 1.19 
5 (N = 575) 650.53 0.99 0.89 0.020 [0.000, 0.030] 0.068 0.67 0.745 1.16 
Wtd. Avg. 677.24 0.99 0.89 0.024 [0.016, 0.033] 0.070 0.66 0.734 1.23 
SEAvg 21.237 0.003 0.003 0.003  0.002 0.005 0.005 0.048 
Note: df = 114 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 18.907, p < 0.0001). The reduction in 
model misfit, however, was significant only within a 93% confidence interval for the 
unimputed data set (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.35, p = 0.067). To decide whether to retain the 
model, I considered three characteristics of the analysis: (1) The large amount of model 
misfit removed across the imputed data sets, (2) The proximity of the significance level 
of the unimputed data set to a 95% confidence interval, and (3) The theoretical strength 
of the additional parameter. I concluded, therefore, that the modification should be 
retained and the modification indices for Model D3 were examined for further calibration 
(Table 57). 
Table 57 
Model D3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 2268.68 LY (1,3); Crossloading, Geometry to Item 1 
1 62.40 TE(4,1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 44.31 TE(13,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 11 errors 
3 78.97 TE(12,8); Covariance between Item 7 and 10 errors 
4 38.25 TD(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 39.06 TE(9, 5); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors 
 
I found no theoretical support for adding the crossloading from geometry to Item 
1; furthermore, the size of the MI exceeded the total amount of misfit in the model, so 
this MI was disregarded. The addition of the covariances between Items 1 and 4, Items 7 
and 11, Items 7 and 10, and Items 8 and 17 were also disregarded as theoretically weak 
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because each pair of items measured different content knowledge and underlying 
misconception. Items 13 and 14, however, measured the same content knowledge, so 
their error covariance was considered theoretically plausible, and the parameter was 
added to the model. Table 58 displays the goodness of fit statistics for the resultant model 
(Model D4). 
Table 58 
Model D4 Goodness of Fit Indices, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 574.99 0.99 0.88 0.022 [0.000, 0.033] 0.074 0.65 0.731 1.36 
1 (N = 577) 724.59 0.98 0.88 0.030 [0.021, 0.039] 0.074 0.65 0.724 1.32 
2 (N = 553) 676.08 0.99 0.89 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.66 0.734 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 711.55 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.072 0.65 0.724 1.35 
4 (N = 566) 583.40 0.99 0.90 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.070 0.66 0.726 1.13 
5 (N = 575) 649.62 0.99 0.89 0.020 [0.0036, 0.031] 0.068 0.66 0.734 1.16 
Wtd. Avg. 669.05 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.014, 0.033] 0.070 0.66 0.728 1.22 
SEAvg 28.122 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.003 0.003 0.053 
Note: df = 113 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 8.194, p = 0.004). The reduction in 
model misfit, however, was non-significant for the unimputed data (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 
0.79, p = 0.374). Therefore, D4 was discarded; and as a result of no other theoretically 




Figure 29. Final Structural Model D3. 
Validation of Model D3. To examine the convergent validity of Model D3, the 
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 59).  
Table 59 
Model D3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 449) 628.51 0.98 0.86 0.026 [0.011, 0.037] 0.081 0.64 0.729 1.51 
1 (N = 556) 592.18 0.99 0.90 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.068 0.67 0.737 1.12 
2 (N = 580) 704.41 0.98 0.88 0.028 [0.017, 0.037] 0.074 0.66 0.735 1.25 
3 (N = 575) 755.89 0.98 0.88 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.077 0.66 0.735 1.28 
4 (N = 567) 612.77 0.99 0.90 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.067 0.67 0.737 1.09 
5 (N = 558) 665.66 0.98 0.89 0.0267 [0.015, 0.035] 0.072 0.66 0.727 1.22 
Wtd. Avg. 665.46 0.98 0.89 0.024 [0.015, 0.033] 0.072 0.66 0.734 1.19 
SEAvg 33.392 0.003 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.003 0.002 0.041 
Note: df = 114 
The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration 
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 60).  
Table 60 
Model D3 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
Imputed Data Set t value 0.42 0.68 -1.00 -0.03 -0.77 -1.00 -0.05 0.91 
 



































































calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model 
D3 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the 
model had good convergent validity across samples. 
Analysis of Model E 
Calibration. Model E reversed the relationship between probability and rational 
numbers from Model D, specifying misconceptions in probability as the independent 
variable with misconceptions in rational number, algebra, and geometry acting as 
dependent variables. The goodness of fit indices suggested that the Model E fit the 
calibration data very well (Table 61). 
Table61 
Model E Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 606.76 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.009, 0.035] 0.075 0.66 0.751 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 751.43 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.076 0.66 0.743 1.37 
2 (N = 553) 680.20 0.99 0.89 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.68 0.734 1.15 
3 (N = 558) 778.03 0.98 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.076 0.66 0.743 1.44 
4 (N = 566) 646.52 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.034] 0.074 0.67 0.765 1.25 
5 (N = 575) 716.60 0.99 0.88 0.025 [0.013, 0.034] 0.072 0.67 0.743 1.25 
Wtd. Avg. 714.68 0.99 0.88 0.026 [0.017, 0.035] 0.073 0.67 0.746 1.29 
SEAvg 26.460 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.006 0.057 
Note: df = 116 
The maximum modification indices for Model E called for the addition of 
covariance parameters between the error terms for Items 5 and 15, Items 7 and 12, Items 
6 and 12, and Items 13 and 14 (Table 62). 
Table 62 
Model E Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 33.17 TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
1 339.07 TE(7, 1); Covariance between Item 7 and 12 errors 
2 42.79 TE(6, 1); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors 
3 894.64 TE(6, 1); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors 
4 68.22 TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 361.69 TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
 
The item pairs Items 6 and 12, Items 7 and 12, and Items 5 and 15 measured the 
same underlying misconception, so they were considered theoretically plausible. Item 13 
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and 14 measured the same content knowledge, so it was also considered theoretically 
plausible. Because the highest MI called for the addition of the error covariance between 
Items 6 and 12 and because that MI was called for by two data sets, I chose to disregard 
the fact that the highest MI was also larger than the total unaccounted variance in the 
model and added this parameter first (Table 63). 
Table 63 
Model E2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 12 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 598.94 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.0097, 0.035] 0.074 0.65 0.740 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 729.62 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.022, 0.040] 0.074 0.66 0.743 1.36 
2 (N = 553) 633.47 0.99 0.90 0.017 [0.000, 0.028] 0.065 0.67 0.737 1.13 
3 (N = 558) 761.00 0.98 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.076 0.65 0.732 1.43 
4 (N = 566) 632.07 0.99 0.89 0.024 [0.013, 0.034] 0.073 0.67 0.745 1.24 
5 (N = 575) 704.59 0.99 0.88 0.024 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.66 0.743 1.25 
Wtd. Avg. 692.41 0.99 0.88 0.026  0.072 0.66 0.740 1.28 
SEAvg 28.888 0.003 0.007 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.058 
Note: df = 115 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 7.82, p = 0.005; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 22.274, p < 0.0001). Therefore, 
Model E2 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 64). 
Table 64 
Model E2 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 36.16 TE(7, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 7 errors 
1 68.61 LY(5, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 5 
2 42.79 TE(6, 1); Covariance between Item 6 and 12 errors 
3 420.34 TE(7, 5); Covariance between Item 5 and 7 errors 
4 67.67 TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 289.01 TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
 
The error covariance of Items 6 and 12 was rejected as theoretically implausible 
because the two items shared neither content area or underlying misconception. Items 13 
and 14, Items 5 and 15, and Items 5 and 7 were considered theoretically plausible 
because each pair shared content area while measuring different underlying 
misconceptions. The error covariance between Items 6 and 7 offered the theoretically 
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strongest MI; both items measured the same content area and underlying misconception. 
So, although the MI for this parameter was the smallest across the data sets, I chose to 
add it to the model next (Table 65).  
Table 65 
Model E3 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 7 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 592.29 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.0084, 0.035] 0.074 0.65 0.740 1.41 
1 (N = 577) 705.52 0.98 0.88 0.030 [0.021, 0.039] 0.074 0.65 0.724 1.34 
2 (N = 553) 627.37 0.99 0.90 0.016 [0.000, 0.028] 0.065 0.67 0.737 1.12 
3 (N = 558) 752.80 0.98 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.075 0.65 0.732 1.42 
4 (N = 566) 629.14 0.99 0.89 0.025 [0.013, 0.034] 0.073 0.66 0.734 1.23 
5 (N = 575) 700.17 0.99 0.88 0.024 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.66 0.743 1.24 
Wtd. Avg. 683.20 0.99 0.88 0.025  0.072 0.66 0.734 1.27 
SEAvg 27.007 0.003 0.006 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.057 
Note: df = 114 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 6.65, p = 0.010; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 9.21, p < 0.002). Therefore, Model 
E3 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 66). 
Table 66 
Model E3 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 45.07 TE(12, 10); Covariance between Item 9 and 11 errors 
1 81.17 LY(7, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 7 
2 90.93 TE(12, 1); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors 
3 1423.41 TE(5, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors 
4 131.15 TE(4, 1); Covariance between Item 12 and 15 errors 
5 186.00 TE(5, 4); Covariance between Item 5 and 15 errors 
 
The crossloading from rational number to Item 7 along with the error covariances 
of Items 5 and 12 and Items 11 and 12 were considered theoretically weak (i.e., no 
matching content knowledge or underlying misconception). The error covariances of 
Items 9 and 11 and Items 12 and 15 were considered theoretically plausible because each 
pair measured the same content knowledge or underlying misconception. The error 
covariance of Items 5 and 15 was considered the strongest plausible modification because 
each item measured rational number meaning misconceptions. Table 67 displays the 
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goodness of fit indices for the model resulting from the addition of this parameter. 
Table 67 
Model E4 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 5 and 15 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 561.19 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.032] 0.073 0.65 0.731 1.34 
1 (N = 577) 703.79 0.98 0.88 0.031 [0.021, 0.039] 0.074 0.65 0.724 1.33 
2 (N = 553) 626.72 0.99 0.90 0.017 [0.000, 0.029] 0.064 0.66 0.726 1.12 
3 (N = 558) 744.57 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.075 0.64 0.721 1.39 
4 (N = 566) 609.20 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.0074, 0.032] 0.072 0.66 0.734 1.17 
5 (N = 575) 661.25 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.0055, 0.031] 0.069 0.66 0.734 1.17 
Wtd. Avg. 669.20 0.99 0.89 0.024 [0.014, 0.035] 0.071 0.66 0.728 1.24 
SEAvg 27.777 0.003 0.006 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.058 
Note: df = 113 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 31.1, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 14.003, p = 0.0002). Therefore, 
Model E4 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 68). 
Table 68 
Model E4 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 32.06 TH(1, 11); Covariance between Item 1 and 10 errors 
1 439.59 LY(7, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 7 
2 83.13 TE(12, 1); Covariance between Item 11 and 12 errors 
3 310.83 TH(2, 6); Covariance between Item 2 and 6 errors 
4 76.70 TE(6, 5); Covariance between Item 5 and 6 errors 
5 37.32 TH(5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors 
 
None of the potential modifications to the model were theoretically plausible 
except for the error covariance between Items 5 and 6, which both measured algebra 
content knowledge. Therefore, the goodness of fit statistics for the resultant model were 
examined (Table 69). 
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Table 69 
Model E5 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 5 and 6 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 545.31 0.99 0.88 0.020 [0.000, 0.032] 0.073 0.65 0.731 1.32 
1 (N = 577) 695.07 0.98 0.88 0.031 [0.021, 0.039] 0.076 0.64 0.713 1.32 
2 (N = 553) 602.29 0.99 0.90 0.016 [0.000, 0.028] 0.065 0.66 0.726 1.10 
3 (N = 558) 736.66 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.074 0.64 0.721 1.37 
4 (N = 566) 587.68 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.0041, 0.031] 0.071 0.65 0.723 1.15 
5 (N = 575) 655.41 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.0054, 0.031] 0.069 0.65 0.723 1.16 
Wtd. Avg. 655.59 0.99 0.89 0.024 [0.013, 0.035] 0.071 0.65 0.721 1.22 
SEAvg 31.209 0.003 0.006 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.002 0.059 
Note: df = 112 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 15.88, p < 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 13.606, p = 0.0002). Therefore, 
Model E5 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 70). 
Table 70 
Model E5 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 32.97 TH(1, 11); Covariance between Item 1 and 10 errors 
1 56.44 TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 95.82 TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors 
3 83.26 TE(5, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors 
4 63.65 TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 37.17 TE(11, 10); Covariance between Item 9 and 10 errors 
 
The error covariances between Items 1 and 10, Items 1 and 4, Items 10 and 12, 
and Items 5 and 12 were considered theoretically weak because the item pairs did not 
measure the same content knowledge or underlying misconception. The error covariance 
between Items 13 and 14 seemed theoretically plausible because both items measured 
rational number content knowledge, and both underlying misconceptions were related 
(i.e., absolute/relative comparison and rational number meaning misconceptions). The 
error covariance between Items 9 and 10 seemed the strongest theoretically because both 
items measured the same content area (geometry) and the same underlying misconception 
(spatial reasoning). The goodness of fit indices for the resultant model were therefore 
computed (Table 71). 
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Table 71 
Model E6 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 9 and 10 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 542.33 0.99 0.88 0.020 [0.000, 0.032] 0.072 0.64 0.720 1.31 
1 (N = 577) 663.77 0.98 0.88 0.028 [0.018, 0.037] 0.074 0.64 0.713 1.26 
2 (N = 553) 597.31 0.99 0.90 0.016 [0.000, 0.028] 0.065 0.65 0.715 1.10 
3 (N = 558) 713.58 0.98 0.88 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.073 0.64 0.713 1.35 
4 (N = 566) 579.89 0.99 0.90 0.020 [0.0024, 0.031] 0.070 0.65 0.715 1.13 
5 (N = 575) 630.88 0.99 0.90 0.020 [0.000, 0.030] 0.068 0.65 0.715 1.13 
Wtd. Avg. 637.14 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.013, 0.033] 0.070 0.65 0.714 1.19 
SEAvg 26.757 0.003 0.005 0.003  0.002 0.003 0.001 0.053 
Note: df = 111 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 18.455, p < 0.0001). The reduction in 
model misfit for the unimputed data, however, was only significant at the 91% 
confidence level (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 2.98, p = 0.084). I considered four criteria to 
determine that the model should be retained: (1) The unimputed data model was nearly 
significant and clearly no worse than the previous model, (2) The modification removed a 
large amount of misfit compared to the 95% CI critical value of four in the imputed 
model, (3) The expected cross validation values were smaller, so the addition of the 
parameter did not likely overfit to the sample, and (4) Three GFI values reached the 
recommended 0.90 cutoff despite non-normality. I therefore retained Model E6 and 
examined its modification indices (Table 72). 
Table 72 
Model E6 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 45.00 TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors 
1 56.41 TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
2 284.54 TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors 
3 67.47 TD(4, 1); Covariance between Item 1 and 4 errors 
4 62.24 TE(8, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 8 errors 
5 37.29 TH(5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors 
 
The error covariances between Items 10 and 12, Items 1 and 4, and Items 8 and 
17, were considered theoretically weak because the item pairs did not measure the same 
content knowledge or underlying misconception. The error covariance between Items 6 
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and 8 seemed theoretically plausible because both items measured algebra content 
knowledge, so the parameter was added to the model, and the goodness of fit indices for 
the resultant model were computed (Table 73). 
Table 73 
Model E7 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 8 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 527.60 0.99 0.88 0.020 [0.000, 0.032] 0.070 0.63 0.709 1.31 
1 (N = 577) 648.02 0.98 0.89 0.028 [0.017, 0.037] 0.072 0.64 0.705 1.25 
2 (N = 553) 595.06 0.99 0.90 0.016 [0.000, 0.028] 0.064 0.65 0.715 1.09 
3 (N = 558) 697.44 0.98 0.88 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.073 0.63 0.702 1.36 
4 (N = 566) 540.98 0.99 0.90 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.069 0.65 0.715 1.11 
5 (N = 575) 618.79 0.99 0.90 0.020 [0.0027, 0.031] 0.067 0.64 0.704 1.14 
Wtd. Avg. 620.06 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.012, 0.033] 0.069 0.64 0.708 1.19 
SEAvg 29.208 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.057 
Note: df = 110 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit for both the unimputed data set (listwise deletion) and the imputed data sets 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 14.73, p = 0.0001; Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 17.077, p < 0.0001). Therefore, 
Model E7 was retained, and the modification indices were examined (Table 74). 
Table 74 
Model E7 Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 58.10 TE(9, 6); Covariance between Item 6 and 16 errors 
1 106.31 TE(6, 4); Covariance between Item 6 and 15 errors 
2 167.49 TE(11, 1); Covariance between Item 10 and 12 errors 
3 74.35 TE(5, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors 
4 64.56 TE(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 47.35 TH(5, 8); Covariance between Item 8 and 17 errors 
 
The potential addition of the error covariances for Items 6 and 15, Items 10 and 
12, Items 5 and 12, and Items 8 and 17 were discarded because each pair measured 
different content knowledge and underlying misconceptions. Items 13 and 14 and Items 6 
and 16, on the other hand, measured the same content knowledge. I differentiated 
between the two error covariances by considering four characteristics: (1) The covariance 
of Items 13 and 14 had significantly reduced model misfit in previous models, (2) The 
underlying misconceptions for Items 13 and 14 were related (absolute/relative 
 183 
comparison and rational number meaning), (3) The MI for the error covariance of Items 
13 and 14 was higher than for Items 6 and 16, and (4) The MI for the error covariance of 
Items 6 and 16 came from the unimputed data set. Since three of the four characteristics 
favored the addition of the error covariance for Items 13 and 14, this parameter was 
added to the model, and the goodness of fit indices were computed (Table 75). 
Table 75 
Model E8 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 13 and 14 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 526.90 0.99 0.88 0.020 [0.000, 0.032] 0.070 0.63 0.709 1.31 
1 (N = 577) 645.67 0.98 0.89 0.028 [0.018, 0.037] 0.072 0.63 0.694 1.25 
2 (N = 553) 594.35 0.99 0.90 0.017 [0.000, 0.029] 0.064 0.64 0.704 1.10 
3 (N = 558) 696.54 0.98 0.88 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.073 0.62 0.690 1.36 
4 (N = 566) 506.12 1.00 0.90 0.015 [0.000, 0.027] 0.067 0.64 0.711 1.05 
5 (N = 575) 618.69 0.99 0.90 0.021 [0.0048, 0.031] 0.067 0.64 0.704 1.15 
Wtd. Avg. 612.27 0.99 0.89 0.022 [0.011, 0.034] 0.069 0.63 0.701 1.18 
SEAvg 35.220 0.004 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.062 
Note: df = 109 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 7.791, p = 0.005). The reduction in 
model misfit, however, was non-significant for the unimputed data (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 
0.70, p = 0.403). To reconcile this difference of significance, I considered that, although 
the imputed data showed a statistically significant change, only one of the data sets 
(Imputation 4) accounted for the change across all five data sets. Consequently, I 
discarded Model E8 and computed the goodness of fit indices for a re-adjusted Model E7 




Model E8ii Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples, Covary Item 6 and 16 Errors 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 523.83 0.99 0.88 0.020 [0.000, 0.032] 0.070 0.63 0.709 1.31 
1 (N = 577) 647.05 0.98 0.89 0.028 [0.018, 0.037] 0.072 0.63 0.694 1.25 
2 (N = 553) 590.05 0.99 0.90 0.016 [0.000, 0.028] 0.064 0.64 0.704 1.09 
3 (N = 558) 693.63 0.98 0.88 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.073 0.62 0.690 1.36 
4 (N = 566) 537.89 0.99 0.90 0.019 [0.000, 0.030] 0.069 0.64 0.704 1.10 
5 (N = 575) 609.35 0.99 0.90 0.020 [0.0028, 0.031] 0.066 0.64 0.704 1.14 
Wtd. Avg. 615.59 0.99 0.89 0.023  0.069 0.63 0.699 1.19 
SEAvg 29.377 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.058 
Note: df = 109 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 4.466, p = 0.035). The reduction in 
model misfit for the unimputed data, however, was only significant at the 93% 
confidence level (Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 3.77, p = 0.035). Because these reductions were 
generally small across the data sets, and the additional parameter was theoretically 
marginal from the outset, I decided that Model E7 was the best calibration of Model E for 
these data (Figure 30). 
 
Figure 30. Final Structural Model E7. 
Validation of Model E7. To examine the convergent validity of Model E7, the 
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 77).  
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Table 77 
Model E7 Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 449) 558.33 0.99 0.88 0.021 [0.000, 0.033] 0.078 0.63 0.709 1.40 
1 (N = 556) 595.43 0.99 0.89 0.021 [0.0059, 0.032] 0.069 0.64 0.712 1.15 
2 (N = 580) 670.25 0.98 0.89 0.028 [0.017, 0.037] 0.073 0.64 0.705 1.23 
3 (N = 575) 727.03 0.98 0.89 0.029 [0.019, 0.038] 0.075 0.64 0.705 1.25 
4 (N = 567) 635.27 0.99 0.90 0.023 [0.010, 0.033] 0.068 0.64 0.704 1.14 
5 (N = 558) 652.34 0.98 0.89 0.027 [0.016, 0.036] 0.072 0.64 0.705 1.22 
Wtd. Avg. 655.55 0.98 0.89 0.026 [0.020, 0.031] 0.071 0.64 0.706 1.20 
SEAvg 24.189 0.003 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.000 0.002 0.025 
Note: df = 110 
The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration 
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 78).  
Table 78 
Model E7 Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
Imputed Data Set t value -1.32 0.68 0.62 -1.05 -1.36 0.71 0.73 -0.17 
 
No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the 
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model 
D3 fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the 
model had good convergent validity across samples. 
Analysis of Model F 
Calibration. Model F specified all four content area misconception factors as 
covarying independent variables (Figure 24F). The goodness of fit statistics indicated an 
excellent fit for the hypothesized model (Table 79). 
Table 79 
Model F Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 602.38 0.99 0.87 0.025 [0.010, 0.036] 0.075 0.64 0.762 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 734.17 0.97 0.87 0.033 [0.024, 0.041] 0.075 0.64 0.747 1.38 
2 (N = 553) 667.59 0.99 0.90 0.018 [0.000, 0.029] 0.066 0.66 0.726 1.13 
3 (N = 558) 722.26 0.98 0.87 0.030 [0.020, 0.039] 0.073 0.65 0.732 1.37 
4 (N = 566) 632.29 0.98 0.88 0.025 [0.014, 0.035] 0.073 0.65 0.724 1.25 
5 (N = 575) 694.49 0.99 0.89 0.024 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.65 0.723 1.23 
Wtd. Avg. 690.36 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.017, 0.036] 0.072 0.65 0.730 1.27 
SEAvg 20.683 0.004 0.007 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.005 0.052 
Note: df = 113 
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The maximum MIs from each data set were examined for potential parameters to 
reduce model misfit (Table 77). The largest MI pointed to a crossloading between 
rational number content and Item 7, an algebra item that measured additive/multiplicative 
structure misconceptions. Such a parameter seemed theoretically weak, and the 
magnitude of the MI (i.e., larger than the total χ2 of each model) suggested that the source 
of the MI might be model instability rather than a substantive improvement in the model. 
Table 80 
Model F Maximum Modification Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation Maximum Modification Index Associated Parameter to Add 
0 142.40 TD(13, 1); Covariance between Item 5 and 12 errors 
1 283.01 TD(11, 4); Covariance between Item 10 and 15 errors 
2 51.97 TD(13, 12); Covariance between Item 5 and 11 errors 
3 8339.60 LX(15, 1); Crossloading, Rational Number to Item 7 
4 69.78 TD(3, 2); Covariance between Item 13 and 14 errors 
5 145.14 TD(13, 12); Covariance between Item 5 and 11 errors 
 
The error covariances for Items 5 and 12, Items 5 and 11, and Items 10 and 15 
were considered theoretically weak additions to the model because each pair of items 
measured different content knowledge and different underlying misconceptions. The 
error covariance for Item 13 and 14 was considered theoretically plausible because the 
items measured the same content knowledge and related underlying misconceptions. So, I 
added the parameter to the model and computed the goodness of fit statistics (Table 81). 
Table 81 
Model F2 Goodness of Fit Indices from Calibration Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 478) 601.99 0.99 0.87 0.025 [0.011, 0.036] 0.075 0.64 0.728 1.42 
1 (N = 577) 731.23 0.97 0.87 0.033 [0.024, 0.041] 0.075 0.64 0.714 1.38 
2 (N = 553) 666.89 0.99 0.90 0.018 [0.000, 0.030] 0.066 0.66 0.726 1.14 
3 (N = 558) 721.38 0.98 0.87 0.031 [0.021, 0.040] 0.073 0.64 0.721 1.37 
4 (N = 566) 598.51 0.98 0.89 0.023 [0.010, 0.033] 0.071 0.65 0.716 1.20 
5 (N = 575) 694.45 0.99 0.89 0.025 [0.013, 0.034] 0.071 0.65 0.723 1.24 
Wtd. Avg. 682.68 0.98 0.88 0.026 [0.016, 0.036] 0.071 0.65 0.720 1.27 
SEAvg 26.607 0.004 0.007 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.002 0.053 
Note: df = 112 
The difference of χ2 test revealed a statistically significant decrease in model 
misfit in the imputed data sets (Δχ2Imputed Avg[1] = 8.000, p = 0.005). The reduction in 
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model misfit for the unimputed data, however, was not statistically significant 
(Δχ2Unimputed [1] = 0.39, p > 0.5). Most of the significant reduction in the imputed data sets 
occurred in the fourth data set while the rest of the data sets, including the unimputed 
data set, reflected no change in model misfit. Furthermore, the expected cross-validation 
statistic increased, which indicated that the new parameter may represent an overfitting of 
the model to a data set. Based on these considerations, I discarded Model F2 and returned 
to the original hypothesized model. Because none of the other MIs from the original 
model were theoretically plausible, I concluded that the original hypothesized model was 
the best calibration of Model F to these data (Figure 31). 
 
Figure 31. Final Structural Model F. 
Validation of Model F. To examine the convergent validity of Model F, the 
goodness of fit statistics were computed based on the validation sample (Table 82).  
Table 82 
Model F Goodness of Fit Indices from Validation Samples 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
0 (N = 449) 633.59 0.98 0.86 0.029 [0.017, 0.040] 0.083 0.63 0.718 1.58 
1 (N = 556) 626.94 0.99 0.89 0.023 [0.0090, 0.033] 0.071 0.66 0.734 1.18 
2 (N = 580) 718.86 0.97 0.87 0.034 [0.025, 0.042] 0.078 0.64 0.714 1.39 
3 (N = 575) 781.93 0.97 0.87 0.032 [0.023, 0.041] 0.078 0.65 0.725 1.36 
4 (N = 567) 628.65 0.99 0.90 0.022 [0.0075, 0.032] 0.068 0.66 0.726 1.13 
5 (N = 558) 685.22 0.98 0.88 0.028 [0.017, 0.037] 0.074 0.65 0.724 1.26 
Wtd. Avg. 687.67 0.98 0.88 0.028 [0.019, 0.036] 0.074 0.65 0.725 1.26 
SEAvg 32.630 0.005 0.007 0.003  0.002 0.004 0.004 0.056 
Note: df = 113 
The goodness of fit statistics were then compared to those from the calibration 
sample using a t-test to compare the difference in the point estimates (Table 83).  
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Table 83 
Model F Comparison of Calibration and Validation Sample Fit Indices 
Imputation χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
Imputed Data Set t value 0.10 0.44 0.00 -0.67 -1.00 -0.50 1.10 0.19 
 
No statistic from the imputed data sets was significantly different for the 
calibration and validation samples (i.e., all t values less than 1.96), indicating that Model 
F fit the validation and calibration samples equally well. I, therefore, concluded that the 
model had good convergent validity across samples. 
Summary of Structural Model Analysis 
I originally hypothesized that either Models B or E would fit the data better than 
the others. The analysis of student response patterns indicated the possibility of a high 
degree of collinearity between the models: This collinearity resulted in every model 
fitting very well according to a wide range of fit indices and low parsimony as evidenced 
by parsimony indices higher than 0.5 (as recommended by Mulaik et al., 1989; Byrne, 
2009). Table 84 summarizes the fit indices for the final calibration of each model. 
Table 84 
Summary of Fit Indices for Final Calibration of Each Model 
Model Statistic χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
A2 Wtd. Avg. 701.59 0.98 0.88 0.025 0.072 0.664 0.741 1.26 
 SEAvg 28.967 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.058 
B3 Wtd. Avg. 677.24 0.99 0.89 0.024 0.070 0.66 0.734 1.23 
 SEAvg 21.237 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.048 
C3Aiii Wtd. Avg. 682.82 0.99 0.89 0.024 0.071 0.66 0.732 1.23 
 SEAvg 22.736 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.045 
C3Bii Wtd. Avg. 703.00 0.98 0.88 0.025 0.072 0.66 0.741 1.25 
 SEAvg 27.783 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.052 
D3 Wtd. Avg. 677.24 0.99 0.89 0.024 0.070 0.66 0.734 1.23 
 SEAvg 21.237 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.048 
E7 Wtd. Avg. 620.06 0.99 0.89 0.023 0.069 0.64 0.708 1.19 
 SEAvg 29.208 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.057 
F Wtd. Avg. 687.67 0.98 0.88 0.028 0.074 0.65 0.725 1.26 
 SEAvg 32.630 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.056 
 
These indices, while all excellent fit indices, are statistically indistinguishable 
across models. This result may be the result of a high degree of collinearity between 
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content area misconceptions. The implications of this collinearity are discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
Impact of Contextual Factors on Item Misconception Responses 
Implementation of Intervention 
Observations of classes and teacher interviews were used to assess fidelity of 
intervention implementation. Teachers from each school began at different times, usually 
upon completion of prior units. The pretest, ATMI, and MAI were administered by each 
teacher to their classes prior to the beginning of the treatment period. The treatment 
lasted between 5 and 10 class periods, depending on the teacher. The sample classes were 
observed in both the treatment and control conditions across all course types included in 
the study (Table 85).  
Table 85 







Duration of Observations (Minutes) 
Min Median Mean (SE) Max 
Total 53 42 20 20 27.14 (2.86) 90 
Treatment 22 28 20 20 26.43 (3.68) 90 
Control 28 14 20 20 28.57 (4.55) 60 
Algebra 1 15 23 20 20 24.78 (3.44) 90 
Geometry 17 8 20 20 30.00 (6.55) 60 
Adv. Geometry 12 4 20 20 30.00 (10.00) 60 
Algebra 2 4 4 20 20 37.50 (17.50) 90 
Adv. Algebra 2 5 3 20 20 20.00 (0.00) 20 
 
To maximize observation representativeness of treatment fidelity (i.e., concurrent 
criterion validity), days, times, and schedules of classroom visits were unannounced. 
These observations indicated that the intervention was not given to the control groups, 
nor were the treatment lessons interrupted with control group lessons. 
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Two Level Model 
Two hierarchical analyses was conducted using HLM 6.08 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & 
Congdon, 2009) to examine the impact of item, student, and class characteristics on the 
emergence of errors due to mathematical misconceptions. The first analysis divided the 
model variance into two levels, student and class. The outcome variable for this model 
was the percent of misconception errors on the posttest. The second analysis divided th 
model variance into three levels, item, student, and class. The outcome variable for this 
model was a posttest misconception error indicator variable. 
Descriptive statistics. Because of missing data in surveys, pretests, and posttests 
not accounted for by multiple imputation, samples sizes were different than those 
reported for other analyses. The observed sample sizes (Table 86) resulted in a statistical 
power of approximately 0.80 to detect a population effect size δ = 0.40 and 
approximately 0.75 for a population effect size δ = 0.30 for approximately 20 students 
per class. In this sample, class sizes averaged approximately 18 students. 
Table 86 
Descriptive Statistics for Two-Level HLM Model 
Variable N Mean SD 
Student Level One 
PostPercent 567 0.35 0.18 
PrePercent 567 0.38 0.17 
Enjoyment 567 2.89 0.79 
Motivation 567 2.87 0.93 
Self Confidence 567 3.18 0.84 
Value 567 3.49 0.76 
Knowledge of Cognition 567 3.43 0.60 
Regulation of Cognition 567 3.23 0.56 
Class Level 2 
Class Mean Enjoyment 32 2.90 0.30 
Class Mean Motivation 32 2.88 0.34 
Class Mean Self Confidence 32 3.17 0.32 
Class Mean Value 32 3.49 0.24 
Class Mean Knowledge of Cognition 32 3.43 0.16 
Class Mean Regulation of Cognition 32 3.23 0.16 
Class Mean PrePercent 32 0.38 0.10 
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Unconditional null model. The unconditional ANOVA model (Equations 20 and 
21) was examined first to determine the appropriateness of using a multilevel model to 
represent the data. The ANOVA HLM model, also referred to as the null model, was used 
to compute the intraclass correlation (ICC) and the overall mean for the dependent 
variable, percentage of misconceptions on the posttest (PostMis). 
Level 1 










The variance for both levels (Table 87) was statistically significant at the 0.001 
alpha level. The intraclass correlation was 0.229, meaning that 22.9% of the variance in 
the model is attributable to classroom effects. 
Table 87 
Unconditional Two Level Model Fixed and Random Effects 
Fixed Effects Coefficient SE T-Ratio  
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00 0.356 0.017 20.94  
     
Random Effects 
Variance 
Component df χ2 p Value 
Between Classes, u0j 0.0073 31 193.397 < 0.001 
Within Classes, R 0.0245    
 
Using this null model as a baseline, the student model was developed to explain 
the impact of as many student characteristics as possible that may have been confounded 
by class effects (Ma, Ma, & Bradley, 2008). 
Student Model. Using backward regression to develop the student model 
(Equations 22 and 23), all student level variables were entered into the null model.  
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Only pretest percentage of misconceptions and mathematics self confidence had a 
statistically significant effect on posttest percentage of misconceptions (Table 88). 
Table 88 
Student Characteristics Model Fixed and Random Effects 
Fixed Effects Coefficient SE T-Ratio p Value 
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00 0.356 0.017 21.34 < 0.001* 
Enjoyment Slope, γ10 0.019 0.014 1.35 0.188 
Motivation Slope, γ20 -0.006 0.010 -0.58 0.565 
Self Confidence Slope, γ30 -0.023 0.008 -2.71 0.011* 
Value Slope, γ40 -0.001 0.011 -0.110 0.914 
Knowledge of Cognition Slope, γ50 -0.022 0.017 -1.302 0.203 
Regulation of Cognition Slope, γ60 0.015 0.019 0.778 0.443 
PrePercent Slope, γ70 0.484 0.051 9.462 < 0.001* 
     
Random Effects 
Variance 
Component df χ2 p Value 
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0 0.0077 31 277.98 < 0.001* 
Enjoyment Slope, u1 0.0009 31 25.47 > 0.500 
Motivation Slope, u2 0.0002 31 25.52 > 0.500 
Self Confidence Slope, u3 0.0002 31 21.19 > 0.500 
Value Slope, u4 0.0007 31 32.80 0.379 
Knowledge of Cognition Slope, u5 0.0008 31 31.72 0.430 
Regulation of Cognition Slope, u6 0.0022 31 35.94 0.248 
PrePercent Slope, u7 0.0256 31 37.41 0.198 
Level 1, R 0.0171    
*Significant p values 
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The intercept of the student model represented a slightly different quantity than 
the null model: In the null model, γ00 represented the overall average percentage of 
misconceptions on the posttest; in the student model, γ00 represented the overall average 
percentage of misconceptions on the posttest after controlling for all level 1 predictors. 
So, γ00 represented the mean misconception percentage for a student who had an average 
score on pretest misconceptions; enjoyment, value, motivation, and self confidence; 
knowledge and regulation of cognition; and, unique student effects. The value of γ00 
between the two models did not appear very different because only two of the fixed 
effects were statistically non-zero. Because of the non-significant fixed effects of most 
level 1 variables, only pretest misconception percentage and mathematics self confidence 
were retained for the contextual model. 
The significance of the random effects in Table 88 provided two additional 
important pieces of information for the development of the contextual model. First, the 
only fixed effect with significant between-class variance to explain was the mean 
percentage of posttest misconceptions after controlling for all other level 1 variables. So, 
neither of the retained fixed effects were permitted to vary freely in Model 2. Second, the 
inclusion of the level 1 variables reduced the level 1 variance from 0.024 to 0.017, a 29% 
reduction. The remaining level 1 variance could not be explained by the other level 1 
variables, so Model 2 (contextual model) left the level 1 variance untouched. 
Contextual Model. The contextual model (Equations 24 and 25) began with the 
removal of all non-significant level 1 variables and non-significant level 2 random effects 
from the student model. Because no significant level 2 variance remained to be explained 
in the impact of the level 1 variables  
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Initial Contextual Model Fixed and Random Effects 
Fixed Effects Coefficient SE T-Ratio p Value 
For Intercept, β0     
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00 0.360 0.007 52.66 < 0.001* 
Mean Enjoyment, γ01 -0.163 0.074 -2.19 0.038* 
Mean Motivation, γ02 -0.039 0.048 -0.82 0.423 
Mean Self Confidence, γ03 0.069 0.050 1.38 0.181 
Mean Value, γ04 0.108 0.051 2.13 0.044* 
Mean Knowledge of Cognition, γ05 -0.0004 0.088 -0.01 > 0.500 
Mean Regulation of Cognition, γ06 0.091 0.084 1.07 0.295 
Mean PrePercent, γ07 0.841 0.085 9.91 < 0.001* 
Treatment, γ08 -0.020 0.015 -1.307 0.202 
For Self Confidence Slope, β1     
Mean Self Confidence Slope, γ10 -0.020 0.008 -2.57 0.011* 
For PrePercent Slope, β2     
Mean PrePercent Slope, γ20 0.492 0.043 11.37 < 0.001* 
Random Effect 
Variance 
Component df χ2 p Value 
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0 0.0003 24 41.30 < 0.001* 
Level 1, R 0.0187    
*Significant p value 
The initial contextual model (Table 89) revealed significant effects for the class 
mean mathematics enjoyment and value. The negative coefficient for enjoyment 
indicated that higher classroom levels of enjoyment of mathematics resulted in lower 
percentages of misconceptions on the posttest. Although the coefficient for value was 
positive, its magnitude was small enough that I hypothesized that it might be due to the 
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non-significant variable inclusion in the model. This hypothesis was therefore tested in 
the final model. The unexplained between class variance was reduced 96% from 0.0077 
to 0.0003, which resulted in a significant reduction in χ2 (Δχ2[7] = 236.68, p < 0.0001). 
The signficant variables were retained for the final model. 
Final Model. The final model (Equations 26 and 27) included only significant 
variables for both student level 1 and class level 2. 
Student Level 1 
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Final Contextual Model Fixed and Random Effects 
Fixed Effects Coefficient SE T-Ratio p Value 
For Intercept, β0     
Class Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00 0.359 0.007 48.639 < 0.001 
Class Mean Enjoyment, γ01 -0.129 0.041 -3.148 0.004 
Class Mean Value, γ02 0.132 0.053 2.492 0.019 
Class Mean Pretest Misconceptions, γ03 0.833 0.079 10.609 < 0.001 
For Self Confidence Slope, β1     
Grand Mean Self Confidence Slope, γ10 -0.020 0.008 -2.57 0.011 
For PrePercent Slope, β2     
Grand Mean PrePercent Slope, γ20 0.492 0.043 11.36 < 0.001 
Random Effect 
Variance 
Component df χ2 p Value 
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0 0.007 29 221.60 < 0.001 
Level 1, R 0.019    
 
The removal of non-significant variables from the contextual model (Table 90) 
added a significant amount of variance to the model, (Δχ2[+5] = +180.30, p < 0.0001). 
This result indicated that, although individual variables were non-significant, their 
cumulative effect may have been significant. One reason for this result may have been 
 196 
the reduced statistical power to detect smaller effect sizes. The reduction in χ2 from the 
student model, however, was still statistically significant (Δχ2[2] = 56.38, p < 0.0001). 
The sign for class mean value remained positive, and the unexplained model variance 
increased significantly. I hypothesized that these effects may have been due to the 
removal of important cumulative effects of variables that were not significant by 
themselves. 
To test this possibility, the two way interactions among the class mean value and 
class mean knowledge and regulation of cognition were computed by multiplying each 
the class mean value scores by the class mean knowledge and regulation of cognition 
scores (Pedhazur, 1997). To begin this investigation, the class mean value main effects 
were removed from the model to avoid multicollinearity. The interaction effects were 
then added to the class level 3 equation to produce a new model (Equations 28 and 29).  
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Post Hoc Model of Interaction Effects of Class Value of Mathematics and Knowledge of Cognition 
Fixed Effects Coefficient SE T-Ratio p Value 
For Intercept, β0     
Class Mean Posttest Misconceptions, γ00 0.359 0.007 50.075 < 0.001 
Class Mean Enjoyment, γ01 -0.141 0.040 -3.546 0.002 
Class Mean Pretest Misconceptions, γ02 0.848 0.077 10.952 < 0.001 
Class Mean Value*Knowledge of Cognition 
Interaction, γ03 
0.031 0.011 2.920 0.007 
For Self Confidence Slope, β1     
Grand Mean Self Confidence Slope, γ10 -0.020 0.008 -2.57 0.011 
For PrePercent Slope, β2     
Grand Mean PrePercent Slope, γ20 0.492 0.043 11.36 < 0.001 
Random Effect 
Variance 
Component df χ2 p Value 
Mean Posttest Misconceptions, u0 0.0005 28 46.39073 0.016 
Level 1, R 0.019    
 
To interpret the interaction effect of mathematics value and knowledge of 
cognition on posttest misconceptions using coefficient values from Table 91 and means 
and standard deviations from Table 86, several predicted case values were examined, in 
which  
γ00 = Mean posttest misconception percentage, controlling for all other variables 
in the model 
γ01 = Impact of class ATMI enjoyment on posttest misconception percentage 
γ02 = Impact of class pretest misconception percentage on student posttest 
misconception percentage 
γ03 = Impact of interaction between class ATMI value and class MAI knowledge 
of cognition on student posttest misconception percentage 
γ10 = Impact of self confidence on posttest misconception percentage 




1. A student who has an average mathematics self confidence (3.18) and a 
pretest misconception percentage that is average for the class, in a 
classroom with average knowledge of cognition (3.43), average classroom 
pretest misconception (0.38), and is 1 standard deviation (0.24 units) 
above the grand mean for value (3.49) is predicted by the post hoc model 
to have a posttest misconception score equal to the mean, 0.359.  
Table 92 
Predicted Value 1 for Two Level HLM Model 
Coefficient Value 




γ00, Intercept 0.359 1 0.359 
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment -0.141 0 0 
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception 0.848 0 0 
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog 0.031 0.24*0 = 0 0 
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence -0.02 0 0 
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception  0.492 0 0 
PostPercent     0.359 
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean) 
 
Although the class value level in this example was 0.24 units above the 
grand mean, its interaction with knowledge of cognition negates its effect 
on the predicted posttest misconception error percentage. The second 
example shows an alternate effect of the interaction effect, when class 
knowledge of cognition is higher than the mean but value is equal to the 
mean. 
2. A student who has an average mathematics self confidence (3.18) and a 
pretest misconception percentage that is average for the class, in a 
classroom with average mathematics value (3.49) and average classroom 
pretest misconception (0.38) and who is 1 standard deviation (0.16 units) 
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above the grand mean for knowledge of cognition (3.43) is predicted by 
the post hoc model to have a posttest misconception score of 0.359. 
Table 93 
Predicted Value 2 for Two Level HLM Model 
Coefficient Value 




γ00, Intercept 0.359 1 0.359 
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment -0.141 0 0 
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception 0.848 0 0 
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog 0.031 0*0.16 = 0 0 
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence -0.02 0 0 
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception  0.492 0 0 
PostPercent     0.359 
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean) 
 
Just as in the first predicted value (Table 92), the interaction of class value 
and knowledge of cognition eliminates the effect of knowledge of 
cognition on the posttest misconception error percentage. The third 
predicted value shows the effect of class value and knowledge of 
cognition when neither variable is equal to its grand mean. 
3. A student who has an average mathematics self confidence (3.18) and a 
pretest misconception percentage that is average for the class, in a 
classroom with average classroom pretest misconceptions (0.38) and is 1 
standard deviation (0.16 units) above the grand mean for knowledge of 
cognition (3.43) and 1 standard deviation (0.24 units) above the mean of 
value is predicted by the post hoc model to have a posttest misconception 
score of 0.360. 
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Table 94 
Predicted Value 3 for Two Level HLM Model 
Coefficient Value 




γ00, Intercept 0.359 1 0.359 
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment -0.141 0 0 
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception 0.848 0 0 
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog 0.031 0.24*0.16 = 0.0384 0.0012 
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence -0.02 0 0 
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception  0.492 0 0 
PostPercent     0.3602 
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean) 
 
Although both class value and knowledge of cognition are above their 
grand means, their combined effect only increased the predicted 
percentage of misconception errors by 1%. The fourth predicted value 
shows the effect of student mathematics self confidence in a class with 
low mathematics value but high knowledge of cognition. 
4. A student who has a mathematics self confidence 1 standard deviation 
(0.84 units) above the mean (3.18) and a pretest misconception percentage 
that is average for the class, in a classroom with average pretest 
misconceptions (0.38) and 1 standard deviation (0.24) below the mean of 
value (3.49) and 1 standard deviation (0.16) above the mean of knowledge 
of cognition is predicted by the post hoc model to have a posttest 
misconception score equal to 0.341. 
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Table 95 
Predicted Value 4 for Two Level HLM Model 
Coefficient Value 




γ00, Intercept 0.359 1 0.359 
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment -0.141 0 0 
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception 0.848 0 0 
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog 0.031 -0.24*0.16 = -0.0384 -0.0012 
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence -0.020 0.84 -0.0168 
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception  0.492 0 0 
PostPercent     0.341 
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean) 
 
The effect of student self confidence was greater than the effect of the 
value-knowledge of cognition interaction even though the coefficient had 
a smaller magnitude because of the relative sizes of the standard deviation; 
the student self confidence standard deviation was almost four times larger 
than value and five times larger than for knowledge of cognition. The final 
predicted value example for this model shows the effect of reversing the 
relative class position for value and knowledge of cognition with respect 
to their grand means. 
5. A student who has a mathematics self confidence 1 standard deviation 
(0.84 units) above the mean (3.18) and a pretest misconception percentage 
that is average for the class, in a classroom with average pretest 
misconceptions (0.38) and 1 standard deviation (0.24 units) above the 
mean of value (3.49) and 1 standard deviation (0.16) below the mean of 
knowledge of cognition is predicted by the post hoc model to have a 
posttest misconception score equal to 0.341. 
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Table 96 
Predicted Value 5 for Two Level HLM Model 
Coefficient Value 




γ00, Intercept 0.359 1 0.359 
γ01, Impact of Class ATMI Enjoyment -0.141 0 0 
γ02, Impact of Class Pretest Misconception 0.848 0 0 
γ03, Impact of Class Value*Kcog 0.031 0.24*-0.16 = -0.0384 -0.0012 
γ10, Average Impact of Student Self Confidence -0.020 0.84 -0.0168 
γ20, Average Impact of Student Pretest Misconception  0.492 0 0 
PostPercent     0.341 
Note: Value Added = (Coefficient Value) • (Number of Units from Mean) 
 
In the fourth example, class value was one standard deviation below while 
knowledge of cognition was one standard deviation above their means. In 
this example, their position from their grand means is reversed. This 
change resulted in no change to the percentage of misconception errors 
predicted by the model. 
Three Level Bernoulli Model 
The student level of the HLM model was then divided into two levels, item 
characteristics and student characteristics. By doing so, the outcome variable become a 
dichotomous variable representing a misconception error for each item for each student in 
each class. The new model was then examined using a generalized HLM model (HGLM) 
to measure the probability of misconception errors. The initial null model was examined 
to determine the amount of variance at each level: item level 1, student level 2, and class 
level 3.The contextual model was then used to evaluate the impact of each variable on the 
outcome. 
Descriptive Statistics. The observed sample sizes (Table 97) resulted in a 
statistical power of approximately 0.80 to detect a population effect size δ = 0.40 and 
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approximately 0.75 for a population effect size δ = 0.30 for approximately 20 students 
per class. In this sample, class sizes averaged approximately 18 students. 
Table 97 
Descriptive Statistics for Three-Level HLM 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Item Level One 
Misconception 9673 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Discrimination 9673 0.80 0.20 0.44 1.22 
Difficulty 9673 0.01 0.51 -1.21 0.96 
Moderate 9673 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Student Level 2 
Enjoyment 515 2.91 0.79 1.00 5.00 
Motivation 515 2.90 0.93 1.00 5.00 
Self Confidence 515 3.19 0.83 1.00 5.00 
Value 515 3.51 0.75 1.00 5.00 
Knowledge of Cognition 515 3.43 0.58 1.18 4.94 
Regulation of Cognition 515 3.23 0.56 1.11 4.74 
NAEP_Pretest Percent Misconception 515 0.38 0.17 0.00 0.76 
Class Level 3 
Mean Enjoyment 32 2.90 0.30 2.35 3.52 
Mean Motivation 32 3.43 0.16 3.01 3.65 
Mean Self Confidence 32 3.23 0.16 2.92 3.50 
Mean Value 32 0.38 0.10 0.14 0.53 
Mean Knowledge of Cognition 32 2.90 0.30 2.35 3.52 
Mean Regulation of Cognition 32 2.88 0.34 2.15 3.63 
Mean Pretest Percent Misconception 32 3.17 0.32 2.41 3.96 
Treatment 32 0.50 0.51 0.00 1.00 
 
Unconditional Null Model. The unconditional model (Equations 30, 31, and 32) 
revealed a significant amount of variance at both the student Level 2 and class Level 3 
(Table 98). Additionally, the level 1 variance was also statistically significant (SE = 
0.014, t = 67.71) 
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Item Level 1 















Student Level 2 
 




Class Level 3 
 






Unconditional Three Level Model Fixed and Random Coefficients 
Fixed Effects Logit Link: 
Unit-Specific Model 
Logit Link: 
Population Average Model 
Mean Item Misconception, γ000 -0.643** -0.590** 
     
Random Effects Variance Component df χ2 p Value 
Between Classes, u00 0.184** 31 188.001 < 0.001 
Between Students, R0 0.299** 483 1117.002 < 0.001 
Between Items, E 0.945**    
*Indicates |coeff/se| > 2.00; ** Indicates |coeff/se| > 3.00; 
 
The outcome variable for Level 1 is in logit units, or the natural logarithm of the 
odds ratio, as shown in Equation 30. The coefficients, therefore, are also computed in 
logit units. Using the logit unit, the relationship between the outcome variable and 
independent variable coefficients have a linear relationship. Once the coefficient logit is 
converted to a probability, its relationship to the outcome variable and other logit 
coefficients is no longer linear. Therefore, to compute a predicted probability of 
misconception error for an item, the predicted logit value must be computed first. 
Conversion to a probability is the final step in predicting outcomes in the Bernoulli HLM 
model. The process of converting from a logit to a probability requires two steps. First, 
the logit is converted to an odds ratio using Equation 33. 
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Odds = eLogit (33) 
 










The γ000 logit (unit specific model) of -0.643 (Table 93) corresponds to an odds 
ratio of 0.526, or a probability of 0.35 for the appearance of a misconception on an item, 
which corresponds to the mean for Item Misconception (see Table 97). The logit of the 
population average model (-0.590) indicates that the expected appearance of 
misconceptions in the population is slightly different from the observed sample 
misconception probability, an odds ratio of 0.554 and a probability of 0.357. This 
difference represents the expected effect of τ00, in this case pulling the mean value of the 
unit specific model upward toward a probability of 0.50 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
The total variance in the model equals the sum of the variance from all three 
levels (Table 98), 0.184 + 0.299 + 0.945 = 1.428. The proportion of variance at the item 
Level 1 is 0.184/1.428 = 0.129 = 12.9%.. The proportion of variance at the student Level 
2 is 0.299/1.428 = 0.209 = 20.9%. The proportion of variance at the class Level 3 is 
0.945/1.428 = 0.662 = 66.2%. In summary, the variance at each level was statistically 
significant, and the class level 3 accounted for the majority of the variance in the 
probability of misconception errors. To begin accounting for variance, the item level 1 
model was calibrated. 
Item level 1 model. The discrimination and difficulty IRT coefficients for each 
NAEP item (see Table 10)were used as explanatory variables in the level 1 model. 
Additionally, the reported level of complexity assigned by NAEP reviewers (see Table 8) 
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was added as a dichotomous predictor of misconception errors on a particular item (Low 
Complexity = 0; Moderate Complextiy = 1). Two models were examined before arriving 
at the final item model (Equations 35, 36, and 37; Table 99). 
Item Level 1 











( ) ( ) ( ) ijkjkjkjkjkijk eComplexityDifficultytionDiscrimina ++++= 3210 ππππη  
 
(35) 
Student Level 2 
 
π0jk = β00k + r0jk 
π1jk = β10k + r1jk 
π2jk = β20k + r2jk 
π3jk = β30k + r2jk 
 
(36) 
Class Level 3 
 
β00k = γ000 + u00k 
β10k = γ100 + u10k 
β20k = γ200 + u20k 




The variance components for class level discrimination (U10), class level 
complexity (U30), and student level complexity (R3) were statistically non-significant, so 
they were fixed in the final item model. The addition of the discrimination, difficulty, and 




Item Model of Mathematics Misconception Errors 










Intercept, γ000 -0.643** -0.233***  -0.590 -0.130*** 
Discrimination, γ100 ―** -1.206***  ―* -0.957*** 
Difficulty, γ200 ―** -0.682***  ―* -0.565*** 
Complexity, γ300 ―** -0.080***  ―* -0.094*** 
 
Variance Components Unconditional Modelb Final Model 
Intercept U00, τ(β)11 0.184*** 0.195*** 
Class Discrimination U10, τ(β)22 ―** ―** 
Class Difficulty, U20, τ(β)33 ―** 0.056*** 
Class Complexity, U30, τ(β)44 ―** ―** 
Std Intercept, R0, τ(π)11 0.299*** 1.044*** 
Std Discrimination, R1, τ(π)22 ―** 2.480*** 
Std Difficulty, R2, τ(π)33 ―** 0.385*** 
Std Complexity, R3, τ(π)44 ―** ―** 
Item, E, σ2 0.945a** 0.881a** 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, a|coeff /SE| > 3.00 
 bdfStudent = 483, dfClass = 31 
Using equations 33 and 34, the logits for the final item model were converted into 
predicted probabilities of misconception errors for different item characteristics. The 
intercept logit value predicts that the probability of a misconception error for a non-
discriminating item (i.e., item characteristic curve = horizontal line) of average difficulty 
(i.e., Difficulty = 0) and low complexity is 0.558 in the sample and 0.532 in the 
population (Table 100). If the difficulty of a non-discriminating item increases difficulty 
by one standard deviation (0.62), then the probability of a misconception error increases 
to 0.658 for the sample and 0.618 for the population (Table 100). 
If an item has average discrimination (0.825, mean of discrimination values from 
Table 10), then the predicted probability of a misconception error reduces to 0.318 in the 
sample and 0.341 in the population. If the discrimination of an item has a value one 
standard deviation above the average discrimination (0.8 + 0.2 = 1), then the predicted 
probability of a misconception error reduces to 0.230 in the sample and 0.277 in the 
population (Table 100). If a non-discriminating item with an average difficulty level 
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increases from low to moderate complexity, the probability of a misconception error 
inceases to 0.578 for the sample and 0.556 for the population (Table 100). 
Table 100 
Selected Predicted Values for Final Item Model 
  Unit Specific Model   Population Average Model 
Fixed Effects Logit Odds Probability   Logit Odds Probability 
INTERCEPT, γ000 -0.234 1.263 0.558 -0.130 1.139 0.532 
Discrimination, γ100 -1.206 0.299 0.230 -0.957 0.384 0.277 
Difficulty, γ200 -0.682 1.978 0.664 -0.565 1.759 0.638 
Complexity, γ300 -0.080 1.083 0.520 -0.094 1.099 0.523 
 
Combined Effects               
Int + Mean Discrimination -0.731 0.481 0.325 -0.636 0.530 0.346 
Int + Complexity -0.314 1.368 0.578   -0.224 1.251 0.556 
Int + 2SD Above Mean Discrimination -1.696 0.183 0.155 -1.018 0.361 0.265 
Int + 1SD Above Mean Difficulty -0.588 1.801 0.643 -0.424 1.528 0.604 
Int + 1SD Below Mean Difficulty -0.107 0.898 0.473 -0.153 0.859 0.462 
 
The probabilities and odds ratios for each logit value in Table 100 were computed 
using Equations 33 and 34. Combined effects were computed through a process of three 
steps. First, standard deviations of discrimination and difficulty were taken from Table 
97. Second, the relevant number of standard deviations values were multiplied by the 
logit coefficient and added to the intercept logit. Third, the resulting logit sum was 
converted to an odds ratio and probability using Equations 33 and 34. 
These predicted probability values reflect a statistically significant impact of item 
characteristics on the probability of a misconception error. The remaining variance of the 
item level was still statistically significant after the addition of all available variables, 
indicating that a future examination of other item characteristics may be beneficial to 
understanding item characteristic influences on misconception errors. The final item 
model was used as the starting point for calibration of the student model. 
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Student level 2 model. Student characteristics were added to level 2 (student level) 
of the final item model to examine the impact of student characteristics on the probability 
of a misconception error and on the impact of item characteristics on the probability of a 
misconception error. Only statistically significant effects were retained in the final model 
(Table 101) with the exception of the self confidence impact on the difficulty slope. Self 
confidence was retained because removing it from the model resulted in the loss of a 
significant coefficient for motivation, which was statistically significant in all 
intermediate models. 
Table 101 
Final Student Model Fixed and Random Coefficients 
Fixed Effects Logit Link: 
Unit-Specific Model 
Logit Link: 
Population Average Model 
Intercept, γ000 -0.237*** -0.165*** 
Discrimination Slope, γ100 -1.221*** -1.027*** 
Pretest Slope, γ110 -3.389*** -2.961*** 
Difficulty Slope, γ200 -0.689*** -0.583*** 
Motivation Slope, γ210 -0.199*** -0.182*** 
Self Confidence Slope, γ220 -0.163*** -0.151*** 
Pretest Slope, γ230 -0.799*** -0.525*** 
Complexity Slope, γ300 -0.080*** -0.095*** 
   
Random Effects 
Variance 
Component df χ2 p Value 
Class Intercept, u00 0.214*** 31 221.117 < 0.001 
Class Difficulty Slope 0.058*** 31 053.032 < 0.008 
Std Intercept, R0 1.075*** 483 622.784 < 0.001 
Std Discrimination Slope, R1 2.265*** 513 686.892 < 0.001 
Std Difficulty Slope, R2 0.348*** 480 649.958 < 0.001 
Item Intercept, E 0.887***    
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, a|coeff /SE| > 3.00 
As with the Item Model, predicted values are presented to clarify the meaning of 
coefficients computed as logits (Table 102). The process for computing these predicted 
probabilities was the same as for the Item Model (i.e., use Equations 33 and 34 to convert 
logits to probability). The fixed effect intercept, γ000, represents a predicted probability of 
a misconception error on an item with no discrimination, average difficulty, and low 
complexity of 0.559 for the sample and 0.541 in the population. The fixed effect for 
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discrimination, γ100, means that the impact of a change of one logit unit in discrimination 
(for an item with average difficulty and low complexity) corresponds to a probability of 
misconception error of 0.228 for the sample and 0.264. 
Table 102 
Selected Predicted Values for Final Student Model 
  Unit Specific Model   Population Average Model 
Fixed Effects Logit Odds Probability   Logit Odds Probability 
Intercept, γ000 0.237 1.267 0.559  0.165 1.179 0.541 
Discrimination Slope, γ100 -1.221 0.295 0.228  -1.027 0.358 0.264 
Pretest Slope, γ110 3.389 29.636 0.967  2.961 19.317 0.951 
Difficulty Slope, γ200 0.689 1.992 0.666  0.583 1.791 0.642 
Motivation Slope, γ210 -0.199 0.820 0.450  -0.182 0.834 0.455 
Self Confidence Slope, γ220 0.163 1.177 0.541  0.151 1.163 0.538 
Pretest Slope, γ230 -0.799 0.450 0.310  -0.525 0.592 0.372 
Complexity Slope, γ300 0.08 1.083 0.520  0.095 1.100 0.524 
Combined Effects ηˆ  Odds Probability   ηˆ  Odds Probability 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
Mean Difficulty + Low 
Complexity + Mean Pretest 
-0.894 0.409 0.290  -0.862 0.422 0.297 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
Mean Difficulty + Low 
Complexity + 1SD Above Mean 
Pretest 
-0.279 0.757 0.431  -0.254 0.776 0.437 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
1SD Below Mean Difficulty + 
1SD Above Mean Motivation + 
1SD Above Mean Pretest 
-0.174 0.840 0.457  -0.152 0.859 0.462 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
1SD Above Mean Difficulty + 
1SD Below Mean Motivation + 
1SD Above Mean Pretest 
0.677 1.968 0.663   0.613 1.846 0.649 
 
The combined effects in Table 102 were computed by adding the relevant student logits 
to the item logits, then combining the item logits to produce the predicted logit for 
misconception errors ( ηˆ ). These combined logits were then converted to probabilities 
using Equations 33 and 34. If a student with more pretest misconceptions (1 SD = 0.17) 
than the mean (0.38) completed an item with average discrimination (0.8), average 
difficulty (0), and low complexity, the probability of a misconception error increases to 
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0.431 in the sample and 0.437 in the population. If a student with more misconceptions (1 
SD = 0.17) and more motivation (1 SD = 0.93) than the mean (0.38, 2.9 respectively) 
completed an easy item (1 SD below difficulty mean = -0.5), the probability of a 
misconception error was 0.457 in the sample and 0.462 in the population. If a student 
with more misconceptions (1SD = 0.17) and less motivation (1 SD = 0.93) than the mean 
(0.38, 2.9 respectively) completed a difficult item (1 SD above difficulty mean = 0.502) 
with mean discrimination (0.8), the probability of a misconception error increases to 
0.663 in the sample and 0.649 in the population. 
Two student level slopes demonstrated statistically significant variance at Level 3 
(class), the intercept U000 and motivation slope U200. The final student model was used 
as the initial model for calibrating class level variables. 
Class level 3 model. Class characteristics were added as predictors to the two 
level 3 equations with statistically significant, the intercept (mean probability of 
misconception error) and the difficulty slope (impact of item difficulty on the probability 
of misconception error).  
The addition of these class parameters produced the final model (Table 103), 
which reduced the class variance from 0.214 to 0.002, a 98.7% reduction. This reduction 
reflected a statistically significant reduction in level 3 model misfit (Δχ2 = 188.482, Δdf = 
8, p < 0.001). 
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Table 103 
Final Class Model Fixed and Random Coefficients 
Fixed Effects Logit Link: 
Unit-Specific Model 
Logit Link: 
Population Average Model 
Intercept, γ000 -0.268*** -0.200b*** 
Class Enjoyment, γ001 -0.885*** -0.867*** 
Class Motivation, γ002 -0.109*** -0.079*** 
Class Self Confidence, γ003 -0.234*** -0.246*** 
Class Value, γ004 -0.649*** 0.597*** 
Class Knowledge of Cognition, γ005 -0.118*** -0.164*** 
Class Regulation of Cognition, γ006 -0.349*** -0.307*** 
Class Pretest, γ007 -4.676*** -4.423*** 
Treatment, γ008 -0.051*** -0.055*** 
Discrimination Slope, γ100 -1.215*** -1.067*** 
Pretest Slope, γ110 -3.379*** -3.100*** 
Difficulty Slope, γ200 -0.814*** -0.730*** 
Class Enjoyment, γ201 -1.384*** -1.319*** 
Class Motivation, γ202 -0.338*** -0.290*** 
Class Self Confidence, γ203 -0.961*** -0.894*** 
Class Value, γ204 -0.118*** -0.158*** 
Class Knowledge of Cognition, γ205 -0.138*** -0.090*** 
Class Regulation of Cognition, γ206 -0.350*** -0.363*** 
Class Pretest, γ207 -0.536*** -0.257*** 
Treatment, γ208 -0.231b*** -0.208b*** 
Motivation Slope, γ210 -0.199*** -0.187*** 
Self Confidence Slope, γ220 -0.162*** -0.154*** 
Pretest Slope, γ230 -0.792*** -0.583*** 
Complexity Slope, γ300 -0.080*** -0.097*** 
   
Random Effects 
Variance 
Component df χ2 p Value 
Class Intercept, u00 -0.002b*** 23 032.635 < 0.088 
Class Difficulty Slope, u20 0.008*** 23 035.125 < 0.050 
Std Intercept, R0 1.044*** 483 621.070 < 0.001 
Std Discrimination Slope, R1 1.494*** 513 683.774 < 0.001 
Std Difficulty Slope, R2 0.597*** 480 650.180 < 0.001 
Item Intercept, E 0.943a**    
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, a|coeff /SE| > 3.00, bp ≤ 0.10 
 
The treatment condition was not a statistically significant predictor of the 
intercept (mean probability of misconception error), but it was a statistically significant 
predictor of the difficulty slope at the 90% confidence level for both the sample and 
population models. The coefficients from Table 103 were used to compute the predicted 




Selected Predicted Values for Final Class Model 
  Unit Specific Model   Population Average Model 
Fixed Effects Logit Odds Probability   Logit Odds Probability 
Intercept, γ000 0.268 1.307 0.567  0.200 1.221 0.550 
Class Enjoyment, γ001 -0.885 0.413 0.292  -0.867 0.420 0.296 
Class Motivation, γ002 -0.109 0.897 0.473  -0.079 0.924 0.480 
Class Self Confidence, γ003 0.234 1.264 0.558  0.246 1.279 0.561 
Class Value, γ004 0.649 1.914 0.657  0.597 1.817 0.645 
Class Knowledge of 
Cognition, γ005 
0.118 1.125 0.529  0.164 1.178 0.541 
Class Regulation of 
Cognition, γ006 
0.349 1.418 0.586  0.307 1.359 0.576 
Class Pretest, γ007 4.676 107.340 0.991  4.423 83.346 0.988 
Treatment, γ008 -0.051 0.950 0.487  -0.055 0.946 0.486 
Discrimination Slope, γ100 -1.215 0.297 0.229  -1.067 0.344 0.256 
Pretest Slope, γ110 3.379 29.341 0.967  3.100 22.198 0.957 
Difficulty Slope, γ200 0.814 2.257 0.693  0.730 2.075 0.675 
Class Enjoyment, γ201 -1.384 0.251 0.200  -1.319 0.267 0.211 
Class Motivation, γ202 0.338 1.402 0.584  0.290 1.336 0.572 
Class Self Confidence, 
γ203 
0.961 2.614 0.723  0.894 2.445 0.710 
Class Value, γ204 0.118 1.125 0.529  0.158 1.171 0.539 
Class Knowledge of 
Cognition, γ205 
0.138 1.148 0.534  0.090 1.094 0.522 
Class Regulation of 
Cognition, γ206 
0.35 1.419 0.587  0.363 1.438 0.590 
Class Pretest, γ207 -0.536 0.585 0.369  -0.257 0.773 0.436 
Treatment, γ208 -0.231 0.794 0.443  -0.208 0.812 0.448 
Motivation Slope, γ210 -0.199 0.820 0.450  -0.187 0.829 0.453 
Self Confidence Slope, γ220 0.162 1.176 0.540  0.154 1.166 0.538 
Pretest Slope, γ230 -0.792 0.453 0.312  -0.583 0.558 0.358 
Complexity Slope, γ300 0.08 1.083 0.520  0.097 1.102 0.524 
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Table 104 (Continued) 
Predicted Values for Final Class Model 
Unit Specific Model Population Average Model 
Combined Effects ηˆ  Odds Probability   ηˆ  Odds Probability 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
Mean Difficulty + Low 
Complexity + Mean Class 
Enjoyment, Self Confidence, 
Motivation + Class Mean 
Pretest + Std Mean Pretest + 
Std Mean Motivation + 
Control 
-0.281 0.755 0.430  -0.274 0.760 0.432 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
Mean Difficulty + Low 
Complexity + Mean Self 
Confidence, Motivation + 
Class Mean Pretest + Std 
Mean Pretest + Std Mean 
Motivation + 1SD Above 
Mean Class Enjoyment + 
Control 
-0.762 0.467 0.318  -0.740 0.477 0.323 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
Mean Difficulty + Low 
Complexity + 1SD Above 
Class Mean Self Confidence, 
Enjoyment, Motivation + 
Class Mean Pretest + Std 
Mean Pretest + Std Mean 
Motivation + Control 
-0.201 0.818 0.450  -0.200 0.819 0.450 
Int + Mean Discrimination + 
Mean Difficulty + Low 
Complexity + Class Mean 
Self Confidence, Enjoyment, 
Motivation, Pretest + Std 
Mean Pretest, Motivation + 
Treatment 
-0.401 0.670 0.401   -0.382 0.682 0.406 
 
The computation of probabilities from the fixed effects in Table 104 proceeded as 
in the item and student models, using Equations 33 and 34. The combined effects, 
however,required a consideration of the effects of class variables on student variables 
before combining student effects with item effects to produce the predicted value. 
The first combined effect predicted the probability of a misconception error on an 
item of mean discrimination, mean difficulty, and low complexity for a student with 
mean pretest misconceptions and motivation in a control class with mean self confidence, 
enjoyment and motivation. Because all student and class level variables were centered 
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(group and grand centered respectively), the student and class mean values produced a 
zero effect on the predicted probability. The intercept logit for this combined effect was 
0.268. The discrimination impact was -1.215 (the coefficient logit) • 0.8 (the average 
discrimination) = -0.972, the value added to the intercept logit. The difficulty impact was 
0.814, the coefficient logit • 0.52, 1 SD above average difficulty = 0.4233, the value 
added to the intercept logit. Complexity was coded as a dichotomous variable in which 
low complexity was coded as 0. Therefore, the predicted logit, ηˆ , for this situation was 
0.268 + -0.972 + 0.4233 = -0.281. The associated probability of misconception error 
(using Equations 33 and 34) was 0.430 in the sample. The same computational process 
was used for the population average model and subsequent combined effect examples. 
The second and third combined effects from Table 104 represent the probability 
of a misconception error on a hard item (1 SD above mean Difficulty = 0.52) of mean 
discrimination (0.8) and low complexity (see Table 97 for difficulty and discrimination 
values). For combined effect 2, a student who had an average pretest misconception score 
in a control class with average pretest misconception, class enjoyment, motivation, value, 
and self confidence scores was predicted by the model to have a probability of a 
misconception error of 0.430 in the sample and 0.432 in the population. For the same 
student (Combined Effect 3), if the class enjoyment level increased by one standard 
deviation (0.3 units), the probability of a misconception error reduced to 0.318 in the 
sample and 0.323 in the population (Table 104).  
The fourth combined effect examines the relationship of self confidence with 
misconception error probabilities. A student with pretest misconception score equal to the 
mean, on a hard item of average discrimination and low complexity, in a control class 
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with average enjoyment, motivation, value, and pretest mean misconceptions but one 
standard deviation above the mean for self confidence had a misconception error 
probability of 0.450 for both the sample and population (Table 104).  
The treatment condition had an indirect effect on the probability of a 
misconception error by impacting the item difficulty slope. A student with a mean pretest 
misconception score and motivation in a treatment class with average enjoyment, self 
confidence, value, and pretest misconception was predicted to have a probability of 
misconception error of 0.401 in the sample and 0.406 in the population on an item of 
average discrimination and difficulty and low complexity (Table 104). 
Summary of Results 
Three analyses were conducted to examine the nature of mathematical 
misconceptions. Document analysis of student responses was used to distinguish between 
errors due to factors other than misconceptions and errors representing misconceptions. 
The coding from this analysis was used for the subsequent quantitative analyses. 
The quantitative analyses included two separate investigations. First, the 
relationship of misconceptions in each content area was examined using structural 
equation modeling. Six models were compared, all of which returned high goodness of fit 
indices and parsimony indices greater than 0.5. All models were calibrated using 
modification indices to reduce the chi-squared value. The final model for all six 
hypotheses validated well across a randomly chosen sample. 
Second, the impact of item, student, and class characteristics on misconception 
errors was investigated through a three level hierarchical generalized linear model. In this 
model, the item and student variance was statistically non-significant, but the between 
class variance was significant. Only class knowledge of cognition was a significant 
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predictor of misconception errors on a particular task. Based on these analyses, the item 
and student levels were combined into a single student level, in which the new outcome 
variable was the percentage of misconception errors for each student on the posttest. In 
this new model, student and class variance was statistically significant. Student 
mathematics self confidence and student percentage of misconceptions on the pretest 
were significant predictors of posttest misconception percentages. These two student 
variables explained 29% of student variance. Class enjoyment of mathematics, value of 
mathematics, and pretest misconception percentage were statistically significant class 
predictors of student posttest misconception percentage. The treatment condition of the 
class was not a statistically significant predictor. The removal of non-significant class 
predictor variables resulted in a significant amount of unexplained variance being 
returned to the model, so interaction effects were added to the model. The interaction of 
class value of mathematics and class knowledge of cognition was a statistically 
significant predictor of student posttest misconceptions. 
These analyses offer information about the nature of misconceptions in 
mathematics that may lead to better assessment of misconceptions and interventions to 








This chapter presents a discussion of the results provided Chapter 4. Three 
analyses were conducted to investigate the nature of misconceptions in mathematics: (1) 
analysis of student response patterns on the mathematics knowledge test (NAEP items); 
(2) comparison of hypothesized structural models representing the relationships among 
content area misconceptions; and, (3) examination of the impact of item, student, and 
class characteristics on misconception errors. Item characteristics were measured using 
Item Response Theory on the NAEP mathematics knowledge test. Student characteristics 
included attitudes toward mathematics (ATMI Enjoyment, Motivation, Self Confidence, 
and Value scales), metacognitive awareness (MAI Knowledge of Cognition and 
Regulation of Cognition scales), and pre- and post-test misconception and percent correct 
scores. Class characteristics consisted of aggregated scores for each student characteristic 
along with indicator variables for treatment condition and type of mathematics class. 
Through these three analyses, seven key findings emerged. 
1. Content area is not the most effective way to classify mathematics 
misconceptions; instead, five underlying misconceptions affect all four content 
areas. 
2. Mathematics misconception errors often appear as procedural errors. 
3. A classroom environment that fosters enjoyment of mathematics and value of 
mathematics are associated with reduced misconception errors. 
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4. Higher mathematics self confidence and motivation to learn mathematics is 
associated with reduced misconception errors. 
5. Probability misconceptions do not have a causal effect on rational numbers, 
algebra, or geometry misconceptions. 
6. Rational number misconceptions do not have a causal effect on probability, 
algebra, or geometry misconceptions. 
7. Probability instruction may not affect misconceptions directly, but it may help 
students develop skills needed to bypass misconceptions when solving difficult 
problems. 
Analysis 1: Misconception Error Analysis 
Two key findings. The first analysis of the present study presented patterns of 
student responses on the mathematics knowledge test composed of NAEP items. This 
document analysis validated hypotheses about how misconceptions would result in error 
choices for eight of the 17 items. Misconception error choices for the other nine items 
were adjusted to align with observed student responses (as shown in Table 18) before 
proceeding with the quantitative analyses. The observed patterns of misconception errors 
revealed an important aspect of mathematics misconceptions, Key Finding 1: On a wide 
array of mathematical problems, a very small number of fundamental misconceptions 
(five) appeared to account for a large proportion of the observed errors (70.49%). All five 
of these core misconceptions (i.e., Absolute/Relative Comparison, 
Additive/Multiplicative Structure, Spatial Reasoning, Variable Meaning, and Rational 
Number Meaning Misconceptions) appeared in multiple mathematics content areas.  
Another conclusion emerged from the analysis of student response patterns, Key 
Finding 2: Misconception error explanations relied on procedural knowledge isolated 
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from conceptual knowledge (as described in Figure 10). Previous studies (e.g., Agnoli & 
Krantz, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Falk, 1992) have also indicated that reliance 
on judgmental heuristics may be an important factor in the development of mathematics 
misconceptions. 
Our task as mathematics educators is to distinguish between those 
circumstances in which judgmental heuristics can adversely affect 
stochastic thinking and those in which the heurisitcs are useful and 
desirable. And we are obliged to point out the differences to our students. 
It is not that there is “something wrong” with the way our students think. 
It is just that they (and we) tend to carry useful heuristics beyond their 
relevant domain (Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993, p. 184). 
The analysis of the present study indicates that connecting procedural knowledge 
to conceptual knowledge may help teachers and students make these distinctions. Hiebert 
and Grouws (2007) described two observable features for a classroom that focuses on 
developing conceptual understanding: (1) Teaching focuses explicitly to connections 
between facts, procedures, and ideas, and (2) Students are allowed to struggle with 
important mathematical concepts. Development of these two features in a classroom may 
help teachers identify the reasoning behind errors that emerge from misconceptions. 
Detecting mathematics misconceptions. NAEP released items were compiled “as 
is,” without any changes for the mathematics knowledge test (Appendix M). By doing so, 
the NAEP-established item content and concurrent criterion validity could be transferred 
to the present study (Daro et al., 2007). The compiled instrument also exhibited 
acceptable internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Despite these qualities, the 
instrument failed to adequately differentiate between misconceptions.  
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The ambiguity in student explanations for several items indicated that the validity 
of the items did not necessarily extend to measuring misconceptions. For example, the 
question of whether content area or type of underlying misconception category is a better 
way to organize mathematical misconceptions cannot be answered by the present study 
— some item responses indicated multiple types of misconceptions (e.g., Item 7, Choice 
D; Item 17, Choice C). Such a question might be answerable using a multi-trait, multi-
method structural equation model, but a model of this type, based on the present 
instrument would most likely require several cross-loadings that would make the model 
structurally unstable (i.e., no amount of iterations can yield a solution), such as was seen 
in Models A, B, and C of the structural analysis. Therefore, I recommend that such a 
study begin by altering the present instrument to focus directly on observed 
misconception responses. For example, in Item 17, the uniformity heuristic sometimes 
represented an absolute/relative comparison misconception, an additive/multiplicative 
structure misconception, a rational number meaning misconception, or a combination of 
these misconception types. To distinguish misconceptions more readily, it may be 
necessary to include explanations with possible answers. For example, instead of simply 
offering the choice “three,” a revised item might offer “one because the numerator is one 
(absolute/relative comparison misconception), “three because the denominator is three” 
(rational number meaning misconception), and “three because R and S have equal faces” 
(additive/multiplicative structure misconception via the uniformity heuristic). Without 
such differentiation, misconception content validity for closed-response items will be 
difficult to establish. A study to develop and validate such a misconception instrument 
may be a necessary first step to replicating and advancing the present investigation. 
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Analysis 2: Content Area Misconceptions 
Two key findings. The second analysis of the present study compared six 
hypothesized relationships between misconceptions in probability, rational numbers, 
algebra, and geometry as shown in Figure 1. Multiple studies found during the literature 
review (e.g., Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Falk, 1992; Freudenthal, 1970, 1973, 1983; Schield, 
2006; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Warren, 2000; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004) 
suggested that misconceptions in probability and rational numbers may hold a causal 
predictive position relative to those of algebra and geometry. They did not, however, 
suggest which might be the primary causal factor or if both acted together as causal 
indicators. The results of the present study suggested Key Findings 5 and 6: Probability 
misconceptions do not have a causal effect on rational numbers, algebra, or geometry 
misonceptions; Rational number misconceptions do not have a causal effect on 
probability, algebra, or geometry misconceptions. These results also reinforced Key 
Finding 1: Content area is not the most effective way to classify mathematics 
misconceptions.Interpretation of this analysis focused on issues of model stability and 
comparisons of the final models using the goodness of fit indices. 
Model stability. Model C (Figure 24) exhibited instability throughout the 
structural model analysis. Instability refers to the iterative process of SEM being unable 
to determine a best fitting solution. In the case of Model C, Lisrel 8.72 identified the 
fitted covariance matrix as “not positive definite,” meaning that the determinant of the 
solution matrix was either less than or equal to zero. This error indicates an unstable 
model for two reasons. (1) If the determinant of the fitted matrix equals zero, then the 
matrix is not invertible: The minimization function requires that the fitted matrix be 
inverted to find a solution. (2) A negative determinant allows the matrix to be inverted 
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mathematically, but the determinant is negative in a symmetric matrix only when 
elements on the diagonal are negative (Wothke, 1993). These diagonal elements represent 
variance (Byrne, 1998), so negative values present serious problems for interpretation 
and fitting the estimated matrix to the observed matrix. Wothke (1993) described two 
reasons for non-positive definite matrices, collinearity and overparameterization. In both 
cases, removal of unnecessary or redundant parameters can allow the analysis to proceed. 
In the case of Model C, both rational number and probability misconceptions could not 
predict both algebra and geometry misconceptions simulateously without creating a non-
positive definite fitted covariance matrix. The structural portion of Model C was 
therefore adjusted to discover the source of the error, which turned out to be the 
crossloadings from both independent variables (rational number and probability) to both 
dependent variables (algebra and geometry). Removal of either the crossloadings or 
direct effects eliminated the non-positive definite matrix problem. I proceeded to ask 
whether non-positive definite matrices would have occurred across imputations in 
Models A and B if the models had specified additional structural parameters. The dotted 
line regression weights in Figure 32 represent each additional parameter added to the 
models. 
 
Figure 32. Post Hoc Hypothesized Structural Parameters for Models A and B (Figure 24) 
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By adding the dotted line regression pathways in Figure 33 one at a time and 
together, both models resulted in non-positive definite matrices that prevented the 
analysis from computing an admissible solution. The consistent pattern of non-
convergence across three different models led to the conclusion that the addition of too 
many structural parameters created unstable models when both rational number and 
probability misconceptions act as predictors of both algebra and geometry 
misconceptions. One interpretation of this model behavior may be that rational number 
misconceptions and probability misconception may impact algebra and geometry 
misconceptions through the other or directly, but they do not appear to act as both direct 
causes and moderators simultaneously.  
Goodness of fit statistics. Each competing model in the calibration sample 
demonstrated excellent goodness of fit statistics with the exception of the GFI, and the 
GFI statistic was consistently moderate across all models. The dichotomous nature of the 
data meant that non-normality necessarily existed in the measurements, which has been 
reported to influence the value of GFI (Hu & Bentler, 1995). None of the models 
demonstrated superiority over the others (see Table 84).  
Conclusions. Based on these analyses, none of the models represented the 
relationship between misconceptions across content areas better than the others. Key 
Finding 5 and 6 emerged from these results: Probability misconceptions do not have a 
causal effect on rational numbers, algebra, or geometry misconceptions; and, Rational 
number misconceptions do not have a causal effect on probability, algebra, or geometry 
misconceptions. 
Multicollinearity between content area misconceptions may account for the lack 
of causal relationships. If multicollinearity were present, it could have caused the 
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different causal models to be statistically indistinguishable. To test for multicollinearity 
between content area misconceptions, pooled Pearson correlations between factor scores 
were computed across the five imputed data sets (Table 105). 
Table 105 
Pooled Intercorrelations Between Content Area Misconception Scores 
Subscale 1 2 3 4 
1. Algebra ― .31** .36** .35** 
2. Geometry ― .27** .23** 
3. Rational Number ― .32** 
4. Probability ― 
Note: N = 1133; ** p < 0.001 
 
All correlation coefficients in Table 105 were statistically significant, ranging 
from 0.23 to 0.37. These values mean that 5% to 13% of the variance between any two 
variables can be accounted for by multicollinearity. Taken together, these correlations 
confirmed that mutlicollinearity was a significant factor in the model analysis.  
By considering the qualitative analysis of student response patterns along with the 
present structural model analysis, the source of the multicollinearity can be traced. In the 
qualitative analysis, students sometimes responded to a misconception item because of 
different misconceptions (e.g., Item 4, Response B and Item 1, Response E). In other 
items, students chose one distractor because of one type of misconception, but chose 
another response because of a different misconception (e.g., Item 17). Because of this 
lack of discrimination within some misconception responses, examining a theoretical 
model of the underlying misconceptions (i.e., the meaning of rational numbers, 
additive/multiplicative structures, spatial reasoning, absolute/relative comparison, and the 
meaning of variables) was not possible with any degree of reliability. The results of the 
present study may strengthen the notion that there exists a core set of misconceptions that 
span content areas; indeed, the lack of difference among content area based models 
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indicates that these underlying misconception structures that influence reasoning in all 
four content areas may be more important than the content area to understanding how 
mathematical misconceptions develop and how they can be better addressed.  
To test this hypothesis, a second order factor was added to Model F (Figure 31). I 
hypothesized two potential outcomes for this new model. If the model demonstrated 
significant improvement over the other models, then this first outcome would mean that 
content area factors may model misconceptions well, but a higher order, fundamental 
mathematics misconceptions would account for the linearity between them. If, on the 
other hand, the new model did not demonstrate significant differences with the other 
models, then content area factors may not be the best way to model mathematical 
misconceptions. 
 
Figure 33. Possible Second Order Factor Model to Explain Content Area Misconception Multicollinearity. 
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The addition of this second order factor required checking that the new level was 
over-identified. With 10 data moments, 3 regression weights, 1 variance, and 4 residuals, 
the second order construct was overidentified with 10 – (3+1+4) = 2 degrees of freedom. 
Overall, the model had 115 degrees of freedom.  
The resulting goodness of fit statistics indicated that this model behaved no 
differently than Models A-F (Table 106). 
Table 106 
Goodness of Fit Indices for Second Order Post Hoc Hypothesized Model 
χ2 CFI GFI RMSEA RMSEA 90% CI SRMR PGFI PCFI ECVI 
604.17 0.99 0.87 0.024 [0.009, 0.035] 0.075 0.66 0.751 1.41 
 
This structural comparison supported the hypothesis that the multicollinearity between 
content area misconceptions cannot be explained by the addition of a single factor. 
Previous studies (e.g., Agnoli, 1987; Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Battista, 2007; Clements & 
Battista, 1992; De Bock et al., 2002; Falk, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973a, 1973b, 
1982; Küchemann, 1978; Lamon, 1999; Shaughnessy & Bergman, 1993; Van Dooren et 
al., 2003; Warren, 2000; Watson & Shaughnessy, 2004) have indicated at least five 
potential cross-content misconceptions that may explain the multicollinearity found in the 
present study, reinforcing Key Finding 1. Figure 34 portrays a possible structure for these 
underlying misconceptions and how they affect misconceptions in each content area. 
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Figure 34. Hypothetical Structure for Underlying Mathematical Misconceptions. 
The solid-line regression weights in Figure 34 represent relationships observed in 
the qualitative analysis of student responses. The dotted-line regression weights represent 
potential relationships between underlying and content area misconceptions that were not 
observed in the qualitative analysis. Whether their absence was due to the lack of a 
relationship or simply an artifact of the assessment instrument is not entirely clear — the 
dotted lines are not necessarily weaker relationships. For example, the meaning of 
rational number misconceptions very likely impacts geometry misconceptions relating to 
similarity concepts, but no items in the assessment instrument measured similarity 
concepts.  
Additionally, the relationship between the underlying misconceptions is not clear 
at this time. There may well be a causal structure between these factors; some may also 
be completely uncorrelated with others. Future studies may wish to measure these 
relationships. 
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Implications for curriculum development. The NCTM (2000) Principles and 
Standards for School Mathematics offered a conceptual framework to organize the 
emphasis of each content strand from Pre-K to Grade 12 (Figure 9). The structural 
analysis of the present study suggests that such an organizational structure may be unable 
to conceptualize fundamental concepts to learning mathematics that often result in 
misconceptions when ignored. A modified scheme adds an extra dimension to the NCTM 
framework (Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35. NCTM (2000) Modified Content Emphases Including Fundamental Mathematics Concepts 
Figure 35 depicts these fundamental mathematics concepts as progressive stages 
of learning throughout a child’s education. As a child progresses through grade school, 
the learning of these concepts can follow two paths. (1) If left unchecked, these concepts 
develop into misunderstandings about ideas, and misconceptions may develop. These 
misconceptions may compound as new learning barriers are encountered. When learning 
is focused primarily on developing procedural knowledge, the resultant rules, heuristics, 
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and formulas developed in isolation from conceptual knowledge lead to instrumental 
understanding and misunderstanding about the meaning of important mathematical ideas 
(as shown in Figure 10). (2) If misconceptions are addressed through an intervention that 
reinforces the meaning of mathematics ideas and the connections between ideas, then the 
learning barriers in Figure 35 may bolster rather than hinder the development of student 
understanding (Resnick, 1983).  
Textbooks may also improve their effect on student mathematics learning by 
integrating the barriers of Figure 35 throughout lesson sequences. Consider the example 
of a linear function definition presented by an algebra textbook. In Chapter 1, this 
problem was described as focusing primarily on a prescription for recognizing linear 
functions. The textbook description also connected the meaning of lines with the shape of 
the graph (i.e., spatial reasoning). The textbook did not, however, address the meaning of 
the variables x, y, or f(x). It also failed to address the meaning of the quantities m and b. 
Furthermore, no comparison was made of the similarities and differences in m and b from 
x and y. A discussion of the meaning of m can be used to address the differences between 
additive and multiplicative structures as described by Warren (2000). 
The potential changes to mathematics curricula supported by the present study 
may add a layer of complexity to the way mathematics content is organized. This 
complexity may have a direct impact on the ability of educators to provide materials to 
help address the barriers students encounter when learning mathematics. 
Analysis 3: Factors Influencing Misconception Errors 
Three key findings. The final analysis of the present study examined the impact of 
item, student, and class characteristics on misconception errors. The results of this 
analysis led to Key Findings 3, 4, and 7: A classroom environment that fosters enjoyment 
 231 
of mathematics or value of mathematics helps reduce student misconception errors; 
Higher mathematics self confidence reduces misconception errors; and, Probability 
instruction may not affect misconceptions directly, but it may help students develop skills 
needed to bypass misconceptions when solving difficult problems. 
The two level model revealed significant predictors of misconceptions for both 
student and class characteristics. Student mathematics self confidence (ATMI self 
confidence scale) and pretest misconception error percentages (NAEP instrument) 
accounted for 29% of the student variance in posttest misconception error percentages 
(NAEP instrument). Class enjoyment of mathematics (ATMI enjoyment scale) and the 
class value of mathematics (ATMI value scale) also had a statistically significant effect 
on posttest misconception errors. The between-class variance in the unconditional model 
(see Table 89) was 0.0073 (p < 0.001). The contextual model that included the 
statistically significant class variables (see Table 92) reduced the between class variance 
to 0.0005 (p = 0.016). This reduction represented a 93.15% reduction. The three level 
model also accounted for 98% of the class level variance. Such large reductions in 
variance indicates that a large percentage of class effects on misconceptions may lie in 
the factors measured by the ATMI scales. If true, then educators can begin focusing on 
improvement of these factors within a class to reduce misconceptions. 
Implications for teaching mathematics. Traditional mathematics instruction has 
relied primarily on teacher-centered epistemologies (Stigler & Hiebert, 1999). This 
investigation began with the assumption that student-centered instructional approaches 
have a more positive effect on student mathematics learning than traditional, teacher-
centered strategies. The present study supported this assumption and extended it to 
addressing misconceptions. Higher mathematics self confidence, value, and enjoyment 
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were associated with a decline in misconceptions; the development of a positive learning 
environment may therefore be a critical component to helping students traverse the 
learning barriers in Figure 35.  
Maher and Tetrault (2001) described four epistemological components critical to 
developing such a positive learning environment: mastery, voice, authority, and 
positionality. First, mastery involves struggle and engagement with a body of knowledge. 
Instead of merely absorbing information, students grapple with difficulties of 
understanding. Rather than the final product as end goal, mastery refers to the continual 
process of working and re-working information into knowledge. Second, the fashioning 
of one’s voice in mathematics means to bring one's personal experiences, questions, and 
perspectives to the mathematics being studied. Third, the concept of authority refers to 
the source of mathematical knowledge in a classroom. Maher and Tetrault (2001) and 
Shrewsbury (1993) described a climate of shared mathematical authority: Students and 
teachers share the knowledge and understanding of important mathematical ideas in such 
an environment. Authority refers to the relationship between students and teachers 
collectively with mathematical knowledge. Fourth, positionality refers to the 
relationships between an individual and mathematical knowledge along with the 
interactions of these within- and between-student relationships.  
As teachers seek to help students turn the barriers of Figure 35 into opportunities 
to reinforce fundamental mathematics concepts, the development of a student-centered 
environment may be a foundational component for any strategy. Previous studies (e.g., 
Slavin & Karweit, 1982; Slavin & Lake, 2008; Slavin et al., 2009) have found that 
student-centered teaching approaches provide benefits to student achievement. If these 
environments are to offer the most benefit to avoiding and addressing misconceptions, 
 233 
then students must be given opportunities to struggle with important mathematical ideas 
and their connections (Hiebert & Grouws, 2007; Kieran, 1989, 1992, 2007). 
An ontological perspective from the present study also offers insight for helping 
students overcome the learning barriers in Figure 35. The examination of student 
misconception error explanations revealed a consistent pattern: Misconception errors 
occurred when students relied on procedures isolated from meaning and mathematical 
structure. This pattern suggests that mathematics is best understood as an organized 
structure of meanings and connections rather than procedures. 
Teachers should strive to organize the mathematics so that 
fundamental ideas form an integrated whole. Big ideas encountered in a 
variety of contexts should be established carefully, with important 
elements such as terminology, definitions, notation, concepts, and skills 
emerging in the process (NCTM, 2000, p. 14)  
In combination with the epistemological implications described above, the present 
study found that student-centered, concept-focused mathematics classrooms may be the 
most effective learning environment for turning fundamental mathematics barriers into 
opportunities to learn. 
Final Thoughts: Pedagogy and Mathematics Misconceptions 
Traditional mathematics pedagogy may be even more detrimental to student 
learning than described by Welch (1978), Stigler and Hiebert (1997), and Manoucheri 
and Goodman (2001). In addition to losing the opportunity to struggle with important 
mathematics, traditional pedagogy also removes students from a position in which they 
can value or enjoy mathematics, individually or collectively (Shrewsbury, 1993). 
Traditional pedagogy positions students to receive and react to goals set out by the 
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teacher rather than allowing them part of the leadership process that helps them develop 
metacognitive knowledge and skills (Maher & Tetrault, 2001; Shrewsbury, 1993). 
Conceptual instruction, on the other hand, guides students to developing their own 
understanding of the meaning of important mathematical ideas and the connections 
between these ideas through authentic intellectual struggle (Rousseau, 1976; Stone, 
Alfeld, & Pearson, 2008). The findings of the present study suggest that conceptually 
focused instruction may position students to grapple with complex, abstract mathematical 
in a way that helps develop relational understanding of relevant mathematical structures, 
thereby reducing misconceptions or turning misconceptions into learning experiences. 
When targeting misconceptions, attending to the underlying structure of 
misconceptions that appear in all four content areas may be more effective than targeting 
the observable errors resulting from those misconceptions. Future investigations of 
mathematics misconceptions may best begin by developing a more refined instruments 
for identifying and categorizing misconceptions and potential causal structures 
The present study explored the use of probability instruction as an intervention to target 
fundamental mathematics misconceptions. The treatment condition had a statistically 
significant impact on the effect of item difficulty on misconception error probabilities, 
and several other important statistically significant factors were also identified. None of 
the hypothesized structures of content area misconceptions could be identified as a better 
fit to the data. This outcome led to the discovery of a high degree of multicollinearity 
between content area misconceptions, which supported the notion of an underlying 
mathematics misconception structure.  Preliminary analysis of a second-level underlying 
structure showed promise for this approach to understanding mathematical 
misconeptions. This finding offers a radically different perspective on the nature of 
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mathematics and mathematics learning. Furthermore, only five foundational concepts 
appeared to be fundamental to learning mathematics. Attending to these five foundational 
concepts may allow mathematics teaching in any single area to fundamentally impact the 
learning of other mathematics areas. Ignoring this small set of foundational concepts may 
allow the development of a formidable obstruction at a level that can inhibit and perhaps 
derail the mathematics future of students. Such an astounding notion may indicate that 
finding ways to identify and address these foundational concepts and their connections to 
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Algebra Lesson 1: Statistical Structure 
 
Situation: 
This lesson is the first of a probability unit designed for high school algebra classes. 
In this lesson, students will examine the structure of descriptive statistics and the 
normal distribution at an introductory level.  
 
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class. 
 
Objectives 
1. Students will describe the structure of data analysis. 
2. Students will interpret mean, median, mode, variance, and standard deviation. 
3. Students will construct normal distribution data displays. 
4. Students will interpret the normal distribution data display. 
 
Connections 
In this lesson, probability is introduced as an extension of data analysis and the need 
to make inferences about a population. The opener begins this sequence by having 
students explore the notion of equality as it relates to rational numbers, a foundational 
concept to probability. In the 2nd lesson of this unit, the topics discussed in the present 
lesson will be reviewed further. 
 
Materials 
1) Measuring tapes to measure height in inches 
2) LCD Projector 
3) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available) 
4) PowerPoint Presentation  
5) Student Lesson Worksheet 
 
 
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards 
MA-HS-1.1.1: Students will compare real numbers using order relations (less than, 
greater than, equal to) and represent problems using real numbers. 
MA-HS-4.1.1: Students will analyze and make inferences from a set of data with no 
more than two variables, and will analyze problems for the use and 
misuse of data representations. 
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two 
variables. 
MA-HS-4.2.1: Students will describe and compare data distributions and make 
inferences from the data based on the shapes of graphs, measures of 
center (mean, median, mode) and measures of spread (range, standard 
deviation).  
MA-HS-4.2.2: Students will know the characteristics of the Gaussian normal 
distribution (bell-shaped curve). 
 283 
Procedures  
1) Opener – Think, Pair, Share (@ 10 minutes overall) 
a. Draw a picture to explain why 1/5 is equal to 0.2 
i. Give 3-5 minutes to draw pictures. (Teacher takes roll and posts) 
ii. Pair up and discuss answers (@ 1-2 minutes) 
iii. Share out in pairs (2 minutes) 
b. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (@ 2 minute) 
i. Two possible pictures are given.  
2) Guided Notes (75 minutes) – Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet. 
a. Structure of Statistics: “The Statistical Pyramid” (Which is actually a 
ziggurat) 
i. The purpose of statistics is to say something about a population 
(Inference). 
1. Can’t measure a population directly because of 
constraining factors (e.g., time, money, ability to identify 
all subjects of population) 
2. Instead, we have to estimate population “parameters” from 
samples. 
ii. Sample statistics are the foundation of all data analysis.  
1. Not particularly interesting by themselves (e.g., I can easily 
measure the attitudes of students in a classroom about a 
topic, but what I really want to measure is the attitude held 
by all teenagers in the U. S.) 
2. Descriptive Statistics: We either describe sample behavior 
by the center or its spread. The center statistics are mean, 
median, and mode. The spread statistics are variance, 
standard deviation, and range. 
3. The frequency with which we observe particular values in a 
sample is sometimes called either the “sample” distribution 
or “data” distribution. (We’ll typically use “data” 
distribution to distinguish it from the “sampling” 
distribution) 
iii. Population parameters are also described by center and spread 
1. Center is typically the mean (although sometimes the 
median is used) 
2. Spread is variance and standard deviation. 
3. The frequency with which we observe particular values in a 
population is the “population distribution” 
iv. In between the population and data distributions is the pyramid 
staircase, the sampling distribution. 
1. What is a sampling distribution? We take a sample of N 
subjects, and compute a mean. The mean becomes a data 
point in the sampling distribution. We repeat this process a 
certain number of times, each time placing the sample 
mean into the sampling distribution set. When we have an 
“infinite” number of samples (of equal size), we have the 
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sampling distribution. (The frequency with which mean 
values are observed in repeated sampling) 
2. The sampling distribution also has a center and a spread. 
The center is the mean (which is actually a mean of means) 
and standard deviation. The standard deviation of a 
sampling distribution is usually referred to as “standard 
error.” 
b. Symbols commonly used in data analysis: 
i. These symbols are organized by which distribution they belong to: 
1. In the sample,  
(a) x = observation data 
(b) x = sample mean 
(c) s2 = sample variance 
(d) s = sample standard deviation 
2. In the sampling distribution, 
(a) xμ = sampling distribution mean (Mean of Means) 
(b) xσ or SE = standard error  
3. In the population distribution, 
(a) μ = population mean  
(b) σ2 = population variance 
(c) σ = population standard deviation 
4. Some general symbols used commonly: 
(a) Δ = Change (Looks like a triangle, but it’s actually 
a Greek Capital Delta) 
(b) Σ = Sum (Greek Capital Sigma) 
(c) df = Degrees of Freedom 
c. Describing data by the center 
i. Why would we want to do this? The center value can sometimes be 
a good representation of the values in the data set. Much easier to 
use one number instead of a thousand. 
ii. Graphing the data on a dotplot (a number line with each repeated 
point stacked) 
iii. Using the sample data set, go through computing the mean, 
median, and mode. Place a mark on the dotplot to show the mean, 
median, and mode. 
iv. Which center best represents this data set? In this case, the mean 
does a better job of representing the set (the 50 is high, but not 
high enough to be an outlier, and the median doesn’t account for 
its high value). 
v. How to decide which center to use: 
1. Mean: Most commonly used center. Used when data are 
distributed “normally” (bell shaped curve). 
2. Median: Used when data set contains outliers. 
3. Mode: Used when all the data cluster around a single value. 
d. Degrees of Freedom (df) 
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i. Defined as the number of independent observations in a population 
represented by a sample. 
ii. What do we mean by independent observations? 
1. Consider a sample of 4 people who are measured on some 
“score.” The sample mean x = 20, which means the sum of 
the scores was 80. 
2. We automatically estimate the population mean μ to also be 
20. 
3. So, when we go to the next sample of 4 people from the 
population, the first three people’s scores can be whatever 
they want (i.e., “free”) 
4. However, the fourth observation must make up the 
difference to get the sum to be 80 so that the population 
mean is still 20. We therefore say that it is “fixed” to track 
the population mean. 
5. So, we say that every time we estimate a population 
parameter, we lose a degree of freedom. So, df = n – 1 
(usually). 
iii. Degrees of freedom are important. Most statistical calculations 
assume that one observation doesn’t influence another (i.e., 
“independent”) 
iv. So, when we talk about samples, we think about sample size. But, 
when we talk about populations, we think about degrees of 
freedom.  
e. Divide students into groups of 6 (or allow them to group themselves). 
i. Measure heights in inches. 
ii. Have students compute the mean and subtract the mean from each 
X. 
iii. Have students add the second column. (If they don’t get 0, then 
there are either rounding errors or computation errors) 
iv. If we are interested in finding an average distance from the mean, 
why is this sum a problem? Because it means that regardless of the 
distances in the set, the average will always appear to be 0. 
v. Why is the sum always 0? Difficult to tell from the table, so let’s 
look at a sample set of data and a number line. Notice that the 
negative distances (observations below the mean) cancel out the 
positive distances (observations above the mean). Check your data 
set and see if it’s true for yours as well! 
vi. Computing the average distance from the mean can be thought of 
like calculating the distance between any other two points 
1. Use Pythagorean Theorem 
2. Notice that a + b ≠ c (and can’t for any triangle) 
3. But a2 + b2 does equal c2. When we talk about a2, b2, or c2, 
we are talking about area of squares.  
4. Benefit of using squares: (1) Can be used to compute 
distance (point out that the Pythagorean Theorem re-
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worked is the distance formula); (2) Eliminates the 0 sum 
problem. 
5. How does it eliminate 0 sum problem? The square of any 
number is positive (positive • positive = positive; negative 
• negative = positive). 
vii. Have students return to their height activity. 
1. Plot points on number line 
2. Draw in mean distances 
3. Draw the squares. 
4. Fill in the third column by squaring each mean distance. 
5. Find the sum of the third column and divide by 5 (Divide 
by 5 and not 6 because we want average distance in 
population, not sample, so use df instead of n). 
6. Go through sample data and allow students to follow their 
work with the sample. 
viii. What does that get us? 
1. Average square area for the mean distances is the 
“variance” 











3. It should be interpreted as the average amount of “noise” 
around the mean. It is the amount of data not represented 
by the mean. 
4. The side length of the variance square is the “standard 
deviation.” 










Deviation Standard  
ix. Don’t worry about memorizing formulas! Graphing calculator 
computes these values easily. 
1. Stat Æ Edit Æ Edit takes students to the lists to type in 
their data (have them use their data set while you go 
through steps) 
2. 2nd Æ Quit returns them to the main calculator screen. 
3. Stat Æ Calc Æ 1 Variable Stats provides: 
(a) Mean 
(b) Sum of X 
(c) Sum of X2 
(d) Population Standard Deviation 
(e) Sample Standard Deviation 
(f) Sample Size 
(g) Minimum X 
(h) Q1 (25th percentile) 
(i) Median (50th percentile) 
(j) Q3 (75th percentile) 
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(k) Maximum X 
x. Normal Distribution 
1. The normal distribution is a frequency distribution that 
corresponds to the probability of seeing a range of values in 
the population. Simplest, most common way of getting to 
population inference from a sample. 
2. Probability patterns are non-linear. (Rule of 3/Linear 
Proportions will not work to find unknowns). 
3. Look at Normal Distribution equation. No need to 
memorize the formula. Just notice that this distribution is 
based on mean, variance, and standard deviation. 
xi. 68-95-99 rule 
1. 68% of population falls between -σ and +σ. 95% of 
population falls between -2σ and +2σ. 99% of population 
falls between -3σ and 3σ WHEN DATA ARE NORMAL. 
2. These percentages are approximations. 
3. Finding critical values: add/subtract σ to/from mean. 
4. Making inferences with normal data. 
xii. Plotting normal curves 
1. Graphing calculator command: Y = Normalpdf(X, mean, 
st. dev.) 
2. Set Window. 
(a) XMin: A little lower than -3σ. 
(b) XMax: A little higher than 3σ. 
(c) XScl: Your choice. I tend to prefer σ. 
(d) YMin: 0 
(e) YMax: Your choice. I would think not higher than 
0.3 
(f) YScl: Your choice. 0.1 is usually pretty good 
(g) XRes: Keep at 1. 
3. Effect of standard deviation on curve height/width. 
(a) Higher SD = Shorter, wider graph 
(b) Lower SD = Taller, narrower graph 
4. Effect of mean on curve. Shifts position. 
 
3) Closure (5 minutes) 
a. Give a couple of minutes for individual work. 
b. Report out with whole class. 
c. Sample Solution: 
A news report posts that a political candidate has a 41% approval rating while 
her opponent has a 38% approval rating (SD = 3%). How does the normal 
distribution indicate that neither opponent is actually winning? 






1) Opener: Students connect rational number representations to notion of equality 
(1.1.1) 
2) Guided Notes and In-Class Simulation (Teacher observes and questions while 
students work individually; Questioning during whole class discussion) (4.1.1, 
4.1.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2) 






Algebra Lesson 1 Student Worksheet 
1.  The structure of statistics 
 































3. Describing data by the center 
Sample Data Set: 50, 10,1, 7, 1, 25, 20 
a) Make a dotplot of the data. 
 
b) Compute the Mean. Mark it on the dotplot above. 
 
c) Compute the Median. Mark it on the dotplot above. 
 
d) Compute the Mode. Mark it on the dotplot above. 
 
e) Which center best represents this sample data set? Why? 
 
4. What does the term “Degrees of Freedom” mean?  
 
a. How is it usually computed?  
 
b. Why is it important? 
 
5. A) Collect the height of six people in the class (in inches). 
 
X (Height)  X ‐ ࢞ഥ   
1)      
2)      
3)      
4)      
5)      
6)      
࢞ഥ =   Σ(X ‐ ݔҧ) =    
 
B) What happened when you tried to calculate the average distance to the mean?  
 
C) Why do you think this happened? 
 






7.  What is the benefit of using square areas for distance? 
 
8. Plot your student height data and mean on the number line provided on the next 
page.  
 
9. Compute the squares of the mean distances in the third column of the table in 
Problem 3; then draw the squares on the number line. 
 
10. Find the sum of the squares from column 3 in problem 3.  
 
a. Divide the sum by 5. Why 5 and not 6? 
 











12. The side length of the average square is the… 














































14.  What is the normal distribution? (Read 
http://davidmlane.com/hyperstat/normal_distribution.html ) 
 













16. What is the 68 – 95 – 99 rule? 
 
 
17. How do you compute the values for the X axis? 
           














18. Complete the following for your example data. 
 
a. Approximately 68% of the population will fall between _____ and _____ 
inches. 
b. Approximately 95% of the population will fall between _____ and _____ 
inches.  
c. Approximately 99% of the population will fall between _____ and _____ 
inches. 
d. Approximately 84% of the population will be shorter than _____ inches. 
e. Approximately 0.5% of the population will be taller than _____ inches. 
f. Approximately 16% of the population will be shorter than _____ inches. 
g. Approximately 99.5% of the population will be taller than _____ inches. 
19. Plotting Normal Distributions 
a. What is the command sequence for graphing a normal distribution on a 
graphing calculator? 
 









c. Plot two normal distributions on the same graph. Graph A: ~N(25, 2); 
Graph B: ~N(25, 5).  
 
d. What is the effect of the mean on the graph of a normal distribution? 
 
e. What is the effect of a larger standard deviation on the normal 
distribution? 
 




APPENDIX C  
 
Algebra Lesson 2: Randomness Lesson Plan 
 
Situation: 
This lesson is the second of a probability unit designed for high school algebra 
classes. In this lesson, students will examine randomness and sampling techniques 
used in experimentation. In subsequent lessons, students will examine counting 
principles and probability patterns of random variables. 
 
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class. 
 
Objectives 
1) Students will distinguish between patterns and randomness. 
2) Students will predict ending positions of a random walk. 
3) Students will distinguish between types of sampling patterns. 
 
Connections 
In the first lesson, students learned how to create normal distribution curves from 
means and standard deviations. In this lesson, students will explore patterns within 
random data and discover that the random data will follow a normal pattern. In the 
next lessons, students will build concepts of counting and probability on the 
foundation of randomness and normality. 
 
Materials 
6) Coins for flipping at Station 1: Determining Random Patterns and Station 2: Ant 
Walk 
7) Computer with Internet for Station 3 
a. Go to Cliff Hanger applet or type in http://mste.illinois.edu/activity/cliff/.  
b. Note: The Cliff Hanger applet has sound; while sound is optional, it will make 
the station far livelier. ☺ 
8) LCD Projector 
9) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available) 
10) PowerPoint Presentation  
11) Student Lesson Worksheet 
 
 
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards 
MA-HS-4.1.1: Students will analyze and make inferences from a set of data with no 
more than two variables, and will analyze problems for the use and 
misuse of data representations. 
  
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two 
variables. 
 
MA-HS-4.2.1: Students will describe and compare data distributions and make 
inferences from the data based on the shapes of graphs, measures of 
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center (mean, median, mode) and measures of spread (range, standard 
deviation). 
 
MA-HS-4.2.2: Students will know the characteristics of the Gaussian normal 
distribution (bell-shaped curve). 
 
MA-HS-4.3.1: Students will recognize potential for bias resulting from the misuse of 
sampling methods (e.g., non-random sampling, polling only a specific 
group of people, using limited or extremely small sample sizes) and 
explain why these samples can lead to inaccurate inferences. 
 
MA-HS-4.3.2: Students will design simple experiments or investigations to collect 
data to answer questions of interest. 
 
 
Procedures (88 minutes overall) 
4) Opener – Think, Pair, Share (@ 8 minutes overall) 
a. Give 2-3 minutes to complete the work. (Teacher takes roll and posts) 
b. Pair up and discuss answers. (@ 2 minutes) 
c. Share out in pairs. (@ 2 minutes) 
d. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (@ 2 minute) 
i. Review computation of critical values for normal distribution. 
ii. Review Probability Percentages and meaning of Percentile: 98th 
percentile does not mean that Ben got 98% of the questions 
correct; it means that he scored better than 98% of the other 
students who took the test. 
5) Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet. Have students read about Randomness and 
Sampling in their textbook and answer as many questions on Page 1 as they can 
on their own. (5 minutes)  
6) Whole Class discussion of Page 1 Questions. (15 minutes) 
a. What is randomness?  
i. Every outcome has an equal chance of being selected. 
b. Why is it important? 
i. Random patterns appear in the world in many places: atomic and 
molecular movement, lottery, decision under uncertainty 
c. Simple Random Sampling  
i. Every individual in a population has an equal and independent 
chance of being selected for the study. The sample is obtained 
through selection by chance, a table of random numbers, or 
computer-generated random numbers. 
d. Systematic Random Sampling  
i. Based on the number needed in the sample, every nth person in the 
target population is selected for the sample.  
ii. Used most often for product quality testing (e.g., every nth 
product) 
iii. If the order to be sampled is random, then no bias increase.  
e. Stratified Random Sampling  
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i. This (method) is used when the proportion of subgroups (strata) 
are known in the population; selection is random but from each of 
these strata. 
ii. Used in political polling, voting (e.g., political districts form the 
strata) 
iii. Especially useful when one or a few groups constitute a large 
portion of the population — in this type of case, the stratified 
sample can reduce bias, rather than increase it.  
f. Convenience Sampling  
i. Sampling is done on the basis of availability and ease of data 
collection rather than in terms of suitability based on research 
objectives/questions.  
ii. Researchers (especially medical and social researchers) rely on 
willing participants (volunteers). This situation adds bias to the 
data — volunteers may share common traits that become over-
represented in the sample. 
iii. Randomly assigning volunteers to treatment/control group reduces 
this added bias.  
 
7) Station Work (15 minutes at each station; 45 minutes total) 
a. Station 1: Distinguishing Randomness within sequences 
b. Station 2: Random Walk of Ants 
c. Station 3: Random Walk with Tourist at the Grand Canyon (“Cliff 
Hanger”) 
8) Return to normal seats. (@ 10 minutes) 
a. Compile frequency of outcomes for ant walk. 
b. Build a histogram of class data. 
c. If we did 100 trials, would the histogram change? Why or why not? 
d. If each trial consisted of 20 steps, would the histogram change? Explain. 
Note: PowerPoint Slide has histogram from two Monte Carlo samples. 
 
9) Closure (5 minutes) 
What was the most surprising thing you learned today? Why did it surprise you? 
a. Write your own answer 
b. Discuss with a partner 
c. Share out with class 
 
Assessment 
4) Opener: Review of Normal Distribution (4.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2) 





Algebra Lesson 2 Station Prompts 
Station 1: Determining Random Patterns 
 
1) A teacher asked Clare and Susan each to toss a coin a large number of times 
and to record every time whether the coin landed Heads or Tails. For each 
‘Heads,’ a 1 is recorded and for each ‘Tails,’ a 0 is recorded. Here are the two 
sets of results: 
 
a) Now one girl did it properly, by tossing the coin. The other girl cheated and just 
made it up. Which girl cheated? How can you tell? 
 
b) Now try it yourself with a partner. One person flips the coin while the other 
records the outcome. Switch off every 10 flips. Flip the coin 100 times. Record 
the results below. 
 
Flips 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Flips 1-10           
Flips 11-20           
Flips 21-30           
Flips 31-40           
Flips 41-50           
Flips 51-60           
Flips 61-70           
Flips 71-80           
Flips 81-90           
Flips 91-100           
 




Station 2: Ants and Random Movement 
 
Problem Statement: 
If a wandering ant starts at a lamp post and takes steps of equal length along the 
street, how far will it be from the lamp post after a certain number, say N, steps? 
Though this question is seemingly trivial, it poses one of the most basic problems 
in statistical science. 
 
It is easiest to visualize random motion (random walk) along one line, that is, in one 
dimension.  
 
• Call x the position of the ant on a one-dimensional line.  
• Locate the origin, that is x = 0, at the lamp post.  








1) How far from the origin do you expect the wandering ant to end up after 10 steps?  
 
2) After 10 steps is the ant more likely to be to the right or to the left of its starting 
point? 
 
3) If another ant takes 10 steps from the starting point, then another ant, then another 




• Choose the direction of the step the ant will take by flipping a coin:  
(+1) If it is a head, the ant steps right and x increases by one.  
(–1) If it is a tail, the ant steps left and x decreases by one.  
 
4) What is the likelihood of getting a head or tail? What is the implication for the ant’s 
steps? 
 
5) Flip a penny ten times and move your ``ant'' accordingly. Record the data in the 
table below. (Starting Position = 0, the lamp post) 
 
Flip 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Result           
Ending Position           
 
6) Did the ending result surprise you? Why or why not? 
 
x = 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8-2 -1-4 -3-6 -5 -7 
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7) Do the repeated trials for the ant walk represent random trials? Why or why not? 
 
Whole Class work on Station 2 Ants 
a. Compile the class data and construct a histogram. 
 


















Now that you've had a chance to experiment, answer the following: 
 






2) If we conducted the same experiment with 100 trials of 10 steps, would the 





3) If each trial had the ant walk 20 steps instead of 10, would the histogram be 




Station 3: Cliff Hanger 
 




A long day hiking through the Grand Canyon has discombobulated this tourist. 
Unsure of which way he is randomly stumbling, 1/3 of his steps are towards the edge 
of the cliff, while 2/3 of his steps are towards safety. From where he stands, one step 
forward will send him tumbling down. What is the probability that he can escape 
unharmed? 
 
1) Build a factor tree for the possible ending points for the tourist’s next 4 steps. (E = 
Toward Edge; S = Toward Safety). For each outcome, compute the ending 
position for that position. If the tourist falls off the cliff, then that branch of the 
factor tree ends — you will not fill in every oval. 
 
2) Compute the probability of moving toward safety or toward the edge for each step 
as shown in the diagram. 
 
 




4) Play five rounds of the cliff hanger game. Record the results below. 
 
























P(Safety) =  
If traveler takes Step 2: 
P(Safety) =  
Record the probability of moving toward safety or toward the edge with each step.  
Note: These are conditional probabilities — each step is contingent on not having already fallen! 
If traveler takes Step 3: 
P(Safety) = ________ 
If traveler takes Step 4: 




Algebra Lesson 3/Geometry Lesson 1: Counting Principles 
 
Situation: 
This lesson is the third of a probability unit designed for high school algebra classes. 
In this lesson, students will examine number properties important to probability. In 
the opener, students compare rational number quantities. In the main lesson, students 
learn to count possible outcomes using the Fundamental Counting Principle and 
factorial structures. Prior to this lesson, students have examined statistical structures, 
normal distribution, and notions of randomness. This unit will continue with 
exploration of probability and probability distributions. 
 
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class. 
 
Objectives 
4) Students will count outcomes using the Fundamental Counting Principle. 
5) Students will count outcomes using factor trees. 
6) Students will count outcomes using permutations. 
7) Students will count outcomes using combinations. 
 
Connections 
Students have completed their first algebra unit. The opener for this lesson connects 
algebra, geometry, and rational numbers (meaning of rational numbers linked to 
central angle measurement and numerical notations). The main lesson lays a 
foundation for the rest of the probability unit. 
 
Materials 
12) LCD Projector 
13) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available) 
14) PowerPoint Presentation  
15) Student Lesson Worksheet 
16) Student Practice Worksheet 
17) Student Practice Worksheet Key 
  
 
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards 
MA-HS-1.1.1: Students will compare real numbers using order relations (less than, 
greater than, equal to) and represent problems using real numbers. 
 
MA-HS-4.4.2: Students will recognize and identify the differences between 
combinations and permutations and use them to count discrete 
quantities. 
 
Procedures (88 minutes overall) 
10) Opener – Think, Pair, Share (@ 8 minutes overall) 
a. Give @ 2 minutes to complete the work. (Teacher takes roll and posts) 
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b. Pair up and discuss answers (@ 2 minutes) 
c. Share out in pairs (@ 2 minutes) 
d. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (@ 2 minute) 
i. Illustration connects angle degrees to rational number comparison 
ii. Before showing the number line, discuss why 99 is the smallest 
common denominator and what common denominators mean. 
11) Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet. Have students read about Counting 
Principles in their textbook and answer as many as they can on their own. (5 – 10 
minutes)  
12) Move students into groups to discuss their answers. (5 minutes)  
13) Students return to their normal seats for whole class discussion. (30 minutes)  
a. Events 
i. Independent Events 
ii. Dependent Events 
b. Counting Independent Outcomes: Three tosses of a coin 
i. Factor Trees:  
1. Why are some of the outcomes in red? Because these 
flips would not be necessary to determine a winner in a 
“Best 2 out of 3” game.  
2. How many outcomes to 3 tosses of a coin? How do you 
know? 8, They can be counted on the last row of the factor 
tree. 
ii. Table Arrangement:  
1. How do these outcomes match the factor tree? Each 
column on the table matches a level of the factor tree.  
2. Which do you think is easier to read? Why? Answers 
will vary. 
3.  What does it mean to be systematic? Why is it 
important? Counting/Arranging in a pre-determined 
order; important to ensure all outcomes are counted. 
iii. Fundamental Counting Principle 
1. Definition 
2. Discuss Notation from slide (| | = magnitude; ∩ = 
intersection). Why multiply? Each outcome for the second 
event applies to every outcome for the first event. 
When would you not multiply? When a situation calls for 
the union of two sets instead of the intersection: Each 
outcome for B does not apply to every outcome for A. 
3. Why do you suppose the Fundamental Counting 
Principle extends to more than 2 events? Each 
subsequent outcome applies to every outcome for each 
previous event. 
4. How do we count 3 flips of a coin? 2 outcomes for the 
first flip, 2 outcomes for the second flip, and 2 outcomes for 
the third flip = 2•2•2 = 8 outcomes 
5. Disadvantage? Doesn’t list the outcomes as well as count 
them; however, more useful for large number of outcomes 
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(e.g., roll 3 dice: 6•6•6 = 216 outcome, impractical to list 
them all) 
c. Counting Dependent Events 
i. A classroom of 30 students arrives on the first day.  
ii. Since I don’t know any of the students I assign seats randomly. 
iii. Count the number of outcomes for each of the first five students: 
30•29•28•27•26… 
iv. At this point, ask the students to describe the pattern. n! or 30! 
d. Permutations 
i. To introduce permutations, consider the following situation with 
the students: “The office calls and needs me to choose 3 people to 
help with a project.” How many ways to choose? 30•29•28 
ii. Developing a formula:  
1. All possibilities = 30! 
2. To count only the first 3, we have to remove 27! 
3. To remove these numbers mathematically, divide n! by (n-
r)! 
iii. Permutations are used when each new arrangement should be 
counted as a different outcome, or we say, “Order Matters.” 
iv. Look at example of choosing a President, Vice President, and 
Secretary. Why does order matter in this situation? 
v. Show how to compute permutation on graphing calculator. 
e. Combinations 
i. New situation: team of 3 instead of 3 different positions.  
ii. Why doesn’t order matter in this situation? Because every 
arrangement of 3 people is now the same team: ABC, ACB, BAC, 
BCA, CAB, CBA 
iii. Show that 6 outcomes = 3! 
iv. Levels of restrictiveness (Most outcomes to the least): 
Factorials Æ Permutations Æ Combinations 
v. Develop combination formula from permutation formula: To 
eliminate r! arrangements, have to divide. Why? Multiplicative 
Structure. 
vi. Discuss calculator functions and answer to example: number of 
teams of 3 out of 9 people. 


















































always = 1? 
x. Show Pascal’s triangle. The rth term of the nth row = nCr. 
Emphasize that both must be counted from 0. 
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xi. Example 1: Twelve skiers compete in the final round of the 
Olympic freestyle skiing competition. How many different top 
three winners are possible? (Gold, Silver, Bronze). 
1. What are the events? A skier finishing. 
2. Are these events independent or dependent? Dependent 
3. Should the number of possible outcomes be counted 
with permutations or combinations? How do you know? 
Permutations because ABC is different than BCA. 
4. Solve: 12P3 = 1320 
xii. Example 1: Twelve skiers compete in the final round of the 
Olympic freestyle skiing competition. How many different top 
three winners are possible? (Gold, Silver, Bronze). 
1. What are the events? A skier finishing. 
2. Are these events independent or dependent? Dependent 
3. Should the number of possible outcomes be counted 
with permutations or combinations? How do you know? 
Permutations because ABC is different than BCA. 
4. Solve: 12P3 = 1320 
 
 
Example 2: A restaurant serves omelets that can be ordered with 
any of the ingredients shown. (a) Suppose you want exactly 2 
vegetarian ingredients and 1 meat ingredient in your omelet. How 
many different types of omelets can you order? (b) Suppose you 
can afford at most 3 ingredients in your omelet. How many 
different types of omelets can you order? 
1. What are the events? Ingredients chosen. 
2. Are these events independent or dependent? Dependent 
3. Should the number of possible outcomes be counted with 
permutations or combinations? How do you know? Combinations 
because Tomato and Cheese is the same as Cheese and Tomato. 
4. Solve (a): Vegetarian: 6C2 = 15; Meat: 4C1 = 4; Vegetarian AND Meat = 
15 • 4 = 60 
5. Solve (b): 10C3 = 120 
 
14) Pass out Student Practice Worksheet. Students work individually or with partners 
as desired. (15 minutes)  
15) Discuss Counting Worksheet: Divide class into 3 groups. Each group discusses 
one question and presents their solution to the class. (5 minutes for group time; 15 
minutes for reporting out)  
16) Closure: 3-2-1 
a. What are 3 things that you found interesting today? 
b. What are 2 things that you learned? 
c. What is 1 thing you still have a question about? 
 
Omelets $7.95 













1) Opener: Students compare rational number values (1.1.1) 
2) Guided Notes and Example Problems (Teacher observes and questions while 
students work individually; Questioning during whole class discussion) (4.4.2) 
3)  Counting Worksheet (4.4.2): Students work individually and collaboratively to 
analyze whether a situation involves independent or dependent events, 






Algebra Lesson 3/Geometry Lesson 1 Task Rotation Prompts 
 
1. You are going to set up a stereo system by purchasing separate components. In your 
price range you find 5 different receivers, 8 different compact disc players, and 12 
different speaker systems.  
 
 
a) What are the three events? 
 
b) Are these events independent or dependent? How did you decide? 
 




d) Draw a picture to illustrate why multiplication is appropriate for counting the 










2. A deck of cards with no wilds is used for a hand of 5 card draw in a game with 6 
players. Use the illustration below to demonstrate how to count the number of 






3. In 1920, an Egyptologist discovered a StarGate, a means of travelling to planets all 
over the galaxy instantaneously. In 1994, Dr. Daniel Jackson discovered that the gate 
required seven symbols: Six points in space to identify the target planet and the point 
of origin. 
 
   
 
The dialing device (DHD) has 39 symbols. Each time a planet is “dialed,” seven 
symbols must be entered.  











c) The point of origin is always the 7th symbol. How does this information 





Algebra Lesson 4/Geometry Lesson 2: Event Probability 
 
Situation: 
This lesson is the fourth of a probability unit designed for high school algebra classes. 
In this lesson, students will rotate between stations to explore probability concepts. 
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class. 
 
Objectives 
1) Students will differentiate between theoretical and experimental probability. 
2) Students will evaluate problems using probability principles. 
3) Students will explain how the law of large numbers applies to simulation. 
4) Students will run a Monte Carlo simulation and interpret the outcome. 
5) Students will use area and length ratios to compare probabilities. 
 
Connections 
In the previous lesson, students learned to count outcomes and differentiate between 
independent and dependent counting. This lesson extends the counting structures for 
each type of situation to probability. 
 
Materials 
18) Dice (For Stations 2 and 4) 
19) LCD Projector 
20) 2 Computers for Student Use (1 with Internet) 
21) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available) 
22) PowerPoint Presentation  
23) Student Lesson Worksheet 
 
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards 
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two 
variables.  
MA-HS-4.4.1: Students will determine theoretical and experimental (from given 
data) probabilities, make predictions and draw inferences from 
probabilities, compare theoretical and experimental probabilities, and 
determine probabilities involving replacement and non-replacement. 
 
MA-HS-4.4.3: Students will represent probabilities in multiple ways, such as 
fractions, decimals, percentages and geometric area models. 
 




0) Before class, Set up Stations: 
a. Station 1: Computer with Applet: Spinners. 
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b. Station 2: Dice for Happy Meal Simulation 
c. Station 3: Computer with Microsoft Excel; Print out directions for 
creating a Monte Carlo Simulation 
d. Station 4: Dice for Craps Simulation 
 
1) Opener (4 minutes overall) 
a. Give @ 2 minutes to complete the work. (Teacher takes roll and posts) 
b. Discuss sample answers on PowerPoint slide. (2 minutes) 
2) Pass out Student Lesson Worksheet. Have students read about Probability in their 
textbook and answer as many as they can on their own. (5 minutes)  
3) Move students into groups to discuss their answers. (5 minutes)  
4) Students return to their normal seats for whole class discussion. (10 minutes) 
y Fundamental Concepts of Probability  
◦ “Probability” means the likelihood of an event occurring. 
◦ Expressed as a part-whole ratio 
y Success and Failure  
◦ Success 
y The outcome of interest. 
y Changes for each new situation.  
◦ Failure: Everything other than success 
◦ S = Number of Successful Outcomes 
◦ F = Number of Failure Outcomes 
y Theoretical Probability  
◦ Probability based on assumption that all outcomes are equally likely 
◦ Examples:  
◦ Tossing a Coin: P(H) = 0.5 = 50% = 1/2 
◦ Rolling a Single Die: P(3) = 0.167 = 16.7% = 1/6 
◦ Rolling 2 Dice: P(3) = 0.056 = 5.6% = 2/36 = 1/18 
◦ “3” from (1 and 2) or (2 and 1); 36 total outcomes  
y Experimental Probability  
y Probability Based on Observations, Data, or Simulation. 
y Examples from a random sample of 10 observations: 
◦ Coin Toss: 
◦ P(H) = 
◦ 1 Die: 
 P(3) = 
◦ 2 Dice: 
 P(3) = 
y Odds  
◦ Odds of Success: Ratio of Success : Failure 
◦ Odds of Failure: Ratio of Failure : Success 
y Example  
◦ A baseball player has 126 hits in 410 at-bats this season.  
y What is the probability that he gets a hit in his next at-bat?  
y Is this a theoretical or experimental probability?  
y What are his odds of success?  
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5) Station work (15 minutes each; 60 minutes total) 
 
6) Closure: (5 minutes) 
a. You are the teacher in a class that just completed today’s lesson.  
b. Write down three details you think are important for students to know 
from this lesson. 
c. Share out in class.  
 
Assessment 
1) Opener: Review of Fundamental Counting Principle  
2) Student Worksheet (4.1.2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.4): Students work individually and 
collaboratively to explore fundamental probability concepts, probability ratios, 
and Monte Carlo simulations. Exploratory problems include multiple 




Algebra Lesson 4 Station Prompts 
Station 1: Spinners. 
 
1) Refer to Applet: “Spinners.” 
a) What is the probability of the spinner landing on Purple? Green? Red? 
Orange? Yellow? 
 
b) Are these probabilities theoretical or experimental? How do you know? 
 
 
c) Click on the “Record Results” button. Record your data in the table below.  
i. Spin the dial 10 times. 
ii. Spin the dial 10 more times. 
iii. In the box that says “Spins,” type in “10.” Spin 8 more times. 
iv. In the box that says “Spins,” type in “50.” Spin 8 more times. 
 







Click “Apply.”  
Draw a picture of the new spinner 
 





ii. Repeat the experiment above with your new spinner. 
 





Station 2: Happy Meal Simulation 
 
2) A blogger posted the following comment about the McDonald’s Happy Meal 
prize: 
 My daughter loves the current McDonald's happy meal prize. It's a Kids Bop CD, and it rocks! 
There are 6 different ones, and they are definitely doing the job, as we are pursuing to collect all 
6! I feel like it's really worth it. Some of the prizes end up in the trash (when the kids aren't 
looking), but these will be around for a while. I am a fan of anything that makes the car trips 
easier:). 
  
Suppose that the prizes are randomly placed in bags. Run a simulation to 
determine how many Happy Meals are likely to need to be bought to get all 6 






a) Roll the dice until you roll all 6 numbers. Use tick marks to record the 
outcome for each roll in the table below.  
Outcome CD 1 CD 2 CD 3 CD 4 CD 5 CD 6 
No. of Rolls       
Probability Ratio       
Percentage       
 




c) What does the law of large numbers indicate about the relationship of your 
experimental probability to the theoretical probability?
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Station 3: Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
3) What is a Monte Carlo simulation? 
 
 
4) In Meiosis, chromosomes from father and mother join to create a new gene. A 
scientist is studying 3 genes, each with a dominant and recessive trait. Using a 
factor tree, she determined that 8 traits were possible: A cereal company is putting 
8 different prizes in their boxes. Run a Monte Carlo simulation to determine how 
many boxes you’ll have to buy to get all 8 prizes. 
a) Double Click the Microsoft Excel Template on the desktop, 
“G2_Station_3_Monte_Carlo_Simulation.xltx” 
b) Use the factor tree on the “Introduction” page to determine the gene labels 
for the 8 traits: 
Trait 1: _______ 
Trait 2: _______ 
Trait 3: _______ 
Trait 4: _______ 
Trait 5: _______ 
Trait 6: _______ 
Trait 7: _______ 
Trait 8: _______ 
c) What is the theoretical probability for each trait? 
d) Go to the “Monte Carlo” page. Type in “=RandBetween(1,8)” into cell A2 
and hit Enter. 
e) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A2 as shown to 
the left; drag the pointer down to A10.  
i. What do you suppose each cell represents?  
ii. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet? How can you tell? 
 
 
iii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability? How do you know? 
 
 
f) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A10. Drag to 
cell A25.  
i. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet?  
 
ii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 

















g) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A25. Drag to 
cell A150. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
 
h) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A150. Drag to 
cell A350. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
 
i) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A350. Drag to 
cell A500. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
 
j) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A500. Drag to 
cell A1000. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
 
k) Based on this simulation, what sample size is needed to ensure that the 




l) Explain the relationship of the Histograms A, B, C, and D to the 
simulation data? To each other? 
 
 
m) What are 2 advantages of a Monte Carlo simulation over other simulations 






Geometry Lesson 2 Station Prompts 
 
Station 1: Geometric Probability. 
 
1) Refer to Applet: “Probability as a ratio of line segments.” 
 
 




b) What is the relationship of P(BC) to P(AC)? How does this relationship 









2) Refer to Applet: “Probability as a Ratio of Concentric Rings.” 
 
a) What is the relationship of the radii of the three rings? 
 
b) Which measurement represents the area of the outer ring? Why? 
 
c) Which measurement represents the area of the middle ring? Why? 
 
d) Which measurement represents the area of the bulls eye? How is this 
region different from the other two? 
 
e) What is the probability of a randomly thrown dart landing in the outer 
ring? How do you know? 
 
f) What is the probability of a randomly thrown dart landing in the middle 
ring? How do you know? 
 
g) What is the probability of a randomly thrown dart landing in the bulls eye? 
How do you know? 
 
h) Why don’t the probability measurements change as the circle moves? 
 





Station 2: Happy Meal Simulation 
 
3) A blogger posted the following comment about the McDonald’s Happy Meal 
prize: 
 My daughter loves the current McDonald's happy meal prize. It's a Kids Bop CD, and it rocks! 
There are 6 different ones, and they are definitely doing the job, as we are pursuing to collect all 
6! I feel like it's really worth it. Some of the prizes end up in the trash (when the kids aren't 
looking), but these will be around for a while. I am a fan of anything that makes the car trips 
easier:). 
  
Suppose that the prizes are randomly placed in bags. Run a simulation to 
determine how many Happy Meals are likely to need to be bought to get all 6 






d) Roll the dice until you roll all 6 numbers. Use tick marks to record the 
outcome for each roll in the table below.  
Outcome CD 1 CD 2 CD 3 CD 4 CD 5 CD 6 
No. of Rolls       
Probability Ratio       
Percentage       
 
e) How many rolls did it take you to buy all 6 CD’s? 
 
 
f) What does the law of large numbers indicate about the relationship of your 





Station 3: Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
4) What is a Monte Carlo simulation? 
 
 
5) In Meiosis, chromosomes from father and mother join to create a new gene. A 
scientist is studying 3 genes, each with a dominant and recessive trait. Using a 
factor tree, she determined that 8 traits were possible: A cereal company is putting 
8 different prizes in their boxes. Run a Monte Carlo simulation to determine how 
many boxes you’ll have to buy to get all 8 prizes. 
a) Double Click the Microsoft Excel Template on the desktop, 
“G2_Station_3_Monte_Carlo_Simulation.xltx” 
b) Use the factor tree on the “Introduction” page to determine the gene labels 
for the 8 traits: 
Trait 1: _______ 
Trait 2: _______ 
Trait 3: _______ 
Trait 4: _______ 
Trait 5: _______ 
Trait 6: _______ 
Trait 7: _______ 
Trait 8: _______ 
c) What is the theoretical probability for each trait? 
d) Go to the “Monte Carlo” page. Type in “=RandBetween(1,8)” into cell A2 
and hit Enter. 
e) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A2 as shown to 
the left; drag the pointer down to A10.  
i. What do you suppose each cell represents?  
ii. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet? How can you tell? 
 
 
iii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability? How do you know? 
 
 
f) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A10. Drag to 
cell A25.  
i. Has the scientist encountered all 8 traits yet?  
 
ii. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 

















g) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A25. Drag to 
cell A150. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
h) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A150. Drag to 
cell A350. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
i) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A350. Drag to 
cell A500. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
j) Click and hold the button at the bottom right corner of cell A500. Drag to 
cell A1000. Does the experimental probability represent the theoretical 
probability now? How can you tell? 
 
k) Based on this simulation, what sample size is needed to ensure that the 
sample data will represent the population distribution? How did you 
decide? 
 
l) Explain the relationship of the Histograms A, B, C, and D to the 
simulation data? To each other? 
 
m) What are 2 advantages of a Monte Carlo simulation over other simulations 




Station 4: Craps 
 
In the game of craps, two common bets are pass line bets and don’t pass line bets. 
 
Pass Line Bet - You win if the first roll is a natural (7, 11) and lose if it is craps (2, 3, 
12). If a point is rolled (4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) it must be repeated before a 7 is thrown in order 
to win. If 7 is rolled before the point you lose. 
 
Don't Pass Line Bet - This is the reversed Pass Line bet. If the first roll of a dice is a 
natural (7, 11) you lose and if it is a 2 or a 3 you win. A dice roll of 12 means you have a 
tie or push with the casino. If the roll is a point (4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10) a 7 must come out 
before that point is repeated to make you a winner. If the point is rolled again before the 
7 you lose. 
 
1) Develop the probability distribution for rolling two die.  
a) List all possible dice sums in the table below. 
 







2  2  2  
3  3  3  
4  4  4  
5  5  5  







2  2  2  
3  3  3  
4  4  4  
5  5  5  
6  6  6  
 
b) What is the total number of outcomes for rolling two die? 
c) Record the probability of each outcome for rolling two dice.  
  









Sum 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Probability            
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3) Would you prefer to bet on a Pass Bet or No Pass Bet? How did you decide? 
 
 
4) Play 10 rounds of craps, using the type of bet you chose. Record the results 
below. 
Roll Outcome Win or Lose?
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
8   
9   
10   
 
5) The Law of large numbers states that as sample size increases, its ability to 
represent the population also increases. How do you think the law of large number 







Algebra Lesson 5/Geometry Lesson 3: Probability Distributions 
 
Situation: 
This lesson is the final lesson of a probability unit designed for high school algebra 
and geometry classes.  
This lesson is designed for a 90 minute block period class. 
 
Objectives 
1) Students will compare two different experiments with equal probability using the 
Law of Large Numbers. 




In the previous lesson, students examined probability as part-whole relationships and 
single and multiple events. They also explored the impact of the law of large numbers 
on the relationship between theoretical and experimental probability. In this lesson, 
students will examine probability distributions as an extension of event probabilities. 
 
Materials 
1) Microsoft PowerPoint (And Clicker, if available) 
2) PowerPoint Presentation  
3) Student Lesson Worksheet 
4) Task Rotation Worksheet 
 
KY Core Content 4.1 Standards 
MA-HS-4.1.1: Students will analyze and make inferences from a set of data with no 
more than two variables, and will analyze problems for the use and 
misuse of data representations.  
MA-HS-4.1.2: Students will construct data displays for data with no more than two 
variables.  
MA-HS-4.2.1: Students will describe and compare data distributions and make 
inferences from the data based on the shapes of graphs, measures of 
center (mean, median, mode) and measures of spread (range, standard 
deviation). 
MA-HS-4.4.4: Students will explain how the law of large numbers can be applied in 
simple examples. 
MA-HS-5.1.3: Students will demonstrate how equations and graphs are models of the 
relationship between two real-world quantities (e.g., the relationship 
between degrees Celsius and degrees Fahrenheit) 
Procedures  
1) Opener (6 minutes): The theoretical probability for an event is ½. Which of the 
two ratios is more likely in a set of repeated trials? 4/8 or 400/800. 
a. Give students @ 2 minutes to complete. (Teacher takes roll and posts)  
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b. In pairs, have students share their thoughts about the ratio likelihoods. (2 
minutes) 
c. Report out and discuss with whole class (The slide “Law of Large 
Numbers” is a discussion of opener solution; 2 minutes) 
2) Introduce Probability Distributions (28 minutes total) 
a. Fundamental Ideas (3 minutes) 
i. Definition 
ii. Two types: Discrete or Continuous 
iii. Based on Random Data and Patterns that emerge from repeated 
trials. 
b. Uniform Distribution (5 minutes) 
i. Uses 
ii. Examples 
iii. Shape of the distribution 
iv. Interpretation 
c. Binomial Distribution (10 minutes) 
i. Uses 
ii. Examples 
iii. Shape of the distribution 
iv. Interpretation 
v. Example Problem 
d. Geometric Distribution (10 minutes) 
i. Uses 
ii. Examples 
iii. Shape of the distribution 
iv. Interpretation 
v. Example problem 
 
3) Problem Set (50 minutes). Pass out Student Problem Set Worksheet. 
a. Do each question one at a time.  
b. Allow students to work approximately 10 minutes individually. 
c. Have students get with a partner and discuss (10 minutes). Use different 
partners for each question. 
d. Report out and discuss with whole class. (5 minutes). 
e. Repeat for 2nd question. 
4) Closure (5 minutes) 
a. Give a couple of minutes for individual work. 
b. Report out with whole class. 
Assessment 
1) Opener assesses how well students can apply Law of Large Numbers to various 
situations (4.1.1, 4.4.4) 
2) Problem Set Question 1 (Blood Type) assesses how well students can apply 
binomial distribution inference to a particular situation. (4.1.2, 4.2.1) 
3) Task Rotation Question 2 (Daughter) assesses how well students can apply the 
geometric distribution to a particular situation. Additionally, students are asked to 





Algebra Lesson 5 Student Worksheet 
 
1.  Blood type is inherited. Suppose a father carries the genotype AO (phenotype = Type 
A) while the mother carries the genotype BO (phenotype = type B). They have 4 
children. 
 
a) Fill in the Punnett Square:  
 
b) Type O blood is considered the “Universal Donor.” What is the probability 
that X = 2 of the children will have Type O blood? 
i. Why is this situation binomial? 
 
ii. What does X represent? 
 
iii. n = ? 
 
iv. p = ? 
 
v. Use the graphing calculator to calculate the full probability distribution 
of X. Then calculate the probability distribution of X on Minitab.  
 
Number of Type O Children:  X = ?  X = ?  X = ?  X = ?  X = ? 
Sum of 
Probabilities 





c) Draw the probability histogram: 
 
 
d) What is the probability that 2 children from this family will have Type O 
Blood? 
 
2. A couple decided to start a family, and both wanted a daughter. Their first child was a 
boy, so they decided to continue having children until they got a daughter. After 
having four boys, the couple’s fifth child was a daughter. 
 
a) In what way is this situation geometric? 
 
b) After the fourth child’s gender was known, the mother proclaimed, “What are 
the chances?!” What was the probability that it would take 5 children before a 
girl was born? 
 
c) Draw a probability histogram for the geometric distribution out to 5 children. 
 
 
d) Does this graph mean that it is less likely that the 2nd child is a girl than the 
1st? Why or why not? If not, what does it mean? 
 
e) Develop an equation to represent the geometric probability of achieving the 



































































The useful life of a radial tire is normally 
distributed with a mean of 80,000 miles and a 
standard deviation of 5000 miles.  The 
company makes 10,000 tires a month. 
a. About how many tires from a 
month’s production will last between 
75,000 and 85,000 miles? 
b. About how many tires from a 
month’s production will last more 
than 90,000 miles? 
c. What is the probability that if you 
buy a radial tire at random, it will 
last between 70,000 and 85,000 miles? 
d. As a consumer, what are two things 
you can do to maximize the life of 
your tires? 
In 1998, Ben took both the SAT and the ACT.  
On the mathematics section of the SAT, he 
earned a score of 624.  On the mathematics 
section of the ACTG, he earned a score of 31.   
 
For the SAT, the mean was 512 and the 
standard deviation was 112.  For the ACT, the 
mean was 21 and the standard deviation was 5. 
 
• Explain how you can know that Ben 
performed better on the ACT than he did 
on the SAT. 
Sketch three normal curves on the same scale 
with the following properties (you can use the 
graphing calculator): 
a. Mean is 50 and standard deviation is 2. 
b. Mean is 50 and standard deviation is 
10. 
c. Mean is 50 and standard deviation is 
20. 
 
If you owned a business and the data represents 
your profits each month over the past year, 
which curve would you prefer?  Why? 
Mario and Luigi are calculating the 
probability of getting a 4 and then a 2 if they 
roll a die twice.  With a partner, decide which 
solution is correct and why. 
Mario: 










= 2.78% chance of rolling a 4, then a 2. 
Luigi: 










= 3.33% chance of rolling a 4, then a 2. 
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APPENDIX M 
NAEP Mathematics Knowledge Instrument 
I. Multiple Choice Answers Explanations 
1) A    B    C    D    E  
2) A    B    C    D    E  
3) A    B  
4) A    B    C    D    E  
5) A    B    C    D    E  
6) A    B    C    D    E  
7) A    B    C    D    E  
8) A    B    C    D    E  
9) A    B  
10) A    B    C    D  
11) A    B    C    D    E  
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12) A    B    C    D    E  
13) A    B    C    D    E  
14) A    B    C    D    E  
15) A    B    C    D    E  
16) A    B    C    D    E  
17) A    B    C    D    E  
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I. Multiple Choice. For Questions 1-15, please mark the response that you think 
best answers the question. Please explain how you decided your answer. 
 
1) A person is going to pick one marble without looking. For which dish is there the 
greatest probability of picking a black marble? 
 
A B C D E 
  
 




2) The table below shows the gender and color of 7 puppies. If a puppy selected at 
random from the group is brown, what is the probability it is a male? 
 
 Male Female 
Black 1 2 




1  B) 
7
2  C) 
3
1  D) 
2








3) A package of candies contained only 10 red candies, 10 blue candies, and 10 green 
candies. Bill shook up the package, opened it, and started taking out one candy at a 
time and eating it. The first 2 candies he took out and ate were blue. Bill thinks the 








a) Is Bill correct or incorrect? A) Yes, he is correct. B) No, he is not 
correct. 





4) If Rose spins a spinner like the one below 300 times, about how many times should 




A) 75 B) 90 C) 100 D) 120 E) 150 
  




5) The temperature in degrees Celsius can be found by subtracting 32 from the 
temperature in degrees Fahrenheit and multiplying the result by 
9
5
 . If the temperature 
of a furnace is 393 degrees Fahrenheit, what is it in degrees Celsius, to the nearest 
degree? 
 
 A) 650      B) 1805     C) 40 D) 201 E) 72 
  




6) In the equation y = 4x, if the value of x is increased by 2, what is the effect on the 
value of y? 
  
  
A) It is 8 more than the original amount. B) It is 6 more than the original amount. 
C) It is 2 more than the original amount. D) It is 16 times the original amount. 
E) It is 8 times the original amount.  
 




7) A plumber charges customers $48 for each hour worked plus an additional $9 for 
travel. If h represents the number of hours worked, which of the following 
expressions could be used to calculate the plumber's total charge in dollars? 
  
A)  h + 48 + 9 B) 48 • 9 • h 
C) 9h + 48 D) h + (48 • 9)  
E) 48h + 9  
 




8) At the school carnival, Carmen sold 3 times as many hot dogs as Shawn. The two of 
them sold 152 hot dogs altogether. How many hot dogs did Carmen sell? 
 
A) 21 B) 38 C) 51 D)114 E) 148 
 




9) Sara was asked to draw a parallelogram. She drew the figure below. 
 
Is Sara's figure a parallelogram?  
 
A) Yes B) No 
 




10) What is the area of the shaded figure? 
 
 
A) 9 square centimeters 
B) 11 square centimeters 
C) 13 square centimeters 
D) 14 square centimeters 
 
Please explain how you decided. 
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11) A scale drawing of a rectangular room is 5 inches by 3 inches. If 1 inch on this scale 
drawing represents 3 feet, what are the dimensions of the room? 
 
A) 5 feet by 3 feet B) 5 feet by 9 feet 
C) 15 feet by 3 feet D) 15 feet by 5 feet 
E) 15 feet by 9 feet  
   




12) The cost to mail a first-class letter is 33 cents for the first ounce. Each additional 
ounce costs 22 cents. (Fractions of an ounce are rounded up to the next whole 
ounce.) 
   
How much would it cost to mail a letter that weighs 2.7 ounces? 
   
A) 55 cents B) 66 cents C) 77 cents D) 88 cents E) 99 cents 
 




13) If you were to redraw the diagram using a scale of 
4
3
inch = 10 feet, what would be 
the length of the side that is 48 feet? 
 
  
A) 3.0 in B) 3.6 in C) 5.6 in D) 7.5 in E) 12.0 in 
 





14) In which of the following are the three fractions arranged from least to greatest? 




















































 C)  
3
1






   
 




16) Angela makes and sells special-occasion greeting cards. The table below shows the 
relationship between the number of cards sold and her profit. Based on the data in 
the table, which of the following equations shows how the number of cards sold and 
profit (in dollars) are related? 
  
  Mon. Tues. Wed. Thurs. Fri. Sat. 
Number Sold, n 4 0 5 2 3 6 
Profit, p $2.00 $0.00 $2.50 $1.00 $1.50 $3.00 
 
A)  p = 2n 
 
B)  p = 0.5n 
 
C)  p = n – 2  
 
D)  p = 6 – n  
 
E)  p = n + 1 
 





17) Each of the 6 faces of a certain cube is labeled either R or S. When the cube is 
tossed, the probability of the cube landing with an R face up is 
3
1 .How many faces 
are labeled R? 
 





Attitudes Toward Mathematics Inventory (Tapia & Marsh, 2004) 
This inventory consists of statements about your attitude toward mathematics.  There are 
no correct or incorrect responses.  Read each item carefully.  Please think about how you 
feel about each item.  Circle the letter that most closely corresponds to how the 
statements best describes your feelings.  Use the following response scale to respond to 
each item. Your responses are confidential. 






1) Mathematics is a very worthwhile and necessary subject.   A      B      C      D      E 
2) I want to develop my mathematical skills. A      B      C      D      E 
3) I get a great deal of satisfaction out of solving a mathematics problem. A      B      C      D      E 
4) Mathematics helps develop the mind and teaches a person to think. A      B      C      D      E 
5) Mathematics is important in everyday life. A      B      C      D      E 
6) Mathematics is one of the most important subjects for people to study. A      B      C      D      E 
7) High school math courses would be very helpful no matter what I decide to study. A      B      C      D      E 
8) I can think of many ways that I use math outside of school. A      B      C      D      E 
9) Mathematics is one of my most dreaded subjects. A      B      C      D      E 
10) My mind goes blank and I am unable to think clearly when working with 
mathematics. 
A      B      C      D      E 
11) Studying mathematics makes me feel nervous. A      B      C      D      E 
12) Mathematics makes me feel uncomfortable. A      B      C      D      E 
13) I am always under a terrible strain in a math class. A      B      C      D      E 
14) When I hear the word mathematics, I have a feeling of dislike. A      B      C      D      E 
15) It makes me nervous to even think about having to do a mathematics problem. A      B      C      D      E 
16) Mathematics does not scare me at all. A      B      C      D      E 
17) I have a lot of self-confidence when it comes to mathematics A      B      C      D      E 
18) I am able to solve mathematics problems without too much difficulty A      B      C      D      E 
19)  I expect to do fairly well in any math class I take. A      B      C      D      E 
20) I am always confused in my mathematics class. A      B      C      D      E 
21) I feel a sense of insecurity when attempting mathematics. A      B      C      D      E 
22) I learn mathematics easily. A      B      C      D      E 
23) I am confident that I could learn advanced mathematics. A      B      C      D      E 
24) I have usually enjoyed studying mathematics in school. A      B      C      D      E 
25) Mathematics is dull and boring. A      B      C      D      E 
26) I like to solve new problems in mathematics A      B      C      D      E 
27)  I would prefer to do an assignment in math than to write an essay. A      B      C      D      E 
28) I would like to avoid using mathematics in college. A      B      C      D      E 
29) I really like mathematics. A      B      C      D      E 
30) I am happier in a math class than in any other class. A      B      C      D      E 
31) Mathematics is a very interesting subject. A      B      C      D      E 
32) I am willing to take more than the required amount of mathematics. A      B      C      D      E 
33) I plan to take as much mathematics as I can during my education. A      B      C      D      E 
34) The challenge of math appeals to me. A      B      C      D      E 
35) I think studying advanced mathematics is useful. A      B      C      D      E 
36) I believe studying math helps me with problem solving in other areas. A      B      C      D      E 
37) I am comfortable expressing my own ideas on how to look for solutions to a difficult 
problem in math. 
A      B      C      D      E 
38) I am comfortable answering questions in math class. A      B      C      D      E 
39) A strong math background could help me in my professional life. A      B      C      D      E 
40) I believe I am good at solving math problems. A      B      C      D      E 
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APPENDIX O 
Metacognitive Awareness Inventory (Schraw & Dennison, 1994) 
We would like you to respond to the following questions by indicating how true or false 
each statement is about you. There are no correct or incorrect responses.  Read each item 
carefully.  Please think about how you feel about each item.  Circle the letter that most 
closely corresponds to how the statements best describes your feelings.  Use the following 
response scale to respond to each item. Your responses are confidential. 
 






1) I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals. A      B      C      D      E 
2) I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer. A      B      C      D      E 
3) I try to use strategies that have worked in the past. A      B      C      D      E 
4) I pace myself while learning in order to have enough time. A      B      C      D      E 
5) I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses. A      B      C      D      E 
6) I think about what I really need to learn before I begin a task. A      B      C      D      E 
7) I know how well I did once I finish a test. A      B      C      D      E 
8) I set specific goals before I begin a task.  
9) I slow down when I encounter important information. A      B      C      D      E 
10) I know what kind of information is most important to learn. A      B      C      D      E 
11) I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a problem. A      B      C      D      E 
12) I am good at organizing information. A      B      C      D      E 
13) I consciously focus my attention on important information. A      B      C      D      E 
14) I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use. A      B      C      D      E 
15) I learn best when I know something about the topic. A      B      C      D      E 
16) I know what the teacher expects me to learn. A      B      C      D      E 
17) I am good at remembering information. A      B      C      D      E 
18) I use different learning strategies depending on the situation. A      B      C      D      E 
19) I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a task. A      B      C      D      E 
20) I have control over how well I learn. A      B      C      D      E 
21) I periodically review to help me understand important    relationships. A      B      C      D      E 
22) I ask myself questions about the material before I begin. A      B      C      D      E 
23) I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one. A      B      C      D      E 
24) I summarize what I've learned after I finish. A      B      C      D      E 
25) I ask others for help when I don't understand something. A      B      C      D      E 
26) I can motivate myself to learn when I need to. A      B      C      D      E 
27) I am aware of what strategies I use when I study. A      B      C      D      E 
28) I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I study. A      B      C      D      E 
29) I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses. A      B      C      D      E 
30) I focus on the meaning and significance of new information. A      B      C      D      E 
31) I create my own examples to make information more   meaningful. A      B      C      D      E 
32) I am a good judge of how well I understand something. A      B      C      D      E 
33) I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically. A      B      C      D      E 
34) I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension. A      B      C      D      E 
35) I know when each strategy I use will be most effective. A      B      C      D      E 
36) I ask myself how well I accomplished my goals once I'm finished. A      B      C      D      E 
37) I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while learning. A      B      C      D      E 
38) I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem. A      B      C      D      E 
39) I try to translate new information into my own words. A      B      C      D      E 
40) I change strategies when I fail to understand. A      B      C      D      E 
41) I use the organizational structure of the text to help me learn. A      B      C      D      E 
42) I read instructions carefully before I begin a task. A      B      C      D      E 
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We would like you to respond to the following questions by indicating how true or false 
each statement is about you. There are no correct or incorrect responses.  Read each item 
carefully.  Please think about how you feel about each item.  Circle the letter that most 
closely corresponds to how the statements best describes your feelings.  Use the following 
response scale to respond to each item. Your responses are confidential. 
 






43) I ask myself if what I'm reading is related to what I already know. A      B      C      D      E 
44) I re-evaluate my assumptions when I get confused. A      B      C      D      E 
45) I organize my time to best accomplish my goals. A      B      C      D      E 
46) I learn more when I am interested in the topic. A      B      C      D      E 
47) I try to break studying down into smaller steps. A      B      C      D      E 
48) I focus on overall meaning rather than specifics. A      B      C      D      E 
49) I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something new. A      B      C      D      E 
50) I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a task. A      B      C      D      E 
51) I stop and go back over new information that is not clear. A      B      C      D      E 
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